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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Post-Earthquake Performance Assessment and Decision-Making for Tall Buildings: 
Integrating Statistical Modeling, Machine Learning, Stochastic Simulation and Optimization 
by 
Yu Zhang   
Doctor of Philosophy in Civil Engineering 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019 
Professor Henry J Burton, Chair 
 
With the embrace of the seismic resilience concept as a measure of the ability of constructed facilities and 
communities to contain the effects of an earthquake and achieve a timely recovery, the critical role of tall buildings 
in supporting community functionality, has been brought to the forefront. This study presents a series of 
frameworks for performing post-earthquake assessment and optimal decision-making for tall buildings. A 
machine learning framework to assess structural safety is first proposed and applied to a low-rise frame building. 
A similar methodology is then adapted for tall buildings, while incorporating robust techniques to deal with the 
high-dimension feature space that arises because of the large number of structural components. Seismic risk 
assessment is then carried out for the tall building by comparing the time-dependent probability of exceeding 
various response demand limits over a pre-defined period considering both mainshock-only and mainshock-
aftershock hazard. The risk-based consistency of the limit state acceptance criteria for engineering demand 
parameters is also examined. Finally, a methodology to support optimal decision-making following the mainshock 
is developed with the goal of minimizing expected financial losses and, at the same time, ensuring life safety. The 
proposed prediction model, risk assessment methodology and optimal decision-making strategy can provide 
critical insights into the seismic performance of mainshock-damaged tall buildings and inform the post-earthquake 
actions of occupants, structural engineers, insurance companies and policymakers. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and Background 
For the most part, seismic design codes and guidelines are established with the intent of 
ensuring the most critical performance objective, which is preventing loss of life or life-
threatening injury to building occupants, when a rare seismic event occurs. Recently, the 
ASCE/SEI 7-10 Standard [1], International Building Code [2] and National Earthquake 
Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) Provisions have consistently adopted the hazard level 
of 2% in 50 years as the Maximum Considered Earthquake (MCE), and updated the 
performance objective from life safety to collapse prevention [3], which is achieved by an 
upper bound of 10% collapse probability. However, they are still limited to one desired 
building performance objective under a specific hazard level, even though events such as the 
1994 Northridge and 1995 Kobe earthquakes have highlighted the need for more robust design 
and evaluation procedures. While these events resulted in a relatively low number of fatalities 
or injuries, meeting the desired code-based performance, high levels of both structural and 
nonstructural damage led to 1) significant economic losses, 2) severe disruption to residential 
and commercial building functionality and 3) weakening of the local competitiveness and 
attractiveness of the affected communities.  
In addition to code-based design, an alternative design procedure derived from 
Performance-Based Earthquake Engineering (PBEE) has been widely used, especially for 
special and tall buildings. PBEE provides a more encompassing design and evaluation 
approach that takes into consideration multiple performance objectives conditioned on a series 
of earthquake hazard levels. Three documents including SEAOC Vision 2000 [4], ATC 40 [5], 
and FEMA 273/274 [6] have laid the foundation for the first-generation PBEE [7], where 
multiple performance objectives such as Immediate Occupancy (IO), Life Safety (LS) and 
Collapse Prevention (CP) are derived from component-level Engineering Demand Parameters 
(EDPs). Despite its remarkable accomplishments, the first-generation PBEE had several 
shortcomings: 1) EDPs are mainly obtained by static analysis; 2) the relationship between 
EDPs and component performance are not validated by test data; 3) the overall building 
performance is assumed to be equal to the worst component performance [8].  
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To overcome these shortcomings, the Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research (PEER) 
Center formalized a more robust global framework for the second-generation PBEE based on 
probability theory. Four discrete analysis steps, i.e., 1) hazard analysis, 2) 
structural/nonstructural analysis, 3) damage analysis, and 4) loss analysis, are characterized by 
corresponding mathematical variables including Intensity Measure (IM), EDP, Damage 
Measure (DM), and Decision Variable (DV). The total probability theorem is employed to 
integrate across the various analysis steps: Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) is 
conducted for a given site, followed by NRHAs performed at different IMs to obtain the 
corresponding EDPs, which are then related to both structural and nonstructural component 
DMs by fragility curves developed using test data and post-earthquake inspections. The final 
step involves translating the DMs to the expected DVs such as repair costs, downtime, injuries, 
and fatalities.  
Many tall buildings which are either newly completed or under construction and which 
have been developed through the application of PBEE, could be found throughout the cities on 
the US west coast, such as Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego. For 
tall buildings, one of the most popular lateral resisting systems has been the reinforced concrete 
(RC) shear wall, which in some cases is used in conjunction with steel or RC special moment 
frames (SMFs). 
More recently, with the embrace of the seismic resilience concept as a measure of the 
ability of building facilities and communities to contain the effects of an earthquake and 
achieve a timely recovery, the critical role of tall buildings in minimizing the impact on 
community functionality has been brought to the forefront (e.g. in the 2010-2011 Canterbury 
earthquake sequence). Although with limited fatalities or injuries, the central business district 
was severely disrupted. A large area in the downtown area was cordoned off mainly due to the 
risk of aftershock collapse and falling debris from several mid- and high-rise buildings, which 
were extensively damaged and subsequently slated for demolition. Moreover, local authorities 
mandated the closure of surrounding streets during the demolition of these buildings [9]. 
Although the overall Canterbury economy proved to be reasonably resilient to the impact of 
the earthquakes, some sectors such as retail, accommodation, and hospitality were hard hit. 
International visitor numbers are sharply down, and there was even some population loss from 
Christchurch [10]. While recent studies on mainshock-aftershock seismic performance 
assessment [32,86,87] have advanced our understanding of the additional seismic risk to 
buildings posed by aftershocks, none-to-date have focused on high-rise buildings, which are 
  
 
 
3 
typically designed using alternative (or performance-based) procedures. Moreover, the 
uncertainty in the seismic hazard (mainshock and aftershock) and the time-dependent building 
structural damage following the mainshock also need to be appropriately considered in the 
seismic risk assessment. 
The physical size and concentration of people and services in tall buildings is such that 
their seismic performance has strong implications for the resilience of the urban environments 
that they occupy. As such, quantifying their seismic performance using resilience-based 
metrics is crucial to understanding their role in ensuring continued functionality of large city 
centers following a hazard event. While resilience-based assessment employs a similar 
approach to the current PBEE framework, a greater emphasis is placed on post-earthquake 
safety, functionality, and recovery. A resilience-assessment frame developed by Burton et al. 
[11] uses specific recovery paths which are explicitly linked to the following building 
performance limit states: 1) damage triggering inspection, 2) occupiable damage with loss of 
functionality, 3) unoccupiable damage, 4) irreparable damage, and 5) collapse. These building-
level limit states are different from those used in the current version of the PBEE framework, 
where component-level DMs are primarily used.  
The Burton et al. methodology points to the need for an objective and scientific 
methodology for mapping the EDPs and component-level DMs obtained from the structural 
and damage analysis in PBEE to building-level performance. To decide whether a damaged 
building is safe to occupy, existing studies and guidelines [12,13] primarily use subjective 
engineering judgment to relate EDPs and component DMs to building level performance. 
Although some practices have been carried out using basic statistical methods for low- and 
mid-rise buildings, further improvements are still needed. When it comes to the building-level 
performance assessment of the tall buildings, even fewer researches are available. 
Finally, it is important that the results from previously mentioned analyses can be 
effectively used to help the decision-making process in the aftershock environment. The actions 
during a time window of interest after the mainshock and their corresponding consequences, 
in terms of both financial gains/losses and fatality losses, need be optimized. 
1.2 Objectives 
The current seismic codes, guidelines, and research have increased our preparedness for a 
major seismic event in the future such that life safety is guaranteed, and the financial losses are 
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limited. However, there are other critical questions related to the post-earthquake environment 
that have only been partially answered or not answered at all.  
1. Despite the widely used judgment-based tagging procedure, can we provide answers 
with robust statistical support for one of the most important questions right after a 
major seismic event, “is it safe to stay in the building”?  
2. How safe is safe-enough? Can we define and quantify the safety of a damaged building? 
What is the best indicator of post-earthquake structural safety? 
3. If various monitoring and inspection data from a damaged building are available, is it 
possible to integrate them together to better estimate the current state of the building? 
How do we trust the estimate?   
4. If we have a methodology that works for a simple low-rise building, can it be used for 
tall buildings? If not, what changes are needed?  
5. If someone is not satisfied with the simple answer of safe and unsafe, can we provide 
more details and let he/she make his/her own decision? 
6. What can we do if some important information is missing but we still want to maintain 
the accuracy of our evaluation? 
7. We know that a mainshock could be followed by a series of potential aftershocks. Could 
they make things worse? Can we consider aftershocks when designing a building?  
8. A major earthquake just happened, and the building was strong enough to survive it. 
What shall we do now given that an aftershock could occur any time soon?  
The objectives of the current study are to answer these critical questions and provide 
helpful solutions at the building level after a major seismic event. 
1.3 Organization and Outline  
This study consists of a total of seven chapters. Starting with the introduction in Chapter 1 
and ending with the summary in Chapter 7, the main body covers 5 distinct yet closely related 
chapters, of which most are adopted from published research papers by the author.  
Chapter 2 outlines a machine learning framework to assess post-earthquake structural 
safety. The concepts of response and damage patterns are introduced and incorporated into a 
systematic methodology for generating a robust dataset for any damaged building. Incremental 
dynamic analysis using sequential ground motions is used to evaluate the residual collapse 
capacity of the damaged structure. Machine learning algorithms are used to map response and 
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damage patterns to the structural safety state (safe or unsafe to occupy) of the building based 
on an acceptable threshold of residual collapse capacity. Predictive models including 
classification and regression tree and Random Forests are used to probabilistically identify the 
structural safety state of an earthquake-damaged building. The proposed framework is applied 
to a 4-story reinforced concrete special moment frame building. 
Chapter 3 presents the structural modeling, probabilistic seismic hazard analysis and 
ground motion selection of tall buildings with core walls and special moment frames and lays 
the foundation for the analyses in the following chapters. 
Chapter 4 extends the framework discussed in Chapter 2 to tall buildings with special focus 
on the high dimensional feature space. A pattern recognition approach is proposed to 
quantitatively assess the residual structural capacity of earthquake-damaged tall buildings. 
Sequential NRHAs using as-recorded mainshock-aftershock ground motions are conducted to 
generate distinct feature patterns comprised of spatially distributed global and local EDPs 
within the tall building. Residual structural capacity is assessed based on the median spectral 
intensity corresponding to the collapse prevention performance level. Correlation-based 
filtering and feature selection using Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selector Operator (LASSO) 
is performed to effectively reduce the high dimensional feature space while selecting the most 
informative ones. The features that survive the filtering but excluded by LASSO are reserved 
and grouped based on their correlations with those that are selected. These reserved features 
can be utilized when the selected ones are unavailable. Predictive models using Support Vector 
Machine are constructed to map the EDP-based features to the residual structural capacity of 
the tall building. 
Chapter 5 presents a seismic risk assessment of a 42-story reinforced concrete dual-system 
building considering mainshock and aftershock hazard. Sequential NRHAs are also performed. 
Aftershock assessment describes the case where the mainshock has occurred and the associated 
damaged state of the building is known. A Markov process model is used to integrate the 
increase in vulnerability of the mainshock-damaged building with the time-dependent 
aftershock hazard. Aftershock risk is quantified as the probability of exceeding the structural 
response demand limits used in performance-based seismic design of tall buildings at different 
instants in time following the mainshock. The same metric is used to quantify mainshock-
aftershock risk, however, for this type of assessment, the uncertainty in the intensity and 
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damage caused by both the mainshock and aftershock is considered. The results of mainshock-
only, aftershock and mainshock-aftershock assessment are compared and discussed. 
Chapter 6 seeks to support optimal decision-making in the aftershock environment by 
integrating the time-dependent Markov Process-based methodology developed in Chapter 5 
with dynamic programming. The objective is to minimize the expected total financial loss from 
various sources such as structural and nonstructural component damage, fatalities due to 
collapse, functionality disruption, and repair cost. The expected cumulative loss within a 
certain time window of interest is obtained by summing up the discounted values of all the 
potential losses in the future. In addition to the fatality loss, a safety constraint is defined based 
on the transition probability into unsafe damage states to ensure life safety. The transition from 
a higher damage state to a lower one (due to repair actions), which is previously excluded in 
Chapter 5, is also considered in this chapter. Two sets of actions after the mainshock are 
considered at any time point: 1) whether to evacuate the building and when to reoccupy the 
building if it is previously evacuated and 2) whether to repair the building and when to start  to 
start and stop the repairs (assuming that the building had been restored to a satisfactory state). 
Dynamic Programming is then performed to find the optimal actions throughout the time period 
of interest Sensitivity analyses are carried out to quantify the impact of the key parameters on 
the decision-making, including time window, safety threshold, fatality loss, disruption loss, 
and repair cost. 
Chapter 7 summarizes all the key findings of the previous chapters, discusses the 
limitations of the current work and provides potential directions that could improve the 
proposed frameworks, methodologies and practices. 
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 CHAPTER 2: Machine Learning Framework for Assessing 
Post-Earthquake Structural Safety 
This chapter is adopted from the following study: 
Zhang, Y., Burton, H. V., Sun, H., & Shokrabadi, M. (2018). A machine learning 
framework for assessing post-earthquake structural safety. Structural Safety, 72, 1-16. 
2.1 Introduction 
Assessing building structural and nonstructural component-level damage is a key step in 
the performance-based earthquake engineering (PBEE) framework [4–6,8,14–17]. Component 
damage characterization serves as the link between building structural response and the 
performance metrics (death, dollars, and downtime) that are relevant to end-users. More 
recently, the importance of building-level limit states has been highlighted due to the growing 
emphasis on quantifying seismic resilience at the individual infrastructure and community 
scales [18,19]. Iervolino [20] defined post-earthquake building-level limit states based on the 
level of functionality (relative to before the event) that a damaged structure could support 
following an earthquake. These limit states were used to model the probabilistic recovery of 
functionality using state- and time-dependent Markov Chains. In the assessment of the seismic 
resilience of a residential community, Burton et al. [11] proposed a set of building-level limit 
states, which are explicitly linked to post-earthquake recovery and functionality. Fragility 
curves were developed to link ground shaking intensity to the probability of exceedance of 
these limit states, which include functional loss, unsafe to occupy, demolition and collapse. 
Building-level limit states have also been used for lifecycle seismic performance assessment 
and optimization for structures, where retrofit strategies, repair cost, time and salvage value are 
considered [21].  
Post-earthquake structural safety is key to determining whether a damaged building is safe 
to re-occupy, which is one of the key pieces of information needed by stakeholders immediately 
after an earthquake. ATC-20 [22,23] provides guidelines for post-earthquake visual inspection 
to rapidly evaluate building structural safety and assign corresponding green, yellow and red 
tags to buildings that are deemed safe to occupy, occupiable with restrictions and unsafe to 
occupy respectively. It has been widely used after U.S. earthquakes such as Loma Prieta, 
Landers, Northridge [23] and Hawaii [24] and adapted for use in many other countries around 
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the world. Building on the work of Porter et al. [16], Mitrani-Reiser [25] used fragility curves 
to map continuous EDPs to discrete component-level damage states that have similar 
descriptions to the ones used in ATC-20. A “virtual inspector” was then used to 
probabilistically estimate building safety and assign corresponding tags based on the criteria in 
the first two tiers of an ATC-20 evaluation. The Mitrani-Reiser methodology was adopted in 
FEMA P58 [12,13] using a slightly different approach to link component-level damage to the 
likelihood that a building will be assigned an unsafe placard. For each structural and non-
structural element, the median fraction of components (based on the total number in the 
building or a single story) in a particular damage state is estimated. The damaged building is 
assigned an unsafe placard if any of these values exceed a pre-defined triggering ratio. For 
example, the unsafe placard for steel special concentrically braced frames with wide flange 
braces could be triggered by any of the three scenarios: more than 60% of the components are 
in damage state 2 (brace has lost significant axial capacity), more than 40% of the components 
are in damage state 3 (brace and gusset are severely damaged with significant loss in stiffness 
and resistance), and more than 20% of the components are in damage state 4 (brace or gusset 
have fractured). It is important to note that the triggering ratios in FEMA-P58 are largely based 
on judgement and are not explicitly linked to the reduction in collapse safety of the damaged 
building. 
Incremental dynamic analysis (IDA) [26–28] has been widely used to probabilistically 
assess the most critical building-level limit state of collapse. More recently, the reduction in 
the collapse capacity of mainshock damaged buildings has been used as a metric for assessing 
the post-earthquake structural safety and occupiability of damaged buildings. IDAs are 
performed using sequential ground motions to quantify the reduction in collapse capacity. 
Maffei et al. [29,30] proposed four post-earthquake occupiability criteria, which differ based 
on the metric used to quantify the reduction in collapse safety of the damaged building. Yeo 
and Cornell [31] used the time-varying aftershock hazard at a given site to compute an 
equivalent constant collapse rate, which decreases with time after the occurrence of the 
mainshock. The time-varying tagging scenarios are established based on the evolving collapse 
risk in the aftershock environment. The time-dependent tag could be changed from red to 
yellow and even green as time elapses. In the Maffei et al. and Yeo and Cornell studies, no 
direct link was made between component-level damage and the safety state of the building. 
Raghunandan et al. [32] quantified the increase in vulnerability to collapse of mainshock-
damaged modern ductile reinforced concrete (RC) special moment frame (SMF) buildings. 
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They also evaluated the extent to which different system- (transient and residual story drifts) 
and component-level damage indicators (e.g. beam and column plastic rotation) can serve as a 
proxy for the reduced collapse capacity. Single variable linear regression was used to link 
individual damage indicators to the residual collapse capacity. Burton and Deierlein [33] 
extended the Mitrani-Reiser and FEMA P58 approach by explicitly linking the component-
level damage ratios that trigger an unsafe placard to the increase in collapse risk of the damaged 
building. However, the interaction between damage indicators was not considered in either of 
these two (Raghunandan et al., and Burton and Deierlein) studies. 
Presented in this chapter is a novel approach to assessing post-earthquake structural safety. 
Central to the newly proposed methodology is a machine learning framework for mapping 
building response and observable damage patterns to the residual collapse capacity of the 
structure, which is used as the criterion for assessing its safety state. The term “response 
pattern” is used to describe the distribution of peak global (e.g. residual and transient drifts) 
and local response (component deformations) demands obtained from NRHA. Similarly, the 
term “damage pattern” describes the distribution of observable states of physical damage to 
key structural components obtained from damage simulation. Machine learning algorithms 
including classification and regression tree (CART) and Random Forests are used to build 
predictive models, which can probabilistically identify the post-earthquake structural safety 
state of the building based on its residual collapse capacity, given any unique response or 
damage pattern. To illustrate the overall methodology, a case study is conducted using a 4-
story RC SMF building. Several applications are envisioned for the proposed framework. The 
model can be embedded in an electronic tool that can be used to supplement the judgment of 
field inspectors conducting post-earthquake building safety assessments. Observations of the 
distribution of component-level damage (or damage pattern) can serve as inputs into the model, 
which will provide probabilistic predictions of the safety state based on the reduced collapse 
capacity. For buildings instrumented to record, process and transmit structural response 
demands, the machine learning algorithm can be used to provide preliminary rapid estimates 
of the safety state of the building. The methodology can also be used to generate fragility curves 
for the “unsafe to occupy” building-level limit state, which can be incorporated into building 
or community resilience and lifecycle performance assessments and optimization. 
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2.2 Post-Earthquake Structural Safety Assessment 
2.2.1 Overview of Methodology 
A schematic overview of the methodology used to assess post-earthquake structural safety 
is shown in Fig. 2-1. Starting with an intact structure, five distinct yet fully integrated steps are 
used to illustrate the assessment framework. The outcome of this assessment is the predicted 
structural safety state conditioned on the structural response demands (from instrumentation) 
and/or available observed physical damage (through field inspections). 
The first step describes the process of using a set of  “damaging” ground motions to create 
samples of the damaged structure from which response and damage patterns will be extracted. 
The response patterns or distribution of EDPs is obtained directly from NRHA. Subjecting the 
intact structure to a single damaging ground motion scaled to a specific spectral intensity will 
produce a single distinct response pattern. Multiple response patterns with different levels and 
distributions of response demands are obtained by using a suite of damaging ground motions 
scaled to incrementally increasing spectral intensities. Damage patterns are simulated using 
structural component damage fragility functions which relate local EDPs to the probability of 
exceeding a given damage state. A single damage pattern is described by each structural 
component assigned a single discrete damage state. Monte Carlo Simulation is used to generate 
multiple damage patterns for single ground motion and spectral intensity. More details on 
generating the response and damage patterns and their relationship to the safety state of the 
building are provided in Section 2.3. 
The collapse capacity of the damaged structure is assessed through the application of IDAs 
using sequential ground motions in the second step (Step 2). Each damaging record, which is 
used as the first ground motion in the sequence, is followed by an IDA using a set of 
“collapsing” ground motions. The median first-mode spectral acceleration corresponding to the 
collapse point (?̂?𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑙,𝐷𝑀𝐺) is used as the measure of residual collapse safety of the damaged 
building. In the third step, the collapse capacity of the intact structure is assessed by conducting 
single-record IDAs using the collapsing ground motions. The median collapse capacity 
(?̂?𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑙,𝐼𝑁𝑇) is also used as the measure of collapse safety for the intact structure. Note that the 
dispersion or log-standard deviation of the collapse capacities, 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑙,𝐷𝑀𝐺and 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑙,𝐼𝑁𝑇, are also 
obtained but not directly used. The ratio of ?̂?𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑙,𝐷𝑀𝐺 to ?̂?𝑎𝑐𝑜𝑙,𝐼𝑁𝑇 (𝜅) is used as a quantitative 
measure of the increased collapse vulnerability or the reduction in the collapse capacity of the 
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damaged structure. The damaged building is classified as safe or unsafe to occupy by 
comparing 𝜅 to a pre-established threshold (𝜅𝑚𝑖𝑛), which represents the minimum acceptable 
reduction in collapse safety. 
The fourth step uses 1) the response and damage patterns generated in step 1 and 2) their 
associated post-earthquake structural safety states determined based on the reduction in 
collapse safety (comparing 𝜅 to 𝜅𝑚𝑖𝑛) obtained from steps 2 and 3 to establish a classification 
problem. The machine learning algorithm is then used to construct predictive models. 
Subsequently, any arbitrary response and/or damage pattern can be used to probabilistically 
predict the safety state of an earthquake-damaged structure (Step 5). 
 
Fig. 2-1. Schematic of post-earthquake structural safety assessment methodology 
2.2.2 Establishing Post-Earthquake Safety State Criteria 
As noted in Section 2.1, the reduction in the collapse capacity of the damaged structure (as 
defined by 𝜅) is used as the basis for assessing its post-earthquake safety state. For each of the 
damaging ground motions, ten incrementally-increasing maximum story drift ratio (𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺) 
levels are targeted, ranging from 0.5% to 5% at increments of 0.5%. These 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺 values serve 
as proxies for the possible states of building damage under a damaging ground motion. The 
number and increment of 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺 used to generate the response and damage patterns is selected 
to balance the need to cover a broad range of damage levels and the computational expense 
associated with performing IDA to collapse of the damaged structure (described in step 2). Fig. 
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2-2 shows a series of IDA plots for the intact structure and three instances of the damaged 
structure for the 4-story RC SMF building used to illustrate the methodology. The design, 
modeling and ground motion details are provided in Section 3.1. Fig. 2-2 (a) shows that the 
median collapse capacity for the intact building, which was obtained by applying IDAs using 
the collapsing ground motions, is 1.20g. Fig. 2-2 (b), (c) and (d) show IDA plots for the 
damaged structure generated using a single damaging ground motion scaled to produce 
𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺values of 2%, 3.5% and 5% respectively. Note that, for the damaged structure, the 
PSDR corresponding to a collapsing ground motion spectral acceleration level (𝑆𝑎𝑇1) of zero 
is the same as the residual drift demand from the damaging ground motion. As expected, the 
median collapse capacity decreases as 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺 increases. For example, the median collapse 
capacity is 1.12g (𝜅 = 0.93)  when 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺 = 2%  and reduces to 0.43g (𝜅 = 0.36)  when 
𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺 = 5%. 
  
(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
  
 
 
13 
Fig. 2-2. Example IDAs using safety-testing ground motions for the (a) intact building 
and the building damaged by damage-generating ground motions with PSDR of (b) 0.01, (c) 
0.03 and (d) 0.05 
For each damaging ground motion, log-normal collapse fragility curves are fitted for the ten 
target damage levels, while accounting for record-to-record variability and structural modeling 
uncertainty [12,13]. Examples of these fragility curves and the relationship between 𝜅 and 
𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺 for a single damaging ground motion are shown in Fig. 2-3. It shows that there is no 
measurable reduction in collapse safety until 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺 = 2%, where 𝜅 drops to 0.92, after which 
𝜅  decreases almost linearly with 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺 . The results shown in Fig. 2-3 (b) confirms the 
effectiveness of 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺as a proxy for the severity of structural damage. Moreover, only for this 
specific damaging ground motion, it appears that 𝜅 corresponding to 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺 = 2%might be an 
appropriate minimum threshold (𝜅𝑚𝑖𝑛) to distinguish the safe and unsafe structural states. 
Further discussion of this issue is presented later in this section. 
  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 2-3. Example (a) collapse fragility curves and (b) median 𝜅 versus PSDR under the 
DG ground motion 
Establishing an acceptable value of 𝜅𝑚𝑖𝑛  is partly a policy decision and is not fully 
addressed in this study. However, as noted earlier, the observed trend between 𝜅  and 
𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺can inform the choice of 𝜅𝑚𝑖𝑛. To further illustrate this point, Fig. 2-4 (a) shows a plot 
of 𝜅 and 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺that was generated by using a suite of damaging ground motions. The details 
of the damaging and collapsing ground motions used in this study are presented in Section 3. 
Fig. 2-4 (b) shows a statistical summary of the relationship shown in Fig. 2-3 (b) including 
plots based on the median (?̂?) and a 90% confidence interval for 𝜅. Here it can be observed 
that the absolute value of the slope of the median line remains roughly constant up to about 
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𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺 = 2%, after which there is a sharp increase.  Based on this observation, one approach 
could be to take 𝜅𝑚𝑖𝑛 to be the median value of 𝜅corresponding to 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺 = 2% in this study. 
Note however that, using this approach, there is a 50% probability that the value of 𝜅is less 
than 𝜅𝑚𝑖𝑛 (based on the definition of the median) at 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺 = 2%. An alternative approach is 
to choose a value of 𝜅 at 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺 = 2%that has a higher probability of being exceeded (e.g. 
90% probability that 𝜅 ≥ 𝜅𝑚𝑖𝑛). A third approach would be to consider the uncertainty in the 
safety state threshold by assuming a parametric (e.g. lognormal) probability distribution for 
𝜅𝑚𝑖𝑛and using the mean/median and dispersion corresponding to 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺 = 2%.  
  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 2-4. Median collapse capacity for (a) individual samples and (b) sample subsets by 
target damage levels 
2.2.3 Classified Structural Response and Damage Patterns 
As described in Section 2.1, structural response and damage patterns are used in 
combination with the safety states to construct the prediction model using an appropriate 
machine learning algorithm. Fig. 2-5 shows some examples of response patterns obtained from 
NRHA using the “damaging” ground motions and the corresponding safety state. The global 
response patterns include peak transient and residual SDRs throughout the building height [Fig. 
2-5 (a) and (b)]. Profiles of peak plastic hinge rotations in the frame beams and columns [Fig. 
2-5 (c) and (d)] are considered local response patterns. A single profile represents the response 
pattern for a single “damaging” ground motion and value of 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺. The response patterns are 
classified into the safe and unsafe states based on 𝜅𝑚𝑖𝑛 (median 𝜅 at 𝑆𝐷𝑅𝐷𝐺 = 2%) from Fig. 
2-4 (b). A noteworthy observation is that there is a clear demarcation between the peak and 
residual drift response patterns of the safe and unsafe states in the first two stories. However, 
in the upper stories, there is a fair amount of overlap between the response patterns of the two 
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safety states. A similar observation can be made for the response patterns based on the beam 
and column plastic hinge rotations. This observation highlights the importance of considering 
the spatial variation of EDPs (or response pattern) and not just the absolute maximum in the 
entire building in structural safety state assessment. 
  
(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
Fig. 2-5. Example response patterns of (a) peak and (b) residual SDRs, and peak plastic 
hinge rotations of exterior (c) beams and (d) columns 
Examples of safe and unsafe damage patterns for the beam hinges simulated using the peak 
plastic rotations in Fig. 2-5 (c) are shown in Fig. 2-6. Damage patterns are described by each 
element being assigned one of four discrete damage states, where state 0 represents no visual 
damage and state 3 represents the most severe damage requiring complete beam replacement. 
Comparing Fig. 2-6 (a) and (b), the damage pattern corresponding to the unsafe state has 8 
beam hinges in higher damage states, 10 in the same damage states and 5 in lower damage 
states. This observation again reinforces the need to consider the spatial distribution of physical 
damage (or damage patterns) to assess the severity of system-level damage and the 
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corresponding building safety state. The response and damage patterns in Fig. 2-5 and Fig. 2-6 
suggest that only a subset of the EDPs and damage states would significantly affect the 
structural safety states. It is important to recall that these results represent patterns obtained for 
a single damaging record and their spatial variation and severity could be very different for 
other distinct ground motions. A major advantage of the machine learning approach is the 
availability of powerful algorithms that can isolate the most critical response and damage points 
and establish more clear distinctions between the two safety states.  
  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 2-6. Example damage patterns at beam hinges for a structure classified as (a) safe 
and (b) unsafe    
2.2.4 Safety State Prediction using Machine Learning 
In a classification problem, machine learning algorithms utilize an observed dataset that is 
divided into a training subset, which is used to construct the predictive models, and testing 
subset, which is used to evaluate the performance of those models. Each observation has two 
attributes: a set of predictors and their associated classes. In this study, the response and damage 
patterns serve as the predictors, which are always assumed to be available. The structural safety 
states (safe or unsafe) serve as the corresponding binary categorical classes, which are assumed 
to be known for the training data and unknown for the testing data. 
2.2.4.1 Classification and Regression Tree 
CART is a machine learning algorithm that can be used to predict both categorical classes 
(classification tree) and ordered values (regression tree) [34]. This study is focused on 
categorical class prediction. By recursively partitioning the predictor space ( 𝑃 ), CART 
gradually explores and learns the structure of the observed dataset with the goal of creating 
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mutually exclusive subspaces with better purity. The ratio between the sample number of the 
dominant class, which is the one with the most samples, and the size of the subset, defines the 
purity of a subspace.  
Fig. 2-7 shows an example of a simple binary tree that is used to represent a CART. It 
comprises of a root node (node number 1 in Fig. 2-7), three interior nodes (numbered 2, 4 and 
8) and five leaf nodes (numbered 3, 5, 9, 16 and 17). Except for the root node which consists 
of the full sample space, each node represents a subspace of observed predictors and classes. 
Each interior (or decision) node is generated when a parent node is split into two child nodes 
based on the observed values of one of the predictors (𝑝 ∈ 𝑃). For example, the split at the root 
node is based on the damage state in one of the beam hinges (e.g. damage state ≤ 0.5 or > 0.5). 
The edges from a parent node to two child nodes represent a split (𝑠𝑝 ∈ 𝑆𝑝), where 𝑆𝑝 is the 
space of all the split points in predictor 𝑝 at the parent predictor. The simple tree shown in Fig. 
2-7 has a depth (the number of splits) of four and five leaf (terminal) nodes. Each leaf node 
provides a predicted class (𝑐 ∈ 𝐶), where 𝐶 is the space of all the classes under consideration, 
given the inputs of all the predictors represented by the complete path from the root to that leaf.  
 
Fig. 2-7. Example tree structure, where   
𝐹𝑖𝐵𝑗𝐻𝑘 denotes the damage states at Hinge 𝑘 of Beam 𝑗 at Floor 𝑖, and 𝑆𝑖𝐶𝑗𝐻𝑘 denotes the 
damage states at Hinge 𝑘 of Column 𝑗 in Story 𝑖. 
There are three main steps involved in building a CART model. First, the binary tree is 
grown following the greedy algorithm, which always tries to find a predictor, 𝑝, and its split 
point, 𝑠𝑝, that maximizes the purity (or minimizes the impurity) of the resulting subspaces. The 
Gini Index (𝐺𝐼) [34] is introduced as a measure of the impurity in Equation 2.1. 
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𝐺𝐼 = ∑ ∑ 𝜋𝑛𝜌𝑐(1 − 𝜌𝑐)
𝑐∈𝐶𝑛∈𝑁
= ∑ 𝜋𝑛(1 − ∑ 𝜌𝑐
2)
𝑐∈𝐶𝑛∈𝑁
 
(2.1) 
where 𝑁 is the set of all leaf nodes in a given tree; 𝜋𝑛 is the proportion of the dataset falling 
into a leaf node, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 , and 𝜌𝑐 denotes the probability of class 𝑐at a given node. For the 
predictors with ordered values such as the response patterns, each split point, 𝑠𝑝, creates a 
hyperplane perpendicular to the axis of the predictor, 𝑝, at location 𝑠𝑝, to divide the predictor 
subspace of the current parent node. For predictors defined by categorical classes, such as the 
damage patterns, each split point, 𝑠𝑝, partitions the predictor space into two sets of classes: one 
contains only a selected class 𝑐and the other consists of all other classes, (𝐶 − 𝑐). Starting with 
the root node, all the predictors are assembled and almost all their possible split points are 
tested by computing the 𝐺𝐼 for each split. The predictor and split point with the lowest 𝐺𝐼 is 
then used to create two child nodes. This process is repeated to recursively partition the dataset 
into subspaces with boundary surfaces parallel to the predictor axes.  
The second main step involves establishing an appropriate criterion for stopping the growth 
of the tree. Examples of stopping criteria include a minimum number of samples needed at a 
given node for the further split, a maximum tree depth, a limit on the total number of leaf nodes 
in a tree. An alternative stopping criterion that balances the tree size and its associated 𝐺𝐼 could 
be achieved by introducing a penalty term. The concept of cost-complexity tuning [34] is then 
adopted, which penalizes the 𝐺𝐼. 
𝐺𝐼 = ∑ 𝜋𝑛(1 − ∑ 𝜌𝑐
2)
𝑐∈𝐶𝑛∈𝑁
+ 𝑐𝑝|𝑁| 
(2.2) 
where 𝑐𝑝 is the complexity parameter and |𝑁|is the size of 𝑁 for the given tree. Equation 
2.2 stops the growth of the tree when the gain from reducing the overall impurity is not large 
enough to compensate for the cost of an excessively complex tree. It should be noted that the 
optimal value of 𝑐𝑝 could be very different for different datasets. If it is too large, the model 
will be unable to adequately capture the characteristics of the dataset. On the other hand, a 𝑐𝑝 
that is too small can lead to overfitting of the training data and have poor performance on the 
testing data. 
The third and final step involves pruning the tree to reduce the possibility of overfitting. 
This could be achieved by randomly selecting a hold-out set from the training data at the very 
beginning, passing it through the generated tree, and testing all splits from the bottom-up, 
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deleting those whose removals would reduce the overall impurity for the hold-out set. The 
pruning process continues recursively until there are no further improvements.  
2.2.4.2 Random Forests 
Although powerful, a CART is very sensitive to the specific dataset on which it is trained 
and is, therefore, a high-variance model. As a result, the tree and corresponding predictions 
generated for different subsets of the same training dataset could be quite different. This 
problem can be addressed by assembling bootstrap-sampled subsets of the training data. 
Bootstrap is a statistical technique that involves randomly sampling from a dataset to create a 
series of sub-datasets [35,36]. Each random sample is placed back into the original dataset such 
that multiple (or no) instances of a particular sample can be included in the sub-dataset. Based 
on these resampled datasets, bootstrap aggregation, also known as bagging [37], is an ensemble 
method, which seeks to achieve better predictions by combining multiple less accurate models. 
Bagging CART is used to train the predictive models using all these resampled datasets and 
generate aggregated predictions by using the prediction that is generated by the majority of 
models. 
While bagging addresses some of the limitations of a basic CART model, the method still 
has an inherent defect that prevents it from producing the optimal predictive model. Bagging 
CART can result in highly correlated tree structures due to the application of the greedy 
algorithm, where all of the original predictors are considered at every split of every tree [38]. 
In order to overcome this problem, the Random Forests [39] algorithm was developed with a 
modification to Bagging to reduce such tree correlation. At each split point during the growth 
of the tree, Random Forests only applies the greedy algorithm to a randomly selected 
proportion of the original predictors.   
2.2.4.3 Evaluating the Performance of the Prediction Model 
Since the unsafe state is unfavorable and critical, it is defined in this study as the “positive 
class” while the safe state as the “negative class”. This section introduces some important 
performance measures, which are used for testing and selecting the predictive models built 
using different machine learning algorithms and corresponding tuning parameters.  
The sensitivity or true positive rate is defined as the proportion of the unsafe (positive) 
samples in the testing dataset that are also predicted to be unsafe. The specificity of a prediction 
model, which is also referred to as the true negative rate, is expressed as the proportion of 
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known safe (negative) samples that are correctly predicted. The accuracy, which combines the 
sensitivity and specificity, is computed as the ratio between the sum of all the true positive and 
true negative samples and the number of the total samples. The false positive rate represents 
the proportion of the safe samples which are recognized as unsafe by the predictive model and 
is equal to one minus the specificity. More importantly, the false negative rate measures how 
many of the unsafe samples are misclassified as safe by the predictive model. This is the most 
unfavorable situation as it poses the highest risk to injury or fatality of the building occupants 
and therefore needs to be carefully maintained at an acceptably low rate. 
The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) describes the relationship between sensitivity 
and specificity [40,41]. The discrimination threshold of the ROC, which can take on a 
numerical value between 0 to 1, is used to relate the probability distribution of the safety state 
to a single state. A sample is classified as unsafe if the probability of being positive obtained 
from the predictive model is larger or equal to this threshold; otherwise, the safe classification 
is assigned. A threshold of 0 guarantees the maximum sensitivity because all the samples are 
predicted to be unsafe and 1 provides the best specificity because it produces only safe 
predictions. When the threshold increases, the sensitivity drops while the specificity grows. A 
ROC curve is obtained by incrementally varying the discrimination threshold from 0 to 1 and 
plotting its corresponding sensitivity and specificity. The area under the ROC curve is then 
used as a balanced measurement of the performance of a particular model. 
K-fold cross-validation is a resampling technique that is also used to reduce possible 
overfitting and select the optimal tuning parameters for a predictive model [36]. The initial 
sample space is partitioned into 𝑘 roughly equally-sized subsets, and a model is trained using 
all but one held-out subset, which is used to assess the model performance [38]. This procedure 
is repeated 𝑘  times by holding out the subsets one at a time and fitting the model to the 
remaining (𝑘 − 1)  subsets. The overall performance for these 𝑘  resampled datasets is 
evaluated for each predictive model with specific tuning parameters, such as the complexity 
parameter for CART, the number of total trees and number of randomly selected predictors to 
choose from at each split for Random Forests. The k-fold cross-validation procedure could also 
be repeated using a different set of partitioned subsamples to further reduce possible bias from 
the partition.   
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2.3 Case Study: Post-Earthquake Structural Safety of A Modern Reinforced 
Concrete Special Moment-Frame Building 
2.3.1 Building Description, Ground Motion Selection, Structural Modeling, and 
Response Simulation 
The post-earthquake structural safety of a 4-story perimeter frame building is assessed to 
demonstrate the proposed framework. This building was developed by Haselton et al. [42] 
(identified with building design ID 1013) as part of a larger study on the seismic collapse safety 
of modern code conforming reinforced concrete moment frame buildings. The building was 
designed according to the provisions of the International Building Code [2], ASCE 7-02 [1], 
and ACI 318 [43], which includes requirements for strength, stiffness, capacity design, and 
detailing. The building has an 8-in flat slab floor system with a square plan of 120𝑓𝑡 by 120𝑓𝑡. 
A height of 15𝑓𝑡 is used for the first story and 13𝑓𝑡 for all the upper stories. The seismic design 
is based on the mapped hazard for a Los Angeles site with 𝑆𝑆 = 1.5𝑔, 𝑆1 = 0.6𝑔, and soil site 
class D. 
A two-dimensional model of the three-bay moment frame is built in OpenSees [44] (Fig. 
2-8) using expected gravity loads (𝐷 + 0.25𝐿). A leaning column is used to account for P-
Delta effects resulting from the loads on the gravity system, which is not explicitly modeled. 
The leaning column is axially rigid, provides no lateral restraint and the horizontal translational 
degrees of freedom of the end nodes are constrained to the floor nodes. It is assumed that 
damage to the slab-column connections of the gravity system will not result in a vertical 
collapse of the slab. The foundation rotation stiffness is calculated from typical grade-beam 
design and soil stiffness properties. The moment frame columns are fixed at the base. Rayleigh 
damping corresponding to 5% of critical damping in the first and third modes is applied.  
The moment frame is defined using elastic beam-column elements with flexural plastic 
hinges at the ends. The nonlinear behavior of the flexural hinges in the frame beams and 
columns is based on the peak oriented hysteretic model [45] and the predictive equations 
developed by Panagiotakos and Fardis [46] and Haselton et al. [47] are used to obtain the 
backbone parameters, such as the plastic rotation capacity, post-capping deformation 
capacity, the ratio of maximum to yield moment and the energy-based cyclic degradation 
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parameter.  
 
Fig. 2-8. Schematic illustration of the RC SMF OpenSees model 
The ground motions used for NRHA are selected based on the conditional mean spectra, 
which are computed for the building site (118.162º W, 33.996º N) using probabilistic seismic 
hazard deaggregation and the ground motion prediction equations developed by Campbell and 
Bozorgnia [48,49]. The approach suggested by Baker and Cornell [50,51] is used to select both 
the damaging and collapsing ground motions, where a mean ɛ of 1.47 for large-magnitude short 
distance events is used for both sets. A total of 98 ground motions is included in the damaging 
set by randomly sampling one of the horizontal components of each record. This is done to 
avoid having ground motions with highly correlated spectral shapes that would induce similar 
(and redundant) response patterns. 32 ground motion pairs are selected for the collapsing set. 
The collapsing and damaging ground motion spectra are shown in Fig. 2-9. 
The collapse performance of the intact building is evaluated by performing IDAs using the 
two components in each pair of the collapsing ground motions and taking the lower of the two 
collapse intensities. To obtain the collapse capacity of the damaged buildings, sequential 
NRHAs are performed, whereby the building is subjected to each of the 98 damaging ground 
motions, followed by an IDA to collapse using the 32 pairs of collapsing records. Like the 
intact building, the lower of the two collapse intensities for each collapsing record-pair is used 
for the damaged buildings. The response and damage patterns are obtained from the damaging 
analysis. Using the ten states of building-level damage described in Section 2.2 for each 
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damaging ground motion produces 980 samples, which include response patterns, damage 
patterns, and 𝜅′𝑠. However, 55 of those samples were excluded because collapse occurred 
during the damaging analysis. As a result, the prediction model was constructed using 935 
samples. 
  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 2-9. Response spectra for (a) damaging and (b) collapsing ground motions 
2.3.2 Safety-State-Based Distribution of Response Demands and Damage Patterns 
The probability distributions of the global response patterns (peak and residual SDRs) for 
all the 935 samples corresponding to each safety state is shown in Fig. 2-10. We are particularly 
interested in the amount of overlap (or lack thereof) in the distribution of peak and residual 
drifts between the safe and unsafe states. The 90% confidence interval for peak 1st story drift 
demands [Fig. 2-10 (a)] ranges from 0.4% to 2.1% for the safe state and 1.5% to 4.6% for the 
unsafe state. For peak 2nd story drift demands, the range is 0.5% to 2.9% for the safe state and 
1.6% to 5.0% for the unsafe state, which indicates that the distribution for the two safety states 
is quite different. In contrast, the 3rd and 4th stories have significant overlap in the distribution 
of peak story drift ratios for the safe and unsafe samples, for example, the 4th story has 90% 
confidence intervals of 0.2% to 1.5% and 0.3% to 1.6% respectively. A similar trend can be 
observed for the distribution of residual drifts. There is relatively less overlap in the residual 
drift distributions between the unsafe and safe samples in the first two stories. For example, 
only unsafe samples have residual drift demands greater than 2.5% in the 1st and 2nd stories. 
The opposite is generally true for the 3rd and 4th stories where the residual drift distributions 
are very similar for the two safety states. The separation of the global EDP distribution in the 
first two stories suggests that they are more likely to be used as split boundaries that distinguish 
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between safe and unsafe states. In other words, the global EDPs in the first two stories are the 
potential strong predictors for classification.  
  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 2-10. Histogram of (a) peak and (b) residual SDRs for samples classified as safe and 
unsafe (the dashed and dot lines show the 90% confidence intervals for the safe and unsafe 
states respectively) 
Fig. 2-11 shows the histograms of the peak plastic hinge rotations at the ends of a typical 
exterior column. From the figure, it can be seen that the plastic rotation demand distributions 
for the column hinges at the top of Stories 1 and 4 are very similar for safe and unsafe states, 
having 90% confidence intervals of 1.09 × 10−4 to 2.07 × 10−4 and 1.34 × 10−4 to 2.52 ×
10−4respectively. The distributions are more separated in the top hinge of the 2nd and 3rd story 
column, where the rotation demands are concentrated around 10−4 for the safe samples and 
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generally range from 10−3 to 5 × 10−2for the unsafe ones. For the bottom hinges, only those 
in the 1st story have distributions that are clearly separated, where a possible split point (recall 
in Section 2.2.4) could be located within the range between 10−3 and 10−2.  
  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 2-11. Histogram of peak plastic hinge rotations at the (a) top and (b) bottom ends of 
a typical column (the dashed and dot lines show the 90% confidence intervals for the safe and 
unsafe states respectively) 
For each of the 935 samples, 100 damage patterns are generated using Monte Carlo 
simulation by combining the local response patterns with fragility curves that relate EDPs to 
the probability of exceeding discrete damage states. A single damage pattern is described by 
each component being assigned a damaged state. Each damage measure (DM) (or mode of 
component-level damage) consists of a pre-defined number of unique damage states [12]. The 
damage states for beam (DM1) and column (DM2) flexural damage are described in Table 2-1. 
The median EDP and dispersion that defines the lognormal fragility function for each damage 
state are also shown in Table 2-1. These fragility parameters are computed using the 
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methodology outlined in Section 3.8.4 of FEMA P58-1 [12] and exercised in Section 6.3 of 
FEMA P58-2 [13]. The median rotation demand for the flexural damage states is defined 
relative to the (capping) rotation demand at peak strength, 𝜃𝑐. 
In Fig. 2-12, the distribution of different damage states in beam and column hinges for the 
safe and unsafe states is compared using the 93,500 samples with distinct damage patterns. As 
observed in Fig. 2-12 (a) and (b), beam flexural damage is highest in the two lower floors. For 
the safe state of the exterior beams, 14.0% and 16.0% of the samples corresponding to the 2nd 
and 3rd floors respectively are in the lowest damage state (DM1-1). For those at the 3rd and 4th 
floors, only 5.2% and 2.9% respectively are in DM1-1. Almost no higher damage states occur 
among the safe state samples. For the unsafe state, 54.7%, 15.2% and 7.8% of exterior beams 
at the 2nd floor are in damage states DM1-1, DM1-2 and DM1-3, respectively. The proportions 
of those damage states in the 3rd floor are 32.4%, 5.6%, and 2.1%, respectively. Similar trends 
are observed for the interior beams at each floor, however, the damage was generally less 
severe than the exterior ones. Fig. 2-12 (c) shows that, for both the safe and unsafe states, 
observable damage to the top column hinges only occurs in the 2nd and 3rd story. For the safe 
state, DM2-1 occurs in 1.1% and 4.0% of the samples corresponding to the 2nd and 3rd stories 
respectively. Much more damage occurs in the samples associated with the unsafe state. 33.4%, 
7.0% and 2.8% of top column hinges in the 2nd story and 18.2%, 2.7% and 0.7% in the 3rd story, 
are in DM2-1, DM2-2 and DM2-3, respectively. As indicated in Fig. 2-12 (d), less than 2.5% 
of the safe samples for the bottom column hinges in the first two stories are in DM2-1 and there 
is no observable damage elsewhere. In general, the distinct damage patterns between the safe 
and unsafe states provides the basis for building the advanced prediction models using machine 
learning algorithms. 
Table 2-1. Structural component damage measures and median EDP and dispersion 
associated with each damage state 
Damage 
Measure 
ID 
Damage 
Measure 
Damage 
State ID 
Damage State Description 
Median 
EDP 
Dispers
ion 
DM-1 
Beam 
Flexural 
Damage 
DM1-1 Residual crack widths > .06 in 0.3𝜃𝑐 
0.4 DM1-2 Concrete spalling and exposed rebar 0.7𝜃𝑐 
DM1-3 Concrete crushing and buckling or fracture of rebar 1.0𝜃𝑐 
DM-2 
Column 
Flexural 
Damage 
DM2-1 Residual crack widths > .06 in 0.25𝜃𝑐 
0.4 DM2-2 Concrete spalling and exposed rebar 0.55𝜃𝑐 
DM2-3 Concrete crushing and buckling or fracture of rebar 0.80𝜃𝑐 
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(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
Fig. 2-12. Distribution of damage states for safe and unsafe samples at (a) exterior beam 
end, (b) interior beam end, (c) top column end and (d) bottom column end 
2.3.3 Machine Learning Based Safety State Prediction Models 
Predictive models are built using two different datasets: 1) 935 classified response patterns 
that comprise only global EDPs and 2) 93,500 damage patterns sampled from classified local 
EDPs. Each dataset is partitioned into two subsets: 75% of the samples are used for training 
and the remaining 25% are held-out for testing the performance of the proposed models. 10-
fold cross-validations are performed using training subsets to find the optimal predictive 
models with the least amount of overfitting given specific tuning parameters. To further reduce 
the possible bias in dividing the training data into 10 folders, the cross-validation is repeated 3 
times with random partitions. Basic CART models are built as well as advanced Random 
Forests models.  
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Fig. 2-13. Example CART model with complexity parameter of 0.01 and trained using 
response patterns, where PSDRi denotes the PSDR at Story i, RSDRj denotes the RSDR at 
Story j 
An example CART model constructed using the training subset of the response pattern 
dataset is presented in Fig. 2-13. The root node has 38% safe samples and 62% unsafe samples, 
which would result in an unsafe prediction based on the majority vote if no more splits are 
created in the model. At this initial step, |𝑁| = 1, 𝜋𝑛 = 1, and the Gini Index computed using 
Equation 2.1 is 0.47, indicating a very high impurity when compared with the maximum 𝐺𝐼 of 
0.5 for a binary dataset. By testing the possible splits associated with the predictors, the 
algorithm finds the optimal point of peak 𝑆𝐷𝑅 = 0.018 and partitions the original sample 
space into two subspaces. 43% of the samples have peak 𝑆𝐷𝑅 < 0.018and the remaining 57% 
have peak 𝑆𝐷𝑅 ≥ 0.018. The overall 𝐺𝐼 after the split decreases to 0.197, which represents a 
substantial reduction of 0.274. Next, within each subspace, the algorithm is repeated in search 
of the next optimal split point, which is again peak 𝑆𝐷𝑅 but at a different point, 0.012. After 
this split, the 𝐺𝐼 is computed as 0.166, which represents a 0.031 decrease. If the model stops 
here, it would only have two splits and three leaf nodes. Predictions can be made with more 
than 90% probability in the cases where peak 𝑆𝐷𝑅 is less than 0.012 or larger than 0.018, but 
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poor performance with only 59% probability is found when the 𝑆𝐷𝑅 falls between those two 
values. Therefore, the tree keeps growing until the reduction of the overall 𝐺𝐼 is less than the 
predefined complexity parameter. Finally, a 7-layer tree with 11 leaf nodes is constructed after 
a total of 9 partitions, which has more than 90% classification accuracy for approximately 84% 
of the training subsets, and only 2% of all the predictions have an accuracy less than 70%.    
Fig. 2-14 illustrates the parameter tuning process for the CART and Random Forests models 
trained using the response patterns. In Fig. 2-14 (a), the area under the ROC curve, sensitivity 
and specificity are plotted versus complexity parameter ranging from 0.5 to 1 × 10−6. It can 
be observed that the area under the ROC curve and specificity increase as the complexity 
parameter decreases, while the sensitivity decreases. All three performance measures remain 
almost unchanged after the complexity parameter exceeds 0.001. Since the unsafe state is more 
critical, sensitivity is more valued than specificity in this study so the optimal complexity 
parameter is chosen as 0.05. Fig. 2-14 (b) demonstrates how the number of predictors 
considered at each split and the number of trees are used to tune the Random Forests model. 
The former ranges from 2 to 10 with an increment of 2 and the latter is defined by the set {10, 
20, 30, 40, 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300}. As shown in Fig. 2-14 (b), the area under the ROC 
curve tends to increase as the number of trees increases. The model that allows 10 predictors 
for further splits has the lowest area while the models allowing to 2, 4, 6 and 8 predictors have 
comparable ones. Fig. 2-14 (c) and (d) show that the models that allow more predictors for 
selecting each split generally have better performance in terms of the sensitivity but are less 
competitive for specificity. By synthesizing the above observations, the optimal tuning 
parameters are selected as 6 predictors considered at split points and 250 trees for bagging.  
  
(a) (b) 
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(c) (d) 
Fig. 2-14. Parameter tuning for (a) CART and (b)-(d) Random Forests models trained 
using response patterns 
Parameter tuning is also performed for the models trained using the damage patterns and 
the results are summarized in Fig. 2-15. A complexity parameter value of 1 × 10−6 is chosen 
as optimal as it maximizes the area under the ROC curve and balances the sensitivity and 
specificity, as shown in Fig. 2-15 (a). Fig. 2-15 (b) shows that the area under the ROC curve 
increases as the number of trees increases. The model with 10 predictors at each split is the 
best and is clearly distinguished from the other four. Fig. 2-15 (c) and (d) show that the model 
with only 1 predictor at each split has the lowest performance for sensitivity but highest 
performance for specificity, while all the other models are comparable. Based on these 
observations, the optimal model allows 5 predictors to be considered at split points and uses 
150 trees.  
  
(a) (b) 
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(c) (d) 
Fig. 2-15. Parameter tuning for (a) CART and (b)-(d) Random Forests models trained 
using damage patterns 
Table 2-2 summarizes the performance measures including sensitivity, specificity, and 
accuracy for the final CART and Random Forests models using 25% held-out testing datasets. 
Predictions obtained from all the final models are compared with their corresponding reference 
(real) states. 240 testing samples with response patterns are employed in the final CART model, 
where 74 true negative and 143 true positive predictions are observed. Only 19 cases are 
recognized as unsafe (negative) when they are actually safe (positive), while 4 unsafe ones are 
misclassified as safe. The overall accuracy of 90.4% is achieved, and more importantly, the 
false negative rate is only 1.7%, giving an acceptably low rate of risky predictions. The Random 
Forests model has similar behavior and only performs slightly better than the CART model, 
indicating that a single tree might be able to capture the key characteristic of the response 
patterns. 22900 testing damage patterns are fed into the final CART model, of which 7219 and 
12646 correct predictions are found for the safe and unsafe states respectively. The false 
positive rate is 15.1% and the more critical false negative rate is 12.2%. Considerably better 
performance is observed for the Random Forests model. The improvements of 1.46%, 1.85% 
and 0.8% on accuracy, sensitivity, and specificity seem small, but in fact, there is a 15.2% (267 
out of 1754) reduction in the critical false negative rate compared to the CART model.  
The predictive models based on the response patterns have an overall slightly better 
performance than the damage pattern models. A possible explanation is that additional 
randomness is introduced by using component fragility curves and Monte Carlo simulation to 
generate the damage pattern from the EDPs. Moreover, the precision of the predictor 
information is somewhat reduced when continuous EDPs are converted to discrete damage 
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states. With that being said, it should be noted that exact or real EDP values are assumed in the 
response pattern models even though the field instruments used to record these EDPs may 
introduce measurement errors, which could potentially lower the performance. This issue is 
not addressed in the current study. More importantly, unlike the response patterns which 
require pre-installed instruments, the damage patterns can be more easily obtained after an 
earthquake through visual inspection.  
Table 2-2. Performance measures of final models based on testing datasets 
Dataset Response Dataset Damage State Dataset 
Model CART Random Forests CART Random Forests 
Confusion 
Matrix 
Actually 
Safe 
(Negative) 
Actually 
Unsafe 
(Positive) 
Actually 
Safe 
(Negative) 
Actually 
Unsafe 
(Positive) 
Actually 
Safe 
(Negative) 
Actually 
Unsafe 
(Positive) 
Actually 
Safe 
(Negative) 
Actually 
Unsafe 
(Positive) 
Predicted 
Safe 
(Negative) 
74 4 76 4 7219 1754 7287 1487 
Predicted 
Unsafe 
(Positive) 
19 143 17 143 1281 12646 1213 12913 
Sensitivity 0.97 0.97 0.88 0.90 
Specificity 0.80 0.82 0.85 0.86 
Accuracy 0.90 0.91 0.87 0.88 
95% CI 0.86-0.94 0.87-0.95 0.86-0.87 0.88-0.89 
2.4 Conclusion 
A machine learning framework for assessing post-earthquake structural safety is developed 
by integrating probabilistic seismic demand analysis, component-level damage simulation and 
robust assessments of the residual collapse capacity. Multiple instances of a damaged structure 
are created by subjecting a nonlinear structural model to a suite of “damaging” ground motions 
scaled to achieve pre-defined target drift demands. The spatial distribution of EDPs from a 
single damaging analysis is described as a response pattern. The term damage pattern is used 
to describe the spatial variation of component-level damage, which is generated through Monte 
Carlo Simulation, by coupling local EDPs with damage fragility functions. The collapse 
capacity of the intact and damaged structures is assessed by performing incremental dynamic 
analysis using a suite of “collapsing” ground motions. For the damaged structure, the model is 
subjected to a single damaging record followed by a collapsing ground motion whose spectral 
intensity is incrementally increased in order to cause collapse. The ratio of the median collapse 
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capacity of the damaged and intact structure is used as the measure of the reduced collapse 
safety and the criterion for the post-earthquake safety state (safe or unsafe) of the building. A 
robust dataset comprising of 935 response patterns, 93,500 damage patterns, and their 
corresponding safety state is used to define a classification problem. 
Machine learning algorithms including CART and Random Forests are implemented to map 
the response and damage patterns to their classified structural safety states, where the predictor 
space is recursively partitioned to capture the underlying relationship. Previously developed 
post-earthquake structural evaluation methods have based the safety state criteria on the 
exceedance of pre-defined response demand levels or damage state ratios within individual 
structural component groups. In contrast to prior approaches, the outcome of the proposed 
framework consists of classification trees, each comprising a high-dimension space of response 
and damage patterns partitioned into multiple subspaces. Given an arbitrarily observed pattern 
for a damaged structure, each tree is intelligently searched to find the matching subspace, which 
will serve as the basis for classifying the safety state of the structure. The result is a discrete 
probability distribution of the structural safety state, which serves as an indicator of the 
confidence of the prediction.  
The proposed methodology is applied to a 4-story reinforced concrete special moment frame 
building located in a region of high seismicity. The results show that, although different 
response and damage patterns exist for the safe and unsafe structural states, they cannot be 
separated by assigning a certain criterion for any individual EDP or damage measure. Such a 
criterion would result in considerable overlap between the two safety states. The predictive 
models presented in this study, which are trained using machine learning algorithms, can 
provide predictions with high performance in terms of accuracy, sensitivity, and specificity. 
The prediction accuracy is above 90% for both the CART and Random Forests models when 
applied to response patterns with unknown safety states. A minimum accuracy of 86% is 
achieved for damage patterns with unknown safety states. Relatively high sensitivity is also 
observed in the prediction models developed for the case study, which is critical for reducing 
the rate of high-risk erroneous predictions i.e. model predicts safe when the building is unsafe.  
The proposed framework could be used for rapid probabilistic assessment of whether a 
damaged building is safe to reoccupy following an earthquake. Additionally, the trees 
generated by the machine learning algorithms could be used to prioritize field inspections 
following an earthquake. Moreover, the probabilistic safety state predictions could be used in 
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community resilience evaluations and individual building life-cycle performance assessment 
and optimization.  
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CHAPTER 3: Structural Modeling, Probabilistic Seismic Hazard 
Analysis and Ground Motion Selection of Tall Buildings with 
Core Walls and Special Moment Frames 
This chapter is partially adopted from the following study: 
Zhang, Y., Burton, H. V., Shokrabadi, M. & Wallace J. W. (2019). Seismic risk assessment 
of a 42-story reinforced concrete dual-system building considering mainshock and aftershock 
hazard. ASCE Journal of Structural Engineering (accepted for publication). 
This chapter introduces a 42-story dual system tall building with core walls and special 
moment frames, which will be used as the archetype structure for the analyses performed from 
Chapter 4 to 6. The PSHA for the given site located in Southern California (118.25° W, 34.05° 
N), is conducted and a set of 34 pairs of as-recorded mainshock and aftershock ground motions 
are selected accordingly for the NLRAs in the following chapters. 
3.1 Building Description 
The reinforced concrete dual system (shear wall and moment frame) building used in the 
current study, which is denoted as Building 2B in the PEER TBI report [52], has 42 stories 
above the ground floor, four basement levels and a penthouse at the roof level. The isometric 
view and plan layout are shown in Fig. 3-1 (a) and (b) respectively. The core walls, which are 
labeled Pier 1 through Pier 3 in Fig. 1(b), are planar and L-shaped and are connected with 
coupling beams. A performance-based approach using the 2008 version of the LATBSDC 
guidelines [53] was adopted in the design. The structure was evaluated for serviceability and 
collapse prevention performance levels. The seismic demands for the serviceability level 
assessment were obtained from a site-specific response spectrum analysis corresponding to a 
25-year return period event assuming 2.5% viscous damping. Up to 20% of the deformation-
controlled components were permitted to reach 150% of their strength capacity at the 
serviceability level [52]. The minimum base shear requirement in 2008 LATBSDC was waived 
and the ACI 318-08 [43] strength reduction factors were applied to evaluate deformation-
controlled actions at the service level. As part of the design process, a three-dimensional model 
of the structure was constructed in Perform-3D and analyzed using seven pairs of spectrally 
matched ground motions. NRHAs were used to evaluate the collapse prevention performance 
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level at the maximum considered earthquake (MCE) hazard level (2475-year return period). 
The reported period of the first three modes was 4.28sec, 3.87sec, and 2.26sec, respectively. 
Additional design details are provided in the TBI case study [52]. 
   
(a) (b) 
Fig. 3-1  (a) Isometric view and (b) plan layout of the dual lateral resisting system  
3.2 Structural Modeling 
A three-dimensional structural model of the lateral force resisting system (gravity system 
not included) of the tower (basement levels not included) is constructed in OpenSees [44]. A 
rigid diaphragm, which is commonly used for the tower portion of tall buildings, is 
incorporated at all suspended floor levels by constraining the horizontal translational and 
vertical rotational degrees of freedom. The additional flexural strength and stiffness provided 
by the floor slabs is included in the calibration of coupling beams. The seismic mass is lumped 
at the center of mass at each floor. Expected gravity loads (𝐷 + 0.25𝐿) are used in the model. 
The expected strengths of the concrete and steel are used by applying factors of 1.30 and 1.17 
to the nominal values respectively. The damping is set as 2.5% at the periods of 0.2 and 0.9 of 
the fundamental period of the structure [52]. The lower bound of 0.2 is used to avoid over-
damping in higher modes and is consistent with the TBI and LATBSDC guidelines. The upper 
bound of 0.9 is less than the 1.5 value recommended in the latest documents (LATBSDC 2017, 
TBI 2017). Therefore, the first mode response could be slightly overdamped. However, since 
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Rayleigh damping is low (2.5%), the impact is not significant and will not influence the key 
findings presented in this chapter. A leaning column is used to account for additional P-Delta 
effects resulting from the expected loads on the gravity system which is not explicitly modeled. 
The leaning column is axially rigid, has no lateral stiffness and the horizontal translational 
degrees of freedom of the end nodes are constrained to the floor nodes. The core walls and 
moment frame columns are fixed at the base.  
The primary energy dissipation elements are the coupling beams and the core wall piers 
and moment frame beams serve as a secondary source of energy dissipation. The hysteretic 
behavior of these three types of elements is modeled to account for cumulative damaging 
effects of sequential ground motions. 
3.2.1 Special Moment Frame 
The moment frames and coupling beams are defined using elastic beam-column elements 
with flexural plastic hinges at the ends. While fiber models are able to explicitly account for P-
M interaction, they are quite cumbersome for capturing rebar buckling. On the contrary, a 
flexural hinge model is more efficient in terms of computational expense and has been widely 
calibrated against physical experiments to properly capture the strength and stiffness loss 
associated with rebar buckling and is therefore deemed appropriate for this study. The 
nonlinear behavior of the flexural hinges in the frame beams and columns is based on the peak 
oriented hysteretic model developed by Ibarra et al. [45] and the predictive equations developed 
by Panagiotakos and Fardis [46] and Haselton [47] are used to calibrate the hysteretic 
parameters.  
3.2.2 Shear Wall and Coupling Beam 
The two-dimensional multiple vertical line element model (MVLEM) [54,55] is adopted 
and used in the three-dimensional model to capture the non-linear behavior of core walls. As 
shown in Fig. 2, two rigid beam elements are connected vertically using a set of two-node-link 
elements, where the parallel material models are used to integrate contributions from concrete 
and reinforcement. Zero-length elements are used to capture the shear behavior at the rotation 
center of wall panels. The L-shaped walls (Pier 1 and Pier 2) are simulated by two such models 
in each of the two directions with the vertical displacements coupled at the joint nodes. To 
achieve the balance between accuracy and efficiency of such a large numerical model, 
sensitivity analyses are conducted for modeling core walls with 4, 6 and 8 vertical links. The 
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confinement effects including an increase in both strength and ductility of the core concrete are 
incorporated using the rules suggested by Mander et al. [56]. This model is very similar to the 
planar (two-dimensional) version and the model that exists in Perform-3D. Prior studies have 
shown that such models reasonably capture the response of T- and C-shaped walls subjected 
to in-plane [55,57] and biaxial loading [58]. The periods of the first three modes of the model 
developed for this study were 4.08 𝑠𝑒𝑐 , 3.37 𝑠𝑒𝑐  and 2.53 𝑠𝑒𝑐  respectively, which are 
comparable with the values reported in the TBI report [52]. Moreover, the MCE-level global 
and local demands from the OpenSees model developed for the current study was found to be 
comparable with those obtained from the Perform-3D model used in the Moehle et al. study. 
For the coupling beams with diagonal reinforcement, the flexural hinge parameters are based 
on test results by Naish et al (2013). 
 
 
Fig. 3-2  A schematic illustration of shear wall modeling in OpenSees 
3.3 Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis and Ground Motion Selection 
3.3.1 Seismic Hazard Analysis 
The goal of PSHA is to provide an estimate of the mean annual rate of exceeding some 
intensity measure for a specific site. The PSHA methodology for mainshocks assumes a 
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homogeneous Poisson distribution for the recurrence rate of earthquakes. However, it has been 
well established that the rate of occurrence of aftershocks decays with the time elapsed since 
the occurrence of the causative mainshock, which is typically modeled using the modified 
Omori’s law [60]. Utilizing the relationship by Reasenberg and Jones [61] for the occurrence 
rate of aftershocks, Yeo and Cornell [62] proposed an Aftershock PSHA (APSHA) 
methodology where the constant rate of occurrence of earthquakes in conventional PSHA is 
replaced by a time-varying rate. The relationship that forms the basis of both PSHA and 
APSHA is shown in Equation 3.1 for a single fault, and the total seismic hazard at the building 
location is obtained through the summation of the individual hazard from all the contributing 
faults.  
𝜆𝐼𝑀,𝑛(𝑖𝑚) = 𝜈𝑛 ∭ 𝐺[𝐼𝑀 > 𝑖𝑚|
𝑀,𝑅,𝜀
𝑀, 𝑅, 𝜀] 𝑓𝑀(𝑚)𝑓𝑅(𝑟)𝑓𝜀(𝜀)𝑑𝑀𝑑𝑅𝑑𝜀 (3.1) 
𝜈𝑛
𝐴𝑆[𝑡0, 𝑡1] = (10
𝑎+𝑏(𝑀𝑚−𝑀0) − 10𝑎)
(𝑡1 + 𝑐)
1−𝜌 − (𝑡0 + 𝑐)
1−𝜌
1 − 𝜌
 (3.2) 
where, in Equation 3.1, 𝐺[𝐼𝑀 > 𝑖𝑚|𝑀, 𝑅, 𝜀] is an indicator function that takes on the value 
of one if 𝐼𝑀 > 𝑖𝑚  and zero otherwise, 𝑛  is the identification number of each fault being 
considered; 𝜆𝐼𝑀,𝑛(𝑖𝑚) is the rate of occurrence of seismic events having 𝐼𝑀 > 𝑖𝑚 generated 
by fault 𝑛 within a specific time window (usually one year);  𝜈𝑛 is the rate of occurrence of 
seismic events with magnitudes larger than a predefined lower-bound associated with fault 𝑛. 
When performing APSHA, the time-invariant 𝜈𝑛 in the conventional PSHA is replaced with 
𝜈𝑛
𝐴𝑆[𝑡0, 𝑡1] in Equation 3.2, which gives the rate of aftershocks during the time interval [𝑡0, 𝑡1]. 
𝑎 and 𝑏 in Equation 3.2 are constants that define the magnitude distribution; 𝑐 and 𝜌 define the 
temporal decay in the number of aftershocks and are adopted from a generic California model 
[61]; 𝑀0 and 𝑀𝑚  are the minimum and maximum magnitudes of aftershocks, where 𝑀𝑚  is 
taken as the magnitude of the causative mainshock. Both the upper and lower limits of the time 
window are defined as the time elapsed since the occurrence of the mainshock. 
APSHA is used in this study to develop an aftershock seismic hazard curve for the building 
site located in Southern California (118.25° W, 34.05° 𝑁, Vs30 = 360𝑚/𝑠), which is shown 
in Fig. 3-3 alongside the mainshock hazard curve, which was obtained using conventional 
PSHA. The hazard curves are presented in the form of the mean annual rate of exceeding 𝑆𝑎𝑇1. 
A total of 49 faults contribute to the hazard at the site of interest. However, it is worth noting 
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that, an implicit assumption in APSHA is that a mainshock has already occurred and the seismic 
hazard due to the following aftershocks is being evaluated. Since it is highly unlikely for 
simultaneous mainshocks to occur on the multiple faults that contribute to the seismic hazard 
at the location of the building, the APSHA curve is developed solely for the fault that 
contributes the most to the mainshock seismic hazard at the location of the building. On the 
other hand, the mainshock seismic hazard curve is developed accounting for all the sources 
that are likely to contribute to the seismic hazard at the site location of the building. APSHA is 
performed for a duration of one year after the mainshock, which is considered long enough for 
the hazard to decrease to a negligible level. The ground motion prediction equations developed 
by Boore and Atkinson [63] are used to perform both PSHA and APSHA. The minimum 
magnitude of mainshocks and aftershocks is taken as 5.0 since events with smaller magnitudes 
are not expected to induce notable damage in code-conforming structures and the magnitude 
of the largest aftershock is assumed to be equal to that of the largest mainshock. 
 
Fig. 3-3. PSHA for all the faults and ASPHA for the fault with the highest contribution to 
the mainshock hazard 
3.3.2 Ground Motion Selection 
A set of 34 ground motion sequences, each with one pair of mainshock and aftershock 
records, are selected and used for the NRHAs of the 42-story dual system tall building. All 
record-pairs are from actual earthquake sequences (meaning each pair was recorded in the same 
sequence) including the Imperial Valley 06, Northridge, Livermore, Coalinga, Landers, 
Mammoth Lakes 01, Chalfant Valley 02, Umbria Marche, Irpinia, Darfield and Chi-Chi 
earthquakes, and were obtained from the  NGA West2 database [64]. The classification of the 
ground motions into mainshocks and aftershocks is based on the time and distance windowing 
algorithms by Knopoff and Gardner [65] and Wooddell and Abrahamson [66]. A magnitude-
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dependent time window and a distance threshold of 40𝑘𝑚 measured in terms of the centroidal 
Joyner-Boore distance [66] is used to identify the aftershock ground motions following a 
mainshock event. The magnitudes of the mainshocks ranges from 5.8 to 7.6 whereas the 
aftershocks’ magnitudes are between 4.7 and 6.7; response spectra for each case are presented 
in Fig. 3-4. The detailed properties of the selected ground motions are provided in Table 3-1. 
   
(a) (b) 
Fig. 3-4. (a) Mainshock and (b) aftershock ground motion spectra 
Table 3-1. Properties of the mainshock-aftershock ground motion sequences 
ID Event name 
Mainshock ground motion 
 
Aftershock ground motion 
Mw 
 
Rjb  
(km) 
Vs30 
(m/s2) 
Mw 
 
Rjb  
(km) 
Vs30 
(m/s2) 
1 Imperial Valley 06 6.53 10.4 208.7  5.01 11.2 205.6 
2 Imperial Valley 06 6.53 7.3 192.1  5.01 10.4 203.2 
3 Imperial Valley 06 6.53 0.1 264.6  5.01 10.6 202.9 
4 Imperial Valley 06 6.53 4.0 205.6  5.62 9.8 193.7 
5 Imperial Valley 06 6.53 1.4 203.2  5.90 19.4 362.4 
6 Imperial Valley 06 6.53 0.6 210.5  5.90 6.5 193.7 
7 Northridge 6.69 20.7 450.3  5.20 20.8 508.1 
8 Livermore 5.80 25.0 403.4  5.42 30.0 517.1 
9 Coalinga 6.36 24.0 274.7  5.38 13.5 352.2 
10 Coalinga 6.36 42.0 178.3  5.38 12.6 286.4 
11 Coalinga 6.36 29.5 246.1  5.38 13.3 617.4 
12 Coalinga 6.36 39.0 294.3  5.77 11.1 474.2 
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13 Coalinga 6.36 32.9 266.7  5.77 11.1 474.2 
14 Coalinga 6.36 27.5 648.1  5.77 12.1 458.1 
15 Landers 7.28 69.2 382.9  6.46 78.2 282.1 
16 Landers 7.28 144.9 269.3  6.46 107.3 339.6 
17 Mammoth Lakes 01 6.06 15.5 537.2  4.73 5.2 353.2 
18 Chalfant Valley 02 6.19 17.2 303.5  5.44 24.8 303.5 
19 Umbria Marche, Italy 6.00 17.3 293.0  5.30 35.3 492.0 
20 Irpinia, Italy 6.90 10.8 382.0  6.20 14.7 496.5 
21 Darfield, New Zealand 7.00 7.3 326.0  6.20 41.1 337.0 
22 Darfield, New Zealand 7.00 25.4 206.0  6.20 14.4 280.3 
23 Darfield, New Zealand 7.00 30.5 255.0  6.20 5.6 187.0 
24 Darfield, New Zealand 7.00 7.1 263.2  6.20 3.3 198.0 
25 Darfield, New Zealand 7.00 24.6 206.0  6.20 4.9 194.0 
26 Darfield, New Zealand 7.00 1.5 295.7  6.20 85.4 638.4 
27 Darfield, New Zealand 7.00 20.9 247.5  6.20 40.6 295.7 
28 Chi-Chi 7.62 9.6 427.7  6.20 80.9 190.6 
29 Chi-Chi 7.62 29.5 226.0  6.20 72.3 497.5 
30 Chi-Chi 7.62 16.0 233.1  6.20 28.7 277.5 
31 Chi-Chi 7.62 78.7 203.0  6.20 38.9 226.0 
32 Chi-Chi 7.62 9.9 258.9  6.20 55.5 210.0 
33 Chi-Chi 7.62 56.1 1525.9  6.20 31.8 544.7 
34 Chi-Chi 7.62 55.6 494.8  6.20 36.4 233.1 
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  CHAPTER 4: Pattern Recognition Approach to Assess the 
Residual Structural Capacity of Damaged Tall Buildings 
This chapter is adopted from the following study: 
Zhang, Y., & Burton, H. V. (2019). Pattern recognition approach to assess the residual 
structural capacity of damaged tall buildings. Structural Safety, 78, 12-22. 
4.1 Introduction and Background 
The vertical extent and concentration of people and services in tall buildings is such that 
the adverse impact of earthquake damage can extend far beyond their footprint. When a tall 
building suffers earthquake damage, the ability to quantify its residual structural capacity is 
essential to informing whether it can be temporarily or permanently re-occupied (before 
repairs) in the aftershock environment when the seismic hazard is elevated. In the United States 
and other parts of the world, the ATC-20 [22,23] guidelines are used to evaluate the post-
earthquake safety and occupiability of damaged buildings. Buildings are assigned red (unsafe 
to occupy), yellow (limited entry) and green (safe to reoccupy) tags based on the extent of 
damage to key structural and non-structural components. In terms of structural safety, the 
document generally relies on the judgment of structural engineers to make the link between the 
damage to individual components and the reduction in lateral load carrying capacity. As a 
result, numerical modeling is often used to augment engineering judgment by explicitly linking 
component-level damage to system level residual structural capacity.  
There have been numerous studies that have employed NRHAs using sequential ground 
motions to evaluate residual structural capacity of earthquake-damaged buildings. Some 
studies have focused on post-mainshock or aftershock vulnerability (e.g. Raghunandan et al. 
[32]; Jeon et al. [67]) by assessing the likelihood that a mainshock-damaged building will 
exceed a predefined limit state (e.g. drift limit exceedance, collapse) given a specific ground 
motion intensity. Others have coupled the reduction in structural capacity of mainshock-
damaged buildings with time-dependent aftershock hazard, to provide risk-based assessments 
(e.g. Yeo and Cornell [68]; Nazari et al. [69]; Shokrabadi and Burton [70]). To complement 
the ATC-20 procedure, Burton and Deierlein [33] developed a methodology that integrates 
component-level visual damage simulation with collapse performance assessment to evaluate 
post-earthquake structural safety. Triggering damage quantities for individual structural 
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components were established based on the implications of increased collapse vulnerability of 
the damaged building. The shortcoming of this methodology stemmed from the use of a one-
dimensional mapping between component-level damage and system-level vulnerability. To 
address this limitation, Burton et al. [71] used multivariate statistical models to link physical 
damage indicators, structural response quantities and mainshock intensity to aftershock 
collapse vulnerability. The methods considered included Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Best 
Subset Regression, Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selector Operator (LASSO), Principal 
Components Analysis and Kernel Ridge Regression. Zhang et al. [72] utilized the Random 
Forests algorithm to probabilistically classify earthquake-damaged buildings into safe and 
unsafe states based on the link between response and damage patterns and the reduction in 
collapse safety. The methodology was applied to a 4-story reinforced concrete (RC) frame 
building. 
In contrast to the low- or mid-rise structures that have been the focus of earlier studies, two 
main challenges arise when evaluating the residual structural safety of earthquake-damaged 
tall buildings. Because of the large number of components, the response patterns of tall 
buildings consist of a high dimensional feature space of global and local EDPs, which makes 
it inefficient or even impossible to obtain and use them all in practice (e.g. through inspection 
or remote sensing). Moreover, the size, complexity and computational expense of tall building 
structural models makes it unfeasible to generate a large number of physical damage 
observations. These two issues are likely to result in more features than observations, making 
some of the aforementioned approaches to linking component-level damage to residual 
structural capacity unfeasible. For example, it is impossible to use the OLS regression, which 
requires at least the same number of observations and features to be applicable, and in practice, 
considerably more observations are needed to achieve a stable model. While some of the 
techniques used in the prior studies(e.g. [71,72]) are applicable to such dataset, they did not 
explicitly incorporate feature selection, let alone the interpretation and evaluation of selected 
features. 
This study develops a pattern recognition approach to quantitatively assess the residual 
structural capacity for tall buildings. The methodology is applied to a 42-story building with 
RC shear walls and frames, which was developed as part of the Tall Buildings Initiative (TBI) 
project [52]. Sequential NRHAs are carried out using as-recorded mainshock-aftershock 
ground motions pairs, where the building is subjected to mainshocks scaled to different 
intensity levels, followed by an assessment of the residual structural capacity using a set of 
  
 
 
45 
aftershock ground motions. Global EDPs including peak story drift ratio (PSDR), residual story 
drift ratio (RSDR) as well as local or component-level EDPs, such as the maximum frame beam 
rotation (FBR), frame column rotation (FCR), coupling beam rotation (CBR), concrete 
compression strain (CCS) and rebar tensile strain (RTS) in shear walls, are recorded for each 
mainshock ground motion. To effectively reduce the dimensions of the raw features while 
keeping the ones that are most informative, dispersion-based filtering and LASSO-based 
feature selection are performed. Support Vector Machines (SVMs) are then used to map the 
measured responses in a subset of components to the residual structural capacity of the 
damaged tall building. In addition to guiding post-earthquake inspections and residual 
structural capacity assessments, the proposed methodology can inform optimal sensor 
placement in buildings with complex structural systems.  
4.2 Overview of Methodology 
Fig. 4-1 provides a conceptual illustration of the methodology for evaluating the residual 
structural capacity of the mainshock-damaged tall building. Beginning with the intact structure 
in Path A, the structure is subjected to a set of as-recorded aftershock ground motions to 
simulate the most desirable scenario where a mainshock occurs but the structural damage is 
inconsequential. This analysis result serves as the baseline for the evaluation and is used to 
calibrate the performance of the tall building for the mainshock damage scenarios that cause a 
reduction in the structural capacity. Several tools and models have been developed to assess 
the sideway collapse safety of frame structures (e.g. [73–75]). Comparatively, much less has 
been done in this area for shear wall structures. Therefore, a PSDR of 4.5% is used as the 
collapse prevention (CP) criteria as recommended in TBI [76] and Los Angeles Tall Buildings 
Structural Design Council (LATBSDC) [53]. Multiple Strip Analyses (MSAs) are conducted 
using the set of aftershock ground motions and the median first-mode spectral acceleration 
corresponding to the exceedance of the CP limit state, ?̂?𝑎𝐶𝑃,𝐼𝑁𝑇,  is adopted as the measure of 
residual structural capacity.  
Sequential response history analyses are performed in Path B, where the intact structure is 
subjected to a mainshock ground motion scaled to a pre-defined first-mode spectral intensity 
level, 𝑆𝑎𝑇1,𝑀𝑆, followed by MSAs using the set of aftershock ground motions (same ones used 
in Path A). The distinct response patterns that lead to structural damage under the mainshock 
ground motion are recorded and the results from the aftershock MSAs are used to estimate the 
median first-mode spectral acceleration corresponding to exceedance of the CP limit state for 
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the damaged structure, ?̂?𝑎𝐶𝑃,𝐷𝑀𝐺 . A dimensionless residual structural capacity index 𝜅𝐶𝑃  is 
defined as the ratio between ?̂?𝑎𝐶𝑃,𝐷𝑀𝐺 and ?̂?𝑎𝐶𝑃,𝐼𝑁𝑇 [71,72].  
By combining the results of Paths A and B, this study seeks to map the response patterns 
of the mainshock-damaged building to its associated safety index 𝜅𝐶𝑃; however, two major 
challenges rise: 1) the response patterns of tall buildings consist of a high dimensional feature 
space of global and local EDPs, which makes it inefficient or even impossible to obtain and 
use them all in practice; 2) the size, complexity and computational expense of tall building 
structural models makes it unfeasible to generate a large number of physical damage 
observations. Therefore, dispersion-based filtering and LASSO are employed in Path C to 
reduce the EDPs recorded during the mainshock to a subset of selected features. For each 
selected feature, a correlation-based process is conducted to construct a feature group 
consisting of reserved features which survive the filtering but are excluded by LASSO and 
could potentially be used as alternatives in the absence of the selected features. In Path D, two 
SVM models are constructed for each EDP group: one based on the selected features and the 
other using the features randomly sampled from the corresponding reserved group.  
 
Fig. 4-1. Overview of methodology  
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4.3 Feature Selection and Grouping of Response Patterns Induced by Mainshock 
The 42-story dual system tall building described and modeled in Chapter 3 is used as the 
archetype for the proposed pattern recognition approach. The set of 34 pairs of mainshock and 
aftershock ground motions are used for the sequential NRHAs. 
4.3.1 Raw Dataset 
The 272 observations of 𝜅𝐶𝑃 are presented in Fig. 4-2 (a) for the damaged tall building 
corresponding to 34 mainshock ground motions scaled to 8 different intensity levels (𝑆𝑎𝑇1,𝑀𝑆). 
Each data point represents the 𝜅𝐶𝑃  associated with a single mainshock ground motion and 
intensity level. A clear descending trend is observed where the median 𝜅𝐶𝑃 declines gradually 
from 1.0 (no mainshock damage) to 0.39 as 𝑆𝑎𝑇1,𝑀𝑆 increases. Fig. 4-2 (b) shows an example 
relationship between 𝜅𝐶𝑃 and a single FBR. The 𝜅𝐶𝑃 value is clustered around 1.0 when the 
FBR is less than 0.01 and then declines to as low as almost zero (the building is at the threshold 
of exceeding the CP limit state after being subjected to the mainshock) as the FBR increases. 
As the data points are considerably sparse in the region where FBR exceeds 0.01, a relatively 
low correlation of -0.44 is computed, indicating a weak linear relationship. 
  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 4-2. Residual structural capacity index 𝜅𝐶𝑃 in the aftershock environment versus (a) 
the mainshock intensity and (b) an example FBR  
Each observation in the raw dataset includes 84 PSDRs and RSDRs (one per story in each 
direction), 672 FBRs and FCRs, 252 CBRs and 420 CCSs and RTSs. The dimension of this 
feature space (2604) is much larger than that of the number of observations (272), making it 
impossible to use some of the more traditional statistical learning methods (e.g. OLS) to map 
component response patterns to residual structural capacity. Moreover, although all the features 
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are assumed to be available in the current study, this is unlikely to be the case for post-
earthquake inspection or even under remote sensing. As a result, a dispersion filter is combined 
with LASSO for feature selection, and SVM regression is used to predict residual structural 
capacity. The following procedure is used to incorporate pattern recognition in the assessment 
of residual structural capacity: 1) the observations in raw dataset are randomly partitioned into 
training (75%) and testing (25%) subsets; 2) the models are built based on pattern recognition 
using only the training subsets; 3) the optimal model selected from the previous step is applied 
to the testing subset. Residual Mean Squared Error (RMSE) is used as a measure of predictive 
performance. In Step 2, 10-fold cross-validation is performed, where a training set is randomly 
partitioned into 10 equal subsets and each time the data from 9 of the subsets are used to train 
a model while the RMSE from the remaining subset is measured to evaluate the model 
performance. This process is repeated 3 times to reduce the potential bias induced by data 
subset partitioning, and the final averaged RMSE is used to select the optimal model.  
4.3.2 Dispersion Filter of Features 
Our goal is to achieve an accurate assessment of residual structural capacity for the damaged 
tall building using a small subset of features that are relatively easy to measure and provide 
robust estimates. This could be addressed in two ways: 1) directly feed the raw data into 
advanced machine learning algorithms that have built-in feature selection or sparsity 
properties, which couples the feature search algorithm with the parameter estimation and 
performs optimization using a single objective function; 2) performing feature selection on the 
raw data before constructing predictive models. In many cases, the 1st way would be convenient 
and efficient enough to provide good predictions; however, the selected features could be very 
sensitive when multicollinearity exists as the model could randomly assign very different 
coefficients to highly correlated features. Moreover, some of the selected features could be 
very small (e.g. very small rotations or strains, which are vulnerable to noise) and very difficult 
to measure in engineering practice. In general, it is well understood that the dispersion in 
structural responses increases with the demand level and extent of inelastic response. 
Moreover, for elastic responses, the demand dispersions are generally very small (near zero) 
and provide very little information about the residual structural capacity of the damaged 
building. To reduce the number of uninformative features, the raw dataset of mainshock 
response demands are filtered by a cut-off value for the dispersion within each EDP group (e.g. 
rotations and strains). These cut-off values are treated as tuning parameters during model 
training. More specifically, they are obtained by searching within the range of measured 
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dispersions and selecting the optimal limits that give the best overall model performance. For 
example, the cut-off value for peak rotation dispersion [Fig. 4-3 (a)] is obtained by searching 
within the range of 0.005 to 0.030 at increments of 0.0025. Dispersions of 0.015 and 0.003 are 
used for rotations and strains respectively. The global EDPs (PSDRs and RSDRs) are not 
filtered because they have a limited number of raw features and relatively large dispersions. 
Fig. 4-3 shows the dispersion distributions together with corresponding cut-off values for two 
EDP groups (rotations and strains). For example, a total of 672 (corresponding to the number 
of beam hinges in the building) FBR dispersions are obtained from their associated 272 
observed values [Fig. 4-3 (a)]. From the 672 measured dispersions, 39% fall below 0.015 and 
432 remain after the filtering process. The number of post-filtered features in each EDP group 
is summarized in Table 4-1. Only 2 features are left for CCS, which are very close to the cut-
off value. This is likely because most of the compressive strains of the shear wall concrete 
come from gravity loads with only small changes resulting from the lateral forces induced by 
mainshocks, indicating CCS provides little information about the overall residual capacity of 
the damaged building. 
  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 4-3. Dispersion filter for (a) rotations and (b) strains 
4.3.3 LASSO-based Feature Selection 
First introduced by Tibshirani [77] in 1996, LASSO has been used to improve the stability 
and accuracy of traditional OLS models. This is achieved by penalizing the loss function of 
OLS regression using the 𝑙1 norm of the feature coefficients, as shown in Equation 4.1. More 
importantly, it also enables efficient feature selection in the original high dimensional space as 
it allows the optimal coefficients of a subset of the original feature space to shrinkage to zeros. 
LASSO can also potentially reduce the multicollinearity in the selected features. For example, 
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if a subset of features is highly correlated, only the one with the highest dispersion will be 
selected and the remainder will be removed as they penalize the objective function without 
providing substantial additional information. 
𝐽(𝒘, 𝜆) = ∑ 𝐿(𝑦𝑖 , ?̂?𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ 𝜆‖𝒘‖1 (4.1) 
Where,  𝑦𝑖 and ?̂?𝑖 are observed and predicted responses (residual structural capacity index,  
𝜅𝐶𝑃 in the current study) respectively; 𝒘 is the coefficient vector; 𝐿(𝑦𝑖 , ?̂?𝑖) = (𝑦𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖)
2 is the 
loss function of OLS regression where ?̂?𝑖 = 𝒘
𝑻𝒙𝒊 + 𝑤0  and 𝒙𝒊  is the feature vector 
representing each EDP group; 𝑁 is the number of observations (204) in the training dataset; 
𝜆 ≥ 0 is a regularization term used to penalize the complexity of the model. 
For a given value of 𝜆, there is a corresponding number of nonzero coefficients, the effective 
degrees of freedom of the model, which is denoted as 𝑑𝑓(𝜆). When 𝜆 = 0, there is no penalty 
and 𝑑𝑓(𝜆) is simply the total number of the features in the original dataset and an OLS solution 
is obtained. As 𝜆 increases, 𝑑𝑓(𝜆) shrinks to zero and the outcome is a naïve model, where the 
prediction is simply the mean of the observed responses. The approach described in Section  
4.3.1 is performed to find the optimal value of 𝜆′𝑠 for the 7 EDP groups (PSDR, RSDR, FBR, 
FCR, CBR, CCS, RTS) that remain after the filtering process described in Section 4.3.2. The 
parameter tuning ranges and the performance in terms of the mean RMSEs from 10-fold cross 
validation are presented in Fig. 4-4. a, while the corresponding 𝑑𝑓(𝜆)’s are summarized in 
Table 4-1. The optimal 𝜆 varies for different EDP groups to balance the amount of information 
(number of features) extracted from the original high dimension feature space and the 
complexity of the associated coefficients (overfitting). In general, features having relatively 
large dispersions and low correlations are desired by LASSO as they not only provide small 
absolute values but also reduce the size of coefficients. Therefore, LASSO regression is 
performed on the raw features without any preprocessing (e.g. centering and scaling) to avoid 
potential selection of features with small values and dispersions that are vulnerable to noise. 
Through the LASSO feature selection process, only 11 and 13 features are kept for PSDRs 
and RSDRs, respectively, giving an 86% reduction for global EDPs. The associated RMSEs of 
0.15 (PSDRs and RSDRs) are found for the training dataset, which are considerably higher 
than the 0.10 obtained from OLS regression using all 84 features in each group. Based on the 
more reliable measurement using the testing dataset, the PSDRs and RSDRs produce RMSEs 
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of 0.22 and 0.25, respectively for LASSO regression, while significantly poorer performance 
corresponding to RMSEs of 0.55 and 0.70, respectively, are obtained from the OLS regression, 
indicating obvious overfitting when all the features are included. More importantly, an OLS 
solution is not even possible for component EDPs such as FBR, which has much more features 
(412) even after the dispersion filter than the total available observations (204) in the training 
dataset. 38 features are selected for FBR, which comprises 9.2% of the dispersion-filtered 
features and only 5.6% of the raw feature space, while a relatively low RMSE of 0.30 is 
achieved. Even better prediction performances with RMSEs of 0.23 and 0.19 are found for the 
LASSO models constructed using 7.5% and 6.2% of the raw CBR and RTS features. However, 
when it comes to the FCR and CCS, none of the filtered features are selected, and the algorithm 
just prefers a naïve model with the prediction using the mean of the responses in the training 
dataset. It is somewhat self-explanatory for CCS as there are only two features left after the 
dispersion filter, which might not carry significant information; however, 241 features are still 
available for FCR after the filter but still none of them are selected. A possible explanation is 
that the strong-column-weak-beam principle used to design the RC frames makes most of the 
potential rotation demands or structural damage concentrated in the frame beams. Therefore, 
the rotation demands in the frame columns do not provide effective information about the 
overall performance of the tall building.  
Fig. 4-4. b shows the comparison of pairwise within-group correlation distributions of the 
component EDPs before and after the feature selection. Multicollinearity is observed for a 
portion of FBR and CBR as a considerable amount of correlations are larger than 0.8. The 
filtered 412 FBR features have a flat correlation distribution with a median around 0.4, while 
the correlation distribution of the 38 post-LASSO FBRs is skewed to the right with a median 
less than 0.2, indicating a significant reduction of the multicollinearity within the FBR group. 
Slightly lower correlations are overserved for CBR, but even higher correlations are found for 
RTS. This could be due to the fact that most of the features in these two groups have relatively 
high dispersions and are informative to the overall performance of the tall building, so the 
algorithm makes a trade-off between the reduction of the number of coefficients and the 
corresponding multicollinearity among them.  
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(a) (b) 
Fig. 4-4. (a) Parameter tuning of 𝝀’s in LASSO models for different EDP groups and (b) 
the comparison of within-group correlation distributions of the component EDPs before and 
after the LASSO feature selection 
Table 4-1. Results of dispersion filtering and LASSO regression 
EDP 
RMSE Number of Features 
Training Testing Raw Post-Filter Post-LASSO 
PSDR 0.15 0.22 84 84 11 
RSDR 0.15 0.25 84 84 13 
FBR 0.13 0.26 672 412 38 
FCR 0.29 0.30 672 241 0 
CBR 0.14 0.23 252 252 19 
CCS 0.29 0.30 420 2 0 
RTS 0.16 0.19 420 307 26 
 
A closer look at the locations and coefficients of the selected features in each EDP group 
could be useful for optimizing sensor layout. As none of the components in FCR and CCS 
survives the LASSO selection, only the results of PSDR, RSDR, FBR, CBR, and RTS are 
discussed. Fig. 4-5 (a) plots the dispersions of the raw features versus their corresponding 
locations in the building. The circles represent the selected features while the diamond dots 
denote the features that are excluded. The size of the circles indicates the relative importance 
of a feature as measured by the absolute value of the corresponding coefficient. In the X 
direction, PSDRs of the 34th, 10th and 19th stories are selected. The first two are the local 
maxima’s and the third is close to the location where the thickness and concrete strength of the 
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shear wall change. For similar reasons, two small clusters are observed at the 23rd and 32nd 
stories.  
  
(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
  
(e) (f) 
Fig. 4-5. LASSO-based selected and excluded features for (a) PSDR, (b) RSDR, FBR in 
the (c) X and (d) Z directions, (e) CBR and (f) RTS 
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A possible explanation for the selection of the PSDRs in the 1st and 41st stories is that they 
are at the very bottom and top of the building and may have lower correlations with the rest of 
the data and provides additional information. As shown Fig. 4-5 (b), the selected RSDRs in the 
two directions are somewhat comparable to the those of PSDRs, especially at the local 
maxima’s and stories where there is a change in the structural design, but they are more evenly 
distributed. The selected FBRs in the X and Z directions are presented in Fig. 4-5 (c) and (d), 
respectively. While they are adequately distributed in terms of both the location and the 
dispersions, some clusters could still be found around the 10th, 20th and 30th floors where there 
are changes in the structural designs. Some attention is also paid to the FBRs above the 30th 
floor where the wall width is the smallest and more contribution of the lateral resistance from 
the frames is potentially needed. Fig. 4-5 (e) and (f) show the patterns for the selected CBRs 
and RTSs, respectively.  Similar patterns with the selected FBRs could be found for both of 
them except that a considerable number of RTSs located at the first 10 stories are also selected. 
This is possibly because the demands at these stories are relatively large making the RTSs more 
sensitive to the overall building performance. Except for the abovementioned patterns, a few 
FBRs, CBRs, RTSs near the base and roof of the building are also selected. The possible 
reasons are the discontinuation of the RC frames at the 42nd story to accommodate a penthouse 
and the hinging that occurs in the walls at the lower stories. 
4.4 Pattern Recognition Using Support Vector Machine 
4.4.1 Support Vector Machine for Predicting Residual Structural Capacity Using the 
Selected Features 
While LASSO provides effective feature selection from the original high dimensional 
feature space, the prediction performance is limited as it could only capture the linear part of 
the relationship between the responses and features. As shown in Fig. 4-2 (b), there is a highly 
nonlinear and sparse relationship between the residual structural capacity index 𝜅𝐶𝑃  and 
selected features, which requires a more advanced model to ensure good predictive 
performance.  
The SVM technique was first introduced by Vapnik [78] in 1995 to solve binary 
classification problems and has since been extended to regression problems [79]. The basic 
idea is to transform the features of the input data into a high dimensional feature space such 
that they are easier to separate using a hyperplane for classification or are closer to a linear 
relationship for regression. An 𝑙2 norm is then used to regularize the risk objective function: 
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𝐽(𝒘, 𝜆) = ∑ 𝐿(𝑦𝑖 , ?̂?𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ 𝜆‖𝒘‖2
2 (4.2) 
Two key modifications, sparse estimation and kernel trick, are employed by SVM to update 
the risk objective function. A variant of the Huber loss function called 𝜖 -insensitive loss 
function is proposed by Vapnik [79], where only the data points lying outside a 𝜖-tube is 
penalized and is defined by: 
𝐿𝜖(𝑦𝑖 , ?̂?𝑖) ≝ {
0, |𝑦𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖| < 𝜖
|𝑦𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖| − 𝜖, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 (4.3) 
Where 𝜖 is the width of the 𝜖-tube used to fit the training dataset. 
By substituting 𝐿𝜖(𝑦𝑖 , ?̂?𝑖) into Equation 4.2 and dividing the objective function by 1 2𝜆⁄ , 
one obtains: 
𝐽(𝒘, 𝐶) = 𝐶 ∑ 𝐿𝜖(𝑦𝑖 , ?̂?𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
+
1
2
‖𝒘‖2
2 (4.4) 
Where 𝐶 = 1 2𝜆⁄  is also a regularization term. 
This objective function is convex and unconstrained, but not differentiable. Therefore, slack 
variables 𝜉+ ≥ 0 and 𝜉− ≥ 0 are then introduced by Equation 4.5 to transform it into the 
constrained optimization problem given by Equation 4.6. 
{
𝑦𝑖 ≤ ?̂?𝑖 + 𝜖 + 𝜉
+
𝑦𝑖 ≥ ?̂?𝑖 − 𝜖 − 𝜉
− (4.5) 
𝐽(𝒘, 𝐶) = 𝐶 ∑(𝜉+ + 𝜉−)
𝑁
𝑖=1
+
1
2
‖𝒘‖2
2 (4.6) 
It is known that the optimal solution of the optimization problem has the form ?̂? = ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝒙𝑖𝑖  
[80]. As a key characteristic of the 𝜖-insensitive loss function, the 𝜶 vector is sparse, and only 
𝒙𝑖  with 𝛼𝑖 > 0 are used in the model and are the so-called support vectors. The predicted 
response given a new data point 𝒙 could be written as: 
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?̂?(𝑥) = 𝑤0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝒙𝑖
𝑇𝒙
𝑖
 (4.7) 
The kernel trick is then applied using a radial basis function (RBF): 
𝑘(𝒙𝑖 , 𝒙) = exp (−
‖𝒙𝑖 − 𝒙‖2
2
2𝜎2
) (4.8) 
Finally, the kernelized solution in Equation 4.9 is achieved by replacing the dot product 𝒙𝑖
𝑇𝒙 
with the RBF kernel 𝑘(𝒙𝑖 , 𝒙), and optimization algorithms are used to estimate the sparse 𝜶. 
Readers are referred to [78] for details of the optimization algorithms. 
?̂?(𝑥) = 𝑤0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑘(𝒙𝑖 , 𝒙)
𝑖
 (4.9) 
As it is almost impossible to have a simple answer for the best parameters 𝜎′s and 𝐶′𝑠 using 
different selected features, SVM regression is performed repeatedly on a turning grid where 𝜎 
ranges from 2-10 to 210 and 𝐶 ranges from 2-15 to 1. Example tuning results for PSDR and FBR 
are shown in Fig. 4-6. The optimal point with the lowest mean RMSE from the 10-fold cross-
validation is found to be  𝜎 = 0.02 and 𝐶 = 8 for the selected PSDRs and be  𝜎 = 0.01 and 
𝐶 = 1 for the selected FBRs.  
  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 4-6. Tuning results of σ and C using selected futures from (a) PSDR and (b) FBR  
The predictive performance (based on RMSE) of six SVM models, which are developed 
using the selected features, is summarized in Table 4-2. The models vary based on the EDP 
groups that are considered. Five of the models are based on individual EDP groups (PSDR, 
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RSDR, FBR, CBR, and RTS) and the sixth model incorporates all groups as predictors. The 𝜎 
and 𝐶 parameters used for each model is also shown in Table 4-2. The model based on all EDP 
groups represents an ideal situation where measurements of both local and global response 
parameters are available. As expected, this model has the lowest RMSE and therefore performs 
the best. The models based on individual EDPs represent a more likely scenario where only 
one type of measurement (e.g. only CBRs) is available. Among these models, the ones based 
on RSDR and CBR provide the best 𝜅𝐶𝑃 predictions with testing set RMSE values that are less 
than 5% higher than that of the model based on all EDPs. The observed and predicted 𝜅𝐶𝑃′𝑠 
are compared in Fig. 4-7 for both the training and testing datasets using the selected CBR 
features. Despite some local variations, a strong trend along the diagonal (predicted = observed) 
is observed, which gives an overall indication of satisfactory predictive performance. To 
benchmark their predictive capability, the RMSEs of the SVM models based on individual 
EDP groups are compared with those obtained from LASSO models. Using the selected CBRs 
and RSDRs as the features, the RMSEs from the SVM models are found to be 36% and 30% 
less than those from the LASSO models, respectively. 
  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 4-7. Comparing the observed and predicted 𝜅𝐶𝑃’s in (a) the training and (b) testing 
dataset using the selected CBR features 
4.4.2 Support Vector Machine Using the Randomly Sampled Reserved Features 
Although the multicollinearity is not preferred in the feature selection, it is desired between 
the selected and reserved EDPs as it enables the possibility of using the latter to predict 𝜅𝐶𝑃 
when the selected features are unavailable. Take the case where the rotation of a coupling beam 
on the 20th floor level is needed by the model, but only the rotation of an 18th floor level 
coupling beam is available. If the demands in these two elements are highly correlated, the 18th 
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floor coupling beam rotation can be used to obtain a satisfactory prediction. For each selected 
feature, all reserved features that have correlations (with the selected feature) above a certain 
threshold are grouped. Fig. 4-8 shows 6 example groups of reserved features for FBR and CBR 
in the X and Z directions with correlation thresholds of 0.95 and 0.90, respectively. It can be 
seen that the features in the same group tend to be located in the same direction and on adjacent 
floors, but considerable variation still exist such that no simple rules could be used to define 
each group. It should be noted that all these features need proper preprocessing before they can 
be fed to the predictive models, i.e., centering by the means and scaling by the dispersions, 
which removes the individual scale effect but keeps the linear relationship. This procedure is 
not performed for PSDRs and RSDRs as they have considerably fewer features and lower 
correlations between the selected and the reserved features in their groups. 
  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 4-8. Example groups of reserve features for (a) FBR and (b) CBR 
An original observation consists of a residual structural capacity index 𝜅𝐶𝑃  and 
corresponding features, which are categorized based on being filtered (pre-LASSO), reserved 
and selected.  The models constructed earlier utilize only the selected features to predict 𝜅𝐶𝑃; 
to evaluate the predictive performance using the reserved features, a virtual observation could 
be simulated by replacing each selected feature with one that is randomly sampled from the 
corresponding reserved group and keeping the same 𝜅𝐶𝑃. For example, an original observation 
has 19 selected CBRs, and a virtual observation is generated by replacing each of them with a 
different CBR in its reserved group. For each original observation, 100 virtual observations are 
sampled resulting in 20,400 and 6,800 virtual observations for the training and testing datasets, 
respectively. As the characteristics of all the features are not fundamentally changed, the same 
tuning parameters 𝜎′𝑠 and 𝐶′𝑠 from Section 4.4.1 are used to train the new SVM models, 
Z X Z X Z X Z X 
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whose predictive performances are also shown in Table 4-2. Consistent increases in RMSEs in 
the testing dataset are found, which is expected as additional randomness is introduced into the 
model. On the other hand, with a maximum increase of only 9.4% in the RMSE compared to 
the model constructed using the selected features, the SVM models based on the reserved 
features still perform significantly better than the LASSO models. 
Table 4-2. Predictive performance of  𝜅𝐶𝑃 using SVM 
EDP 𝜎 𝐶 
RMSE 
Selected Features Reserved Features Change 
Training Testing Training Testing 
PSDR 0.02 8.0 0.14 0.17 NA1 NA1 NA1 
RSDR 0.02 1.0 0.12 0.16 NA1 NA1 NA1 
FBR 0.01 1.0 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.19 9.4% 
CBR 0.06 4.0 0.12 0.16 0.13 0.17 6.3% 
RTS 0.01 0.5 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.20 5.1% 
All 0.01 1.0 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.18 NA1 
1Reserved features are not used for PSDR and RSDR models 
4.4.3 Example Application of Pattern Recognition Approach to Assessing Post-
Earthquake Residual Capacity 
This section presents an example application of the proposed pattern recognition approach 
to assessing the residual structural capacity of damaged tall buildings. A hypothetical scenario 
is considered, where an instrumented tall building is subjected to a sequence of earthquakes, 
each of which causes increasingly severe damage. The instrumentation layout can be informed 
by the results from Section 4.3.3 where sensors are only used for the responses parameters 
identified in the LASSO-based feature selection (e.g. 19 CBRs). Where feasible, an additional 
set of sensors can be used to capture a small number of reserved features. Once the SVM model 
is constructed based on these selected and reserved features, response measurements recorded 
during an earthquake can be used to generate real-time 𝜅𝐶𝑃  predictions, which can inform 
decisions regarding the need for detailed inspections and/or whether the damaged building is 
safe to reoccupy. It is important to note that, in the case of a non-instrumented building, the 
EDP-based features used in the current study can be coupled with damage fragility functions 
and the SVM model constructed using physical damage states as the features. Using this 
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approach, 𝜅𝐶𝑃  predictions can be obtained from observed damage gathered during field 
inspections. 
Fig. 4-9 shows the results from a hypothetical scenario where the building is subjected to a 
mainshock followed by four aftershocks (denoted AS-1 through AS-4), which are assumed to 
occur on the 2nd, 4th, 12th and 26th day after the first event. Fig. 4-9 (a) shows that  𝜅𝐶𝑃 drops to 
0.94 right after a mainshock. Subsequent reductions in 𝜅𝐶𝑃  are observed following each 
aftershock with the value dropping to as low as 0.78. To inform the decision regarding 
reoccupancy of the damaged building, a minimum 𝜅𝐶𝑃 can be defined, whereby the building is 
deemed unsafe if the value falls below this threshold. Using a minimum 𝜅𝐶𝑃 of 0.9 for the 
hypothetical scenario, the building is deemed safe to occupy right after the mainshock. 
However, given that the value of 𝜅𝐶𝑃 drops to 0.82 following the third aftershock, which occurs 
on the 12th day, the building is considered unsafe and must be evacuated. Recall that 𝜅𝐶𝑃 is the 
ratio of the median first-mode spectral acceleration associated with the CP limit state for the 
intact and damaged structure. Using an assumed dispersion of 0.6 [12] and using the predicted 
𝜅𝐶𝑃 to compute ?̂?𝑎𝐶𝑃,𝐷𝑀𝐺, the pattern recognition model can be used to generate a lognormal 
time-dependent fragility functions for the CP limit state [Fig. 4-9 (b)]. These fragility functions 
can be combined with time-dependent aftershock hazard curves to obtained risk-based 
assessments of the tall building performance in the aftershock environment [70]. 
  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 4-9. (a) Predicted 𝜅𝐶𝑃 values and (b) CP fragility functions for a hypothetical 
scenario where the building is subjected to a mainshock followed by four aftershocks 
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4.5 Conclusion 
A pattern recognition approach is developed to quantitatively assess the residual structural 
capacity of tall buildings. Sequential NRHAs are conducted using as-recorded mainshock-
aftershock ground motions pairs, where the building is subjected to various mainshocks scaled 
to different intensity levels, followed by multiple stripe analyses using a set of aftershock 
ground motions. The peak story drift ratio (PSDR) corresponding to the collapse prevention 
(CP) performance criteria (0.045), which is recommended by the Tall Buildings Initiative and 
Los Angeles Tall Buildings Structural Design Council, is used as the basis of evaluating the 
performance of the mainshock-damaged building. More specifically, the ratio of the median 
first-mode spectral acceleration corresponding to the CP performance level for the intact and 
damaged structure, 𝜅𝐶𝑃, is used as the measure of the residual structural capacity. 
A total of 7 EDP groups are examined in detail to understand how they contribute to the 
residual structural capacity. The global EDPs include PSDR and residual story drift ratios. 
Maximum frame beam and column rotation (FBR and FCR, respectively), coupling beam 
rotation (CBR), maximum concrete compression strain (CCS) and rebar tensile strain (RTS) in 
shear walls, are the local EDPs. Effective feature dimension reduction and informative feature 
selection are conducted using dispersion-based filtering and Least Absolute Shrinkage and 
Selection Operator (LASSO) regression. Support Vector Machines (SVMs) are then used to 
predict 𝜅𝐶𝑃. To train the LASSO and SVM models, 10-fold cross-validations are used to find 
the optimal model parameters. The features excluded by LASSO are used to generate the 
reserved dataset, which, through a random simulation process, enables the construction of 
alternative predictive models.  
Pattern recognition models are constructed for the different EDP groups built on a 
significantly smaller (compared to the raw data) feature space. The global EDPs are observed 
to be strong indicators of the reduction in structural capacity possibly because they are directly 
associated with the CP performance metric. However, only the FBR, CBR and RTS give 
informative predictions and a weak relationship was found between the FCR and CCS and 𝜅𝐶𝑃. 
For FCR, this is likely due to the strong-column-weak-beam principle used to design the 
reinforced concrete frames, which seeks to limit plastic rotation demands in the frame columns. 
As for CCS, it is possible that most of the compressive strains in the shear wall concrete come 
from gravity loads with only small changes resulting from the lateral forces induced by 
mainshocks. While it is useful for feature selection, the predictive performance of LASSO is 
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limited due to the highly nonlinear relationship between 𝜅𝐶𝑃 and features. SVM with radial 
basis function kernel is able to significantly reduce the root mean square errors using the 
selected features. Moreover, the reserved features can be used when the selected ones are 
unavailable, within minimal loss in the predictive accuracy.  
The proposed methodology provides a rapid link between the structural responses 
measured during an earthquake to the building performance in subsequent events. This 
information can be used to optimize the placement of sensors used to measure such responses 
and guide engineers performing post-earthquake inspections and assessments of residual 
structural capacity, which can be updated in real-time as structural response data becomes 
available. Only a single tall building was considered in the development of the methodology. 
To generalize its feasibility, additional evaluations are needed using other tall buildings with 
different structural configurations and lateral force resisting systems. Finally, the analyses used 
to generate the response patterns only incorporated record-to-record uncertainty. Prior studies 
have shown that modeling uncertainty can affect both the dispersion and median values of 
limit-state-based performance metrics. Therefore, for implementation purposes, the effect of 
modeling uncertainty should be incorporated in future work. 
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 CHAPTER 5: Seismic Risk Assessment of Tall Buildings 
Considering Mainshock and Aftershock Hazard 
This chapter is adopted from the following study: 
Zhang, Y., Burton, H. V., Shokrabadi, M. & Wallace J. W. (2019). Seismic risk assessment 
of a 42-story reinforced concrete dual-system building considering mainshock and aftershock 
hazard. ASCE Journal of Structural Engineering (accepted for publication). 
5.1 Introduction and background 
High-rise buildings are often an integral part of the residential, commercial and cultural 
development of urban centers. Several tall buildings, which are either newly-completed or 
under construction, can be found in high-seismicity hazard regions on the west coast of the 
United States in cities such as Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego. 
Aside from the direct financial losses resulting from structural and non-structural damage, 
significant downtime in high-rise buildings following a major earthquake could have a rippling 
negative effect on the local economy. Seismic risk assessment is one of the techniques that can 
be used to assess these concerns and can be used to inform decision-making in both pre- and 
post-earthquake environment. 
Advancements in seismic hazard analysis, nonlinear response simulation, and 
performance-based engineering are enabling better assessment of the risk associated with tall 
buildings from earthquakes and other hazards. Organizations such as the Los Angeles Tall 
Buildings Structural Design Council (LATBSDC) and the Pacific Earthquake Engineering 
Research (PEER) Center have developed tools and guidelines that permit rigorous design and 
assessment procedures. 
Several high-rise building cases were developed and analyzed as part of the PEER Tall 
Buildings Initiative  (TBI) project [81], including a 42-story concrete core wall residential 
building, a 42-story concrete dual core wall/frame system and a 40-story office building with 
buckling restrained braces (BRB) [52,82–84]. These building cases have since been the subject 
of numerous studies. Jayaram et al. [85] implemented the ATC-58 guidelines to develop 
vulnerability functions for a set of tall buildings (including two of the TBI buildings) relating 
ground motion spectral intensities to direct economic losses. Jones and Zareian [86] evaluated 
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the seismic performance of three variations of the TBI 40-story BRB building. Tipler et al. [87] 
evaluated the seismic performance of several variants of the TBI, 42-story core wall building 
using financial losses and functional downtime as the performance metrics of interest and also 
examined the effect of incorporating damped outriggers and base isolation as alternative 
schemes intended to enhance seismic performance.  
The aforementioned studies only considered mainshock hazard in the seismic performance 
assessment of tall buildings; however, major mainshock seismic events are known to be 
followed by a cluster of aftershock events in a relatively short time period. Despite being 
smaller in magnitude than their preceding mainshock, aftershocks could be particularly 
impactful because of their high rate of occurrence and the reduction in the structural capacity 
mainshock-damaged buildings. Documented losses from several earthquakes (e.g., 2011 
Christchurch, 2011 Tohoku, and 2016 Central Italy earthquakes) have highlighted the role of 
aftershocks in exacerbating the financial and human implications of major mainshock events 
[9,10,88].  
In recent years, several studies have attempted to characterize the impact of aftershocks on 
the seismic performance of buildings. Jeon et al. [67] proposed a framework for developing 
aftershock damage fragility curves for reinforced concrete frames. The application of the 
framework to a series of 4- to 12-story non-ductile frames showed that the aftershock 
vulnerability of buildings is greatly affected by the level of mainshock-damage. A study by 
Burton and Sharma [89] on the post-mainshock seismic performance of reinforced concrete 
frame buildings with infills found that infill strut axial deformations and story drift demand 
metrics are the most informative indicators of the aftershock residual collapse capacity. Burton 
et al. [71] also explored the accuracy and stability of different statistical models for estimating 
aftershock collapse vulnerability of buildings using predictors including mainshock intensity, 
structural response, and physical damage indicators. Yeo and Cornell [68] proposed a 
framework for estimating earthquake-induced monetary losses under mainshock-aftershock 
sequences. While these and other similar studies on mainshock-aftershock seismic performance 
assessment [32,90,91] have advanced our understanding of the additional seismic risk to 
buildings posed by aftershocks, none-to-date have focused on high-rise buildings, which are 
typically designed using alternative (or performance-based) procedures. Zhang and Burton [92] 
used a pattern recognition approach to assess the residual structural capacity of an earthquake-
damaged tall building, however, the effect of time-dependent aftershock hazard was not 
considered. 
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The present study examines the seismic performance of a 42-story reinforced concrete dual 
system building considering mainshock and aftershock hazards. A Markov process is 
implemented, which accounts for the uncertainty in the seismic hazard (mainshock and 
aftershock) and the time-dependent building structural damage following the mainshock. The 
elevated seismic activity that follows the mainshock is captured using the aftershock 
probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (APSHA) methodology developed by Yeo and Cornell 
[62]. The time-dependent probability of exceeding various response demand limits over a pre-
defined period considering only mainshock and mainshock-aftershock hazard is compared. The 
risk-based consistency (or lack thereof) of the limit state acceptance criteria for EDPs suggested 
by TBI [81] and LATBSDC [53] is also examined. It is worth noting that, while there are more 
recent versions of these guidelines (e.g. TBI 2017 and LATBSDC 2017), there are have been 
no major changes to the modeling and acceptance criteria that would influence the key findings 
of the current study. 
5.2 Seismic Demand and Vulnerability Assessment 
The 42-story dual system tall building described and modeled in Chapter 3 is used as the 
archetype in the assessment. The set of 34 pairs of mainshock and aftershock ground motions 
are used for the sequential NRHAs. 
5.2.1 Nonlinear Response History Analyses 
The design procedures provided by TBI Guidelines [76] and LATBSDC [93] use both local 
(component-level) and global EDPs to evaluate collapse prevention performance at the MCE 
hazard level. Table 5-1 summarizes the deformation-based EDPs and their demand limits 
associated with the collapse prevention performance level. Note that these limits are used as 
indicators of potential collapse and are not explicitly associated with the collapse state [94]. In 
other words, explicit collapse simulations are not within the scope of the current study. To 
characterize the structural response and evaluate the performance of the mainshock-damaged 
42-story reinforced concrete dual system structure in the aftershock environment, NRHAs are 
performed using mainshock-aftershock sequential ground motions. A forty-five second free-
vibration period is added following the mainshock record to ensure that the structure comes to 
rest (i.e. all nodes are at zero velocity) before it is subjected to the aftershock record. Prior to 
this, the performance of the intact or undamaged building is assessed by subjecting the 
structural model to only the mainshock ground motions scaled to MCE hazard level (𝑆𝑎𝑇1 =
0.20𝑔). The principal horizontal directions of the building are referred to as the X- and Z-
  
 
 
66 
Direction [Fig. 3-1 (b)]. Fig. 5-1 shows the peak story drift ratio (PSDR) profile in the two 
horizontal directions, including the response to the individual ground motions as well as the 
mean, median, 16th and 84th percentile response. Two analyses are conducted for each 
mainshock ground motion pair by switching the orthogonal direction of each record. The 
median PSDR in X-Direction is 1.1% at the 32nd story and the dispersion, which is described 
in terms of the log-standard deviation is 0.42. The median PSDR in Z-Direction is 1.0% at the 
29th story and the lognormal dispersion is 0.43. The mean PSDR along height is 1.4% at the 
29th story and 1.2% at the 10th story for X- and Z-Directions respectively, which satisfies the 
design requirements of the TBI report [84].  
Table 5-1. Collapse prevention performance criteria defined based on EDP limits 
[52,76,93] 
Description Notation Acceptance Criteria 
Peak Story Drift Ratio PSDR 3.0% 
Residual Story Drift Ratio RSDR 1.0% 
Frame Beam Rotation FBR 4.5% 
Coupling Beam Rotation CBR 6.0% 
Concrete Compression Strain CCS 0.015 
Rebar Tension Strain RTS 0.050 
 
   
(a) (b) 
Fig. 5-1. PSDR profile in the X- and Z-Direction under the mainshock only 
A comparative assessment of the effect of mainshock-damage on the amplification of the 
peak demand levels corresponding to the response parameters in Table 5-1 is presented. To 
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conduct this assessment, sequential NRHAs are performed with each mainshock ground 
motion scaled to the MCE hazard level, which is followed by incremental dynamic analyses 
(IDAs) with the aftershock ground motions scaled with 𝑆𝑎𝑇1 ranging from 0.025𝑔 to 0.25𝑔 at 
increments of 0.025𝑔. Since the intent of the analyses performed in this section is not to 
quantify aftershock risk (this is done in the section of Aftershock Seismic Risk), the mean rate 
of exceedance for each of the aftershock intensities is not considered. The goal here is to 
evaluate whether there are systematic differences in the extent to which the demand levels for 
the various types of EDPs (e.g. PSDR versus CBR) are affected by mainshock damage. The 
MCE hazard level is chosen because it is expected to induce levels of damage that would 
highlight these differences. The range of aftershock intensities is selected to be sufficient for 
constructing the limit state fragility curves. The orthogonal directions of the ground motions 
are switched for each pair, which means that a single sequence corresponds to 4 analyses, which 
captures the uncertainty in the directions of mainshock-aftershock ground motions relative to 
the principal axes of the building. 
Fig. 5-2 compares the median peak values of the 6 EDPs for the intact structure analyzed 
using MCE level shaking (mainshock-only analyses) and the mainshock-damaged structure 
(mainshock ground motion scaled to MCE) subjected to an aftershock ground motion scaled to 
0.15𝑔 (mainshock-aftershock analyses). In each plot, X-MS and Z-MS denote the responses in 
the X and Z directions from the mainshock-only analyses and X-MSAS and Z-MSAS are from 
the mainshock-aftershock analyses. Fig. 5-2 (a) shows that the median PSDR in X-Direction 
increases from 1.1% in mainshock-only analyses to 1.2% under aftershock while the Z-
Direction PSDRs are similar for mainshock-only and mainshock-aftershock. It is worth 
recalling that the intensity of the mainshock (0.25𝑔) is higher than that of the aftershock 
(0.15𝑔). Significant amplifications are observed in Fig. 5-2 (b) for residual story drift ratios 
(RSDR), with a 70% increase in the X-Direction at median demand level (0.17% to 0.29%) 
and 44% in the Z-Direction (0.34% to 0.49 %). This observation suggests that, in the aftershock 
environment, RSDR demands are more sensitive to mainshock-damage compared to PSDR. 
As shown in Fig. 5-2 (c), the mainshock-aftershock median of the maximum hinge rotations in 
the moment frame beams is 30% higher in Z-Direction but only 9% higher in X-Direction. In 
Fig. 5-2 (d), the median of the maximum coupling beam hinge rotations increases from 3.4% 
to 4.5% and from 5.1% to 7.1% in the X- and Z-Direction, respectively, representing 33% and 
39% increases. Fig. 5-2 (d)-(e) compares the median peak compression and tension strains at 
wall boundaries. The mainshock-aftershock compressive strains are 16% and 47% higher in X-  
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(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
  
(e) (f) 
Fig. 5-2. Median profile of maximum (a) story drift ratio, (b) residual story drift ratio, (c) 
beam hinge rotation, (d) coupling beam hinge rotation, (e) wall compression strain and (f) 
wall tension strain. 
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and Z-Direction; while the corresponding tension strains increase by 16% and 7%, respectively. 
The strain increases are mainly concentrated at the 20th and 30th story where the design of 
wall sections and reinforcement are reduced. 
Fig. 5-3 (a) shows a plot of the ratio of the median maximum response demands between 
the mainshock-only and mainshock-aftershock analyses (demand ratio) versus the ratio 
between the aftershock and mainshock intensity (intensity ratio), where the maximum of the 
X- and Z-Direction responses are used to compute the intensity ratio. It can be observed that, 
when the structure is damaged by MCE level mainshock, aftershock ground motions with only 
75% intensity of that mainshock (intensity ratio of 0.75) can generate response demands which 
are higher than the mainshock (demand ratio greater than 1.0). The extent of this response 
amplification is different for different EDPs.  For example, Fig. 5-3 (b) shows a plot of the 
intensity ratio that corresponds to a demand ratio of 1.0 for all six EDPs. RSDR is observed to 
have the lowest intensity ratio (0.31) and is, therefore, the most sensitive mainshock-damage. 
The CBR and CCS also have lower intensity ratios (0.35 and 0.36, respectively), while the 
FBR, PSDR, and RTS are considerably less sensitive.  
   
(a) (b) 
Fig. 5-3. (a) Ratio of the response demands between the mainshock-only and mainshock-
aftershock analyses (demand ratio) versus the ratio between the aftershock and mainshock 
intensity (intensity ratio) and (b) intensity ratio corresponding to a demand ratio of 1.0 for all 
six EDPs 
5.2.2 Limit State Fragility Functions 
Fragility functions linking the probability of exceeding the individual response demand 
limits in Table 5-1 and the ground motion intensity measure under mainshock-only and 
mainshock-aftershock analyses are presented in Fig. 5-4. The mainshock-aftershock fragility 
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functions all correspond to MCE level mainshock damage. Fragility functions showing the 
probability of not achieving the collapse prevention (CP) performance level (as defined by 
TBI), which corresponds to the case where any of the six EDP limits are exceeded, are also 
shown in Fig. 5-4. Comparing the mainshock-only [Fig. 5-4 (a)] and mainshock-aftershock 
fragility functions [Fig. 5-4 (b)], lower median intensity corresponding to each EDP limit state 
and higher levels of dispersion are observed for the latter. For example, the median capacity 
for FBRs for the mainshock-only fragility is 0.36𝑔 and the log-standard deviation is 0.40, while 
the same parameters for the mainshock-aftershock case are 0.17𝑔 and 1.74, respectively. Fig. 
5-4 shows that the collapse prevention performance level is controlled by the CBR. In other 
words, the limit state for this EDP has the highest exceedance probability across all mainshock 
and aftershock intensity levels and the fragility function overlaps with that of the collapse 
prevention performance level. Recall from Table 5-1 that, in accordance with TBI and the 
LATBSDC design guidelines, a 6% coupling beam rotation limit is used for the collapse 
prevention performance level. However, prior experimental investigations on the cyclic 
response of coupling beams showed that residual strength (10% to 20% of the capping strength) 
is maintained at rotation demands as high as 10% [95]. RSDR limit state has the next highest 
exceedance probability and peak compression strain has the lowest. For the mainshock-only 
case, PSDR has higher exceedance probabilities than FBR and RTS. However, the reverse is 
true for the mainshock-aftershock case; the FBR and RTS states have higher exceedance 
probabilities compared to PSDR, which again highlights the differences in the extent to which 
mainshock damage is reflected in the different EDPs. 
   
(a) (b) 
Fig. 5-4. Fragility functions of the 6 EDPs for (a) mainshock-only and (b) mainshock-
aftershock cases, where the mainshock intensity is set at the MCE-level 
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5.3 Seismic Risk Assessment 
Two categories of risk assessment are conducted in the aftershock environment. The first, 
which is described as aftershock risk, computes the probability of exceeding some limit state 
conditioned on a known mainshock event and immediate post-mainshock damage state of the 
structure. The second considers the uncertainty in the mainshock and aftershock hazard and is 
referred to as mainshock-aftershock risk. For both categories of assessments, a Markov process 
model is used to quantify the probability that the structure incrementally transitions through 
different states of damage at any point in time following a mainshock earthquake (Yeo and 
Cornell 2005).  
5.3.1 PSDR-Based Building Damage States and Fragility Functions 
PSDR is often used as an indicator of the reduction in the lateral force resisting capacity of 
damaged buildings under sequential ground motions [21,32,33,68,69,72] and is adopted in this 
study as a proxy for the building-level damage states. Limit states of primary interest are the 
EDP-based criteria defined in Table 5-1. The incremental PSDR-based damage states are only 
used to consider the uncertainty in building-level damage after being subjected to mainshock 
or aftershock ground motions. Alternatively, an energy-based measure of global damage [96] 
could be used; however, given the large number of components in the structure under 
consideration, this would significantly increase the computational expense of the proposed 
assessments as it requires recording the full cyclic hysteric response of all components and 
integration to compute the energy dissipation. In addition to the intact or undamaged structure, 
eleven damage states corresponding to PSDRs ranging from 0.25% to 5.25% at 0.5% 
increments are used for the Markov chain model described in the section of Aftershock Seismic 
Risk. In the following sections, the center point or median value of the associated increment 
interval denotes each PSDR-based damage state. For example, the 1st damage state has an 
interval from 0.25% to 0.75%, which is denoted by PSDR = 0.5%.  
For both the mainshock and mainshock-aftershock risk assessment, fragility functions 
describing the probability of transitioning from the intact structure to a higher state of damage, 
conditioned on the mainshock intensity, are needed. These fragility functions are generated 
using the results from multiple stripe analyses (MSA) with the ground motion intensity (𝑆𝑎𝑇1) 
ranging from 0.05𝑔  to 0.6𝑔  at increments of 0.025𝑔 . The 34 mainshock ground motions 
described earlier are used, where the geometric mean 𝑆𝑎𝑇1 of the two horizontal components 
of each record is used for scaling. For each 𝑆𝑎𝑇1 increment, the building is subjected to the two 
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possible direction combinations of the two components of each ground motion, which results 
in a total of 1564 NRHAs. The lognormal cumulative distribution function (CDF) shown in 
Equation 5.3 is adopted for fitting the fragility function of each PSDR-based damage state.  
𝑓𝑘
𝑀𝑆(𝑖𝑚) = Φ (
ln(𝑖𝑚) − ln (𝜃𝑘
𝑀𝑆)
𝛽𝑘
𝑀𝑆 ) (5.3) 
where; 𝑓𝑘
𝑀𝑆(𝑖𝑚) is the probability of exceeding the 𝑘𝑡ℎ PSDR-based damage state (𝑘 =
1, … ,11) when subjected to a mainshock ground motion with 𝐼𝑀 = 𝑖𝑚; Φ is the standard 
normal CDF; 𝜃𝑘
𝑀𝑆  and 𝛽𝑘
𝑀𝑆  are the median and dispersion of the 𝑘𝑡ℎ  PSDR-based damage 
fragility function. The maximum likelihood method [97–99] is used for parameter estimation 
and the median 𝜃𝑘
𝑀𝑆 increases monotonically with 𝑘 since all the lower damage states must be 
exceeded before the building transitions into a higher state. The lognormal dispersion 
𝛽𝑘
𝑀𝑆varies from 0.29 to 0.41, and is generally higher for the more severe damage states. 
In the aftershock environment, the fragility functions capture the probability of 
transitioning from any PSDR-based damage state (including the intact state) to another that is 
more severe. The aftershock fragility functions are developed using sequential response history 
analyses where the mainshock ground motions are iteratively scaled to induce the desired 
PSDR corresponding to each damage state. The mainshock NRHA is followed by a series of 
MSAs using the aftershock ground motions to obtain the fragility functions for states that are 
higher than the known conditioning damage state. Ten 𝑆𝑎𝑇1 increments ranging from 0.06𝑔 to 
0.6𝑔 are used to balance computational expense with the accuracy of the maximum likelihood 
estimation. All 4 possible direction combinations of the two components from mainshock-
aftershock ground motion pairs are considered, resulting in a total of 14,960 sequential 
NRHAs. The analyses were conducted using 500 cores on the UCLA Hoffman2 Cluster for 4 
weeks. Equation 5.4 defines conditional fragility functions. 
𝑓𝑖,𝑗
𝐴𝑆(𝑖𝑚) = Φ (
ln(𝑖𝑚) − ln (𝜃𝑖,𝑗
𝐴𝑆)
𝛽𝑖,𝑗
𝐴𝑆 ) (5.4) 
where 𝑖 ≤ 𝑗; 𝑖 = 0, … ,10 and 𝑗 = 1, … ,11; 𝑓𝑖,𝑗
𝐴𝑆(𝑖𝑚) is the probability that the building 
with an existing damage state 𝑖 will exceed damage state 𝑗 when subjected to an aftershock 
ground motion with 𝐼𝑀 = 𝑖𝑚; 𝜃𝑖,𝑗
𝐴𝑆 and 𝛽𝑖,𝑗
𝐴𝑆  are the median and dispersion of a conditional 
fragility function between damage states 𝑖  and 𝑗 . Repair activities in the aftershock 
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environment are not considered; therefore 𝑓𝑖,𝑗
𝐴𝑆(𝑖𝑚) = 0 when 𝑖 > 𝑗 as transitions from higher 
to lower damage states are not possible. The lognormal dispersion 𝛽𝑘
𝐴𝑆varies from 0.37 to 1.39 
and is generally higher for the more severe damage states. 𝛽𝑘
𝐴𝑆 is generally larger than 𝛽𝑘
𝑀𝑆 as 
more uncertainties are expected when aftershocks are incorporated. 
Fig. 5-5 presents a sample comparison of fragility curves showing the probability of 
exceeding different PDSR levels for the intact building and the damage state corresponding to 
median PSDR = 1.5% (PSDR interval from 1.25% to 1.75%). Fragility functions for PSDRs 
ranging from 1.25% to 5.25% are shown for the intact case [Fig. 5-5 (a)] and 2.25% to 5.25% 
for the immediate post-mainshock PSDR = 1.5% case [Fig. 5-5 (b)]. Considerably lower 
medians and higher dispersions are observed for the latter, confirming that the conditional 
fragility functions capture the degradation of the structural capacity in the mainshock-damaged 
building. 
  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 5-5. Aftershock fragility functions for (a) the intact state and (b) the PSDR = 1.5% 
damage state 
5.3.2 Conditional Probability of Exceeding EDP-based Limit States 
In the next two sections, the seismic risk is assessed in terms of the time-dependent 
probability of exceeding the structural response demand limits set by the TBI and LATBSDC 
(shown in Table 5-1) considering both mainshock and aftershock hazards. To compute these 
exceedance probabilities, the relationship between the EDP limits shown in Table 5-1 and the 
PSDR-based damage states is established. For each EDP limit, the probability of exceedance 
conditioned on the PSDR-based damage state is obtained by fitting the empirical data with a 
lognormal distribution according to Equation 5.5. 
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(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
 
(e) 
Fig. 5-6. Conditional probability of exceeding EDP levels for (a) RSDR, (b) FBR, (c) 
CBR, (d) CCS and (e) RTS given each PSDR-based damage state 
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𝑢𝑘
𝑔(𝑒𝑑𝑝) = 1 − Φ (
ln(𝑒𝑑𝑝) − ln (𝜃𝑘
𝑔
)
𝛽𝑘
𝑔 ) (5.5) 
where 𝑔 is the identification number of the EDP, 𝑔 = 1, … ,6; 𝑢𝑘
𝑔(𝑒𝑑𝑝) is the conditional 
exceedance probability that EDP-𝑔 > 𝑒𝑑𝑝 given a damage state of PSDR-𝑘; 𝜃𝑘
𝑔
 and 𝛽𝑘
𝑔
 are the 
median and dispersion of the conditional lognormal distribution. 
Except for PSDR (since it is used as the conditioning EDP), the conditional probability of 
exceedance for each EDP is shown in Fig. 5-6 alongside its associated limit. Fig. 5-6 (a) 
indicates that the exceedance probability for RSDR increases significantly with each increment 
of PSDR damage state. Conditioned on the same PSDR-based damage state, the relative 
increase in the exceedance probabilities for CBRs are much larger than those of FBRs. For 
example, when the damage state corresponds to PSDR = 2.0% or higher, the probability of 
exceeding the CBR limit is more than 90%. For the same PSDR damage state, the probability 
of exceeding the FBR limit is only 51%. The exceedance probabilities of CCS and RTS are 
generally very low compared to the other EDPs. In fact, the probability of exceeding the CCS 
limit is essentially zero for PSDR damage levels of 1.5% or less. The RTS limit has low to 
moderate exceedance probabilities up to PSDR = 2.5% but exceeds 50% at PSDR = 4.5%. 
These observations are consistent with the design objectives of the building, as most of the 
inelastic deformations are intended to take place at CBRs and FBRs. 
5.3.3 Aftershock Seismic Risk 
For the case where a mainshock has occurred and the damage state of the building is 
known, the state-conditioned fragility function is combined with the exceedance probabilities 
and the aftershock hazard described in the previous sections to assess risk. As noted earlier, the 
aftershock hazard is time-dependent and decreases rapidly following the occurrence of the 
mainshock. Thus, a non-homogeneous Markov process is constructed to simulate the time-
dependent probability of exceeding the EDP limits shown in Table 5-1. 
The time period is discretized into small increments such that the probability of more than 
one aftershock is negligible [62]. Equation 5.6 shows the 12-by-12 upper triangular Markov 
transition matrix for one increment and a single fault. Each entry describes the probability of 
transitioning between any two damage states, which is computed using Equations 5.7 and 5.8. 
Given an initial probability distribution, the time-dependent probability distribution in the post-
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mainshock environment is computed using Equation 5.9 by cumulatively multiplying the 
Markov transition matrices.  
𝑀𝑛
𝑠 = (
𝜋𝑛,0,0
𝑠 ⋯ 𝜋𝑛,0,11
𝑠
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
0 ⋯ 𝜋𝑛,11,11
𝑠
) (5.6) 
𝜋𝑛,𝑖,𝑗 
𝑠 = 𝜆𝑛,𝑖,𝑗
𝑠 𝑒−(𝜆𝑛,𝑖,𝑗
𝑠 ) (5.7) 
𝜆𝑛,𝑖,𝑗
𝑠 = ∫ (𝑓𝑖,𝑗
𝐴𝑆(𝑖𝑚) − 𝑓𝑖,𝑗+1
𝐴𝑆 (𝑖𝑚))𝑑𝜆𝐼𝑀,𝑛,𝑠
𝐴𝑆 (𝑖𝑚)
+∞
0
 (5.8) 
(𝑝𝑛,0
𝑁𝑠   𝑝𝑛,1
𝑁𝑠  ⋯  𝑝𝑛,11
𝑁𝑠 ) = (𝑝𝑛,0
0   𝑝𝑛,1
0  ⋯  𝑝𝑛,11
0 ) ∏ 𝑀𝑛
𝑠
𝑁𝑠
𝑠=1
 (5.9) 
where 𝑠 denotes the identification number of the time increment, 𝑁𝑠 is the total number of 
increments in the time period considered, 𝑀𝑛
𝑠 is the Markov transition matrix at time increment 
s for Fault 𝑛; 𝜋𝑛,𝑖,𝑗
𝑠  is the transition probability from PSDR-𝑖 to PSDR-𝑗 at Increment 𝑠 for 
Fault 𝑛, 𝑖, 𝑗 = 0, … ,11; Δ𝑡 is the uniform time increment; 𝜆𝑛,𝑖,𝑗
𝑠  is the mean rate of the building 
transitioning from PSDR-𝑖 to PSDR-𝑗 within time increment 𝑠 based on aftershock generated 
at Fault 𝑛;  𝜆𝐼𝑀,𝑛,𝑠
𝐴𝑆 (𝑖𝑚) is the mean rate of the seismic events having 𝐼𝑀 > 𝑖𝑚 generated by 
fault 𝑛 within time increment 𝑠, and it is computed by replacing the 𝑡0 and 𝑡1 with 𝑡𝑠−1 and 
𝑡𝑠 in Equation 5.2 at increment 𝑠 and substituting the associated 𝜈𝑛
𝐴𝑆[𝑡𝑠−1, 𝑡𝑠] into Equation 
5.1; 𝑝𝑛,𝑘
0  and 𝑝𝑛,𝑘
𝑁𝑠  denote the probability of PSDR-𝑘 at the start and end of the time period only 
considering the influence of Fault 𝑛. 
Examples of transition matrices for the PSDR-based damage states corresponding to (a) 
immediately following the mainshock and (b) 30 days after the mainshock considering a single 
fault are shown in Table 5-2 and  
Table 5-3, respectively, which are obtained using a time-increment of 0.01 day. It is 
observed that the diagonal entries are always significantly larger than the off-diagonal ones in 
the same row, indicating low probabilities of transitioning to higher damage states in the 
aftershock environment. The off-diagonal entries drop significantly from 𝑀𝑛
1 to 𝑀𝑛
3000 while 
the diagonal entries approach 1.0, which reflects the time-dependent decrease in aftershock 
hazard. However, the probabilities in both matrices are the stand-alone transition probabilities 
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(i.e., the history and cumulative effects of such transitions from 𝑀𝑛
1 up to 𝑀𝑛
3000  are not 
shown), which are computed for a very short time interval (0.01 day).  
Table 5-2. Markov transition matrix 𝑀𝑛
1 (10−3)  
DS 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
0 891 95.6 10.4 1.54 0.556 0.172 0.065 0.028 0.044 0.018 0.019 0.074 
1  979 16.0 2.85 1.120 0.372 0.147 0.069 0.100 0.040 0.045 0.189 
2   997 1.57 0.584 0.181 0.104 0.083 0.036 0.029 0.010 0.073 
3    997 2.040 0.559 0.339 0.154 0.102 0.110 0.013 0.146 
4     997 1.82 0.631 0.134 0.452 0.171 0.062 0.142 
5      997 1.940 0.797 0.255 0.087 0.046 0.105 
6       992 4.970 1.520 0.379 0.351 0.527 
7        992 3.350 0.945 1.360 1.960 
8         992 2.630 2.190 3.630 
9          988 3.930 8.100 
10           993 7.050 
11            1000 
 
Table 5-3. Markov transition matrix 𝑀𝑛
3000 (10−6) 
DS 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
0 106 105 11.5 1.70 0.613 0.189 0.071 0.031 0.048 0.019 0.021 0.082 
1  106 17.7 3.14 1.240 0.409 0.162 0.076 0.110 0.044 0.050 0.208 
2   106 1.73 0.644 0.200 0.115 0.091 0.040 0.032 0.011 0.080 
3    106 2.250 0.616 0.374 0.170 0.112 0.121 0.015 0.161 
4     106 2.010 0.695 0.148 0.498 0.189 0.068 0.156 
5      106 2.140 0.878 0.281 0.096 0.051 0.115 
6       106 5.480 1.670 0.418 0.387 0.580 
7        106 3.690 1.040 1.500 2.160 
8         106 2.890 2.410 4.000 
9          106 4.330 8.920 
10           106 7.760 
11            106 
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By setting 𝑝𝑛,1
0 = 1 (or 𝑝𝑛,2
0 = 1) and the rest zeros in Equation 5.9, the time-dependent 
probability of exceeding the six limit states in the aftershock environment is assessed given 
that a mainshock has occurred and the building is damaged with median PSDR of 0.5% (or 
1.0%). Fig. 5-7 (a) shows how these exceedance probabilities vary in the 30-day period after 
the mainshock given that the building is damaged with median PSDR of 0.5%. It is observed 
that, with the exception of CBR, the probability of exceedance rapidly increases for all the limit 
states in the first 3-day period due to the high aftershock hazard right after the mainshock. This 
is followed by a much slower and gradual increase towards the end of the 30-day period as the 
hazard decreases. For example, the probability of exceeding FBR limit state rises from 0.6% 
to 3.0% in the first 3 days and is approximately 4.0% after 30 days. A higher initial value but 
the moderate increase is observed for the probability of exceeding CBR limit, which starts at 
15%, and increases to 18% in 3 days, and reaches 20% after 30 days. The time-dependent 
probabilities of exceedance for the building damaged to PSDR = 1.0% in the mainshock are 
depicted in Fig. 5-7 (b). Significantly higher probabilities throughout the 30-day period are 
found for CBR, FBR, RSDR, and RTS. For example, the probability of exceeding FBR limit 
state is approximately 36% for the full 30 days during for which aftershock hazard is 
considered. For both Fig. 5-7 (a) and (b), the probabilities tend to stabilize at the end of the 30-
day period, indicating that this time period is sufficient to incorporate the aftershock hazard 
and is adopted in the next section for mainshock-aftershock seismic risk assessment.  
  
(a) (b) 
 
 
Fig. 5-7. The time-dependent probabilities of exceeding the EDP limit in the aftershock 
environment given that the building is damaged under mainshock with median PSDR of (a) 
0.5% and (b) 1.0%. 
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5.3.4 Mainshock-Aftershock Seismic Risk 
For a single fault, the mean annual rate of occurrence for each PSDR-based damage state 
is computed in Equation 5.10 by combining the fragility function of each damage state with 
the mainshock hazard at the building site from this fault only. The total mean annual rate for 
mainshock is obtained in Equation 5.11 by summing the contributions from all the considered 
faults, which are reported in Table 5-4. 
𝜆𝑛,𝑘
𝑀𝑆 = ∫ (𝑓𝑘
𝑀𝑆(𝑖𝑚) − 𝑓𝑘+1
𝑀𝑆 (𝑖𝑚))𝑑𝜆𝐼𝑀,𝑛
𝑀𝑆 (𝑖𝑚)
+∞
0
 (5.10) 
𝜆𝑘
𝑀𝑆 = ∑ 𝜆𝑛,𝑘
𝑀𝑆
𝑁𝐹
𝑛=1
 (5.11) 
where 𝜆𝑛,𝑘
𝑀𝑆  is the mean annual rate of the building being in PSDR-𝑘 due to the potential 
seismic event at Fault 𝑛, while 𝜆𝑘
𝑀𝑆 is for all faults, 𝑘 = 1, … ,11; 𝑁𝑓 = 49 is the number of 
total faults considered in this study.  
The seismic risk from both the mainshock and aftershock hazard is obtained by 
incorporating the potential transitions to higher damage states under aftershock into the mean 
annual rate of occurrence of all the PSDR-based damage states under mainshock. Since the 
mainshock-aftershock hazards are pairwise at each fault, the above process needs to be 
performed fault by fault before being aggregated to obtain the total mainshock-aftershock mean 
annual rate as presented in Equations 5.12 and 5.13. 
(𝜆𝑛,0
𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑆  𝜆𝑛,1
𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑆  ⋯  𝜆𝑛,11
𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑆) = (𝜆𝑛,0
𝑀𝑆  𝜆𝑛,1
𝑀𝑆  ⋯  𝜆𝑛,11
𝑀𝑆 ) ∏ 𝑀𝑛
𝑠
𝑁𝑠
𝑠=1
 (5.12) 
𝜆𝑘
𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑆 = ∑ 𝜆𝑛,𝑘
𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑆
𝑁𝐹
𝑛=1
 (5.13) 
where 𝜆𝑛,𝑘
𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑆  is the mean annual rate of occurrence of PSDR-𝑘  considering both the 
mainshock and aftershock hazards from Fault 𝑛; 𝜆𝑘
𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑆 is the total mainshock-aftershock mean 
annual rate of occurrence of PSDR-𝑘. 
Table 5-4 compares the mean annual rate of occurrence for different PSDR-based damage 
states when mainshock only and mainshock-aftershock hazard is considered. The mainshock-
aftershock mean annual rate of PSDR = 0.5% and PSDR = 1.0% is roughly twice and 23% less 
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than the mainshock-only values, respectively. The lower mean annual rate for PSDR = 1.0% is 
fully explained by the significant increase in the mean annual rates of all the other higher 
damage states. In other words, the rate of transitioning from intact and PSDR = 0.5% to PSDR 
= 1.0% is less than the rate corresponding to transitions from PSDR = 1.0% to the higher 
damage states.  
Table 5-4. Mean annual rates of occurrence for PSDR-based damage states (unit: 10−5) 
DS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
𝜆𝑘
𝑀𝑆 4429 1198 19.16 4.82 2.28 1.18 0.452 0.505 0.181 0.128 0.902 
𝜆𝑘
𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑆 8980 924.4 157.8 61.0 21.7 9.31 4.942 5.620 2.493 2.469 11.42 
 
With the exception of PSDR, the total probability theorem is used to compute the mean 
annual rate of exceeding the EDP limits in Table 5-1, as shown in Equation 5.14. Since PSDR 
is the conditioning EDP, and the mean annual rate of exceeding values ranging from 0.25% to 
5.25% with an increment of 0.5% is obtained from Equation 5.15.  
𝛾𝑔
𝑀𝑆(𝑒𝑑𝑝) = ∑ 𝜆𝑘
𝑀𝑆
𝑁𝐿𝑆
𝑘=1
𝑢𝑘
𝑔(𝑒𝑑𝑝) (5.14) 
𝛾1,𝑘
𝑀𝑆 = ∑ 𝜆𝑘
𝑀𝑆
𝑁𝐿𝑆
𝑘
 (5.15) 
where 𝛾𝑔
𝑀𝑆(𝑒𝑑𝑝) is the mean annual rate of exceedance that EDP-𝑔 > 𝑒𝑑𝑝 considering 
only the mainshock hazard, 𝑔 = 2, … ,7; 𝛾1,𝑘
𝑀𝑆 is the mean annual rate corresponding to PSDR 
being larger than the lower value in the range defining the increment; 𝑁𝐿𝑆 = 10 is the total 
number of damage states;  𝛾𝑔
𝑀𝑆(𝑒𝑑𝑝) ,  𝛾1,𝑘
𝑀𝑆 and  𝜆𝑘
𝑀𝑆 could be substituted with  𝛾𝑔
𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑆(𝑒𝑑𝑝) , 
 𝛾1,𝑘
𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑆 and  𝜆𝑘
𝑀𝑆𝐴𝑆  for the mainshock-aftershock case. 
The mean annual rate of exceedance is transformed into the probability of exceedance in 
50 years using exponential distribution to quantify the risk as the latter is more common in 
engineering practice. Fig. 5-8 shows the probability of exceedance in 50 years for all limit 
states. For the same exceedance probability, significantly larger demands are found for all the 
EDPs when aftershock hazard is considered and this difference increases with demand level. 
For example, in Fig. 5-8 (a), for exceedance probability of 10%, 5% and 2% in 50 years, the 
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PSDR demands are 0.7%, 0.9% and 1.2% when only considering mainshock. These values 
increase to 1.4%, 1.8% and 2.5% when aftershock hazard is included. Similar relationships are 
presented in Fig. 5-8 (b) for RSDR. In Fig. 5-8 (c), CBR has a higher probability of exceedance 
than FBR for any rotation demand, indicating that, as expected, the coupling beams are the 
most susceptible to structural damage. Fig. 5-8 (d) shows that the demand and probability of 
exceedance for RTS are consistently larger than those for CCS at wall boundaries.  
  
(a) (b) 
   
(c) (d) 
Fig. 5-8. 50-year exceedance probabilities for (a) PSDR, (b) RSDR, (c) FBR, and CBR 
and (d) CCS and RTS 
The EDP value corresponding to three different risk levels are reported in Table 5-5. Recall 
that the limits presented in Table 5-1 are based on median or maximum (depending on the 
number of ground motions used) value and are intended to represent the collapse prevention 
limit state. Modern design codes target a risk threshold of 1% collapse probability in 50 years 
[3,100]. However, it should be noted that the demands used for the collapse prevention 
performance level are typically less than what is used for collapse. For example, a 10% PSDR 
is often associated with a collapse for low- to moderate-height moment frames [75,101,102], 
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whereas, a 3% PSDR is used for collapse prevention performance. Given these considerations, 
a risk level of 2% in 50 years is assumed acceptable for the collapse prevention limit state. 
From Table 5-5, it can be observed that, with the exception of CBR, all other EDP values 
corresponding to the 2% in 50-year risk level are less than the collapse prevention limits set by 
TBI and LATBSDC when only mainshock hazard is considered. The 2% in 50-year CBR is 
only 5% higher than the collapse prevention demand limit. On the other hand, when both 
mainshock and aftershock hazard are considered, the RSDR, FBR, and CBR are significantly 
larger than the collapse prevention limits. This result is consistent with earlier findings (e.g. 
Fig. 5-3 and Fig. 5-4), which show that these demand parameters are most affected by the 
inclusion of aftershock hazard.  Lower response demand limits are expected for higher 
performance levels such as life safety and immediate occupancy, which are associated with 
lower risk levels and higher 50-year exceedance probabilities. While further work is needed to 
calibrate these higher performance levels, response demands for two additional risk levels with 
50-year exceedance probabilities of 5% and 10%, are shown in Table 5-5. Note that, for 
performance levels related to post-earthquake functionality, non-structural damage, which is 
beyond the scope of the current study, must be considered. 
Table 5-5. EDP values corresponding to three risk levels 
EDP 
10% in 50 years 5% in 50 years 2% in 50 years 
MS MSAS MS MSAS MS MSAS 
PSDR 0.7% 1.4% 0.9% 1.8% 1.2% 2.5% 
RSDR 0.3% 0.5% 0.4% 0.8% 0.5% 1.7% 
FBR 1.1% 2.8% 1.4% 6.9% 2.0% >10% 
CBR 3.2% 8.1% 4.3% >10% 6.3% >10% 
CCS 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.008 
RTS 0.016 0.030 0.021 0.037 0.030 0.050 
 
Shown in Table 5-6 are the 50-year exceedance probabilities implied by the collapse 
prevention EDP limits when only mainshock and mainshock-aftershock seismic hazard is 
considered. It can be observed that, when only mainshock hazard is considered, most of the 50-
year probabilities of exceedance are less than 2%. However, these 50-year exceedance 
probabilities vary widely across EDPs, ranging from 0.07% for CCS to 2.3% for CBR, which 
represents a 30-fold difference. For the mainshock-aftershock hazard case, the exceedance 
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probabilities of RSDR, FBR and CBR are much greater than 2%. The variation in exceedance 
probabilities is also significant for the mainshock-aftershock case with the highest and lowest 
values differing by a factor of about 20. Given that all the EDP limits are associated with the 
collapse prevention performance level, the large differences in 50-year exceedance 
probabilities reveal a high level of risk inconsistency in the acceptance criteria.  
Table 5-6. Implied Probability of exceedance given the acceptance criteria of EDPs 
(Unit: %) 
Hazard PSDR RSDR FBR CBR CCS RTS Risk 
MS 0.17 0.40 0.72 2.30 0.07 0.37 
2.00 
MSAS 1.67 3.68 6.74 16.92 0.79 1.20 
 
It is noted that the 6% limit on CBR is associated with strength loss, whereas laboratory 
tests have shown that modest residual strength (e.g., 10 to 20% of peak strength) is typically 
maintained for CBRs exceeding 10% [95,103]; therefore, exceeding the 6% CBR limit is 
unlikely to produce system collapse. If component (e.g., CB) strength loss is modeled, the TBI 
and LATBSDC documents limit the loss of story strength to 20%. This limit state is not 
considered in this study, as the limit states given in TBI and LATBSDC are intentionally set to 
preclude any significant component or system strength loss because of uncertainties associated 
with modeling components and component level and system level interactions, as well as 
modeling simplifications employed to reduce computational effort. None-the-less, use of these 
limits states provides a basis for comparing mainshock and mainshock-aftershock seismic risk 
in this study.  
5.4 Conclusions 
The mainshock, aftershock and mainshock-aftershock seismic risk of a typical high-rise 
building with reinforced concrete core walls and a perimeter special moment frame is assessed. 
Two key sources of increased risk of exceeding the collapse prevention performance level 
(relative to mainshock-only assessments) are incorporated: the reduction in the deformation 
capacity of the lateral force resisting system due to mainshock damage and the elevated seismic 
hazard in aftershock environment during a short period after the mainshock. Conventional 
(mainshock) and aftershock probabilistic seismic hazard analysis are conducted for the site that 
is the basis of the building design, considering hazard contributions from 49 faults. 34 pairs of 
as-recorded mainshock-aftershock ground motion sequences are selected.  
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NRHAs are conducted using mainshock ground motions scaled to the MCE hazard level 
followed by multiple stripe analysis using the aftershock records. The objective of this part of 
the study was to evaluate and compare the extent to which the response measured by six 
demand parameters are amplified. These EDPs, which form the basis of the performance-based 
design criteria for tall buildings, include peak story drifts ratios (PSDRs), residual story drift 
ratios (RSDR), coupling beam rotation (CBR), frame beam rotation (FBR), concrete 
compressive strain (CCS) and rebar tensile strain (RTS). The demand amplification was 
assessed by computing the aftershock intensity, which is normalized by that of the mainshock, 
at which the demand associated with the maximum considered earthquake (MCE) level 
mainshock hazard is exceeded (denoted as intensity ratio). RSDR, CBR, and CCS were 
observed to have the smallest intensity ratios – the ratio between the aftershock and mainshock 
intensity at the point where the demand under the former is the same as the latter –, which 
implies that these EDPs are reflected the most in mainshock damage and aftershock 
performance. Fragility functions describing the probability of exceeding the EDP limits set by 
the Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center Tall Buildings Initiative (TBI) and Los 
Angeles Tall Building Structural Design Council (LATBSDC) were developed from the results 
of the mainshock analyses as well as the aftershock analyses conditioned on MCE level 
mainshock ground motions. For both cases, CBR controlled the collapse prevention 
performance level implied by the EDP limits set by TBI and LATBSDC.    
Two types of risk assessments were conducted. The first, which is referred to as aftershock 
risk, considers the case where the mainshock has occurred and the immediate post-mainshock 
building-level damage state is known. A non-homogenous Markov process model is used to 
couple the probability of exceeding the limit for each of the six response parameters, which is 
conditioned on a known PSDR-based building-level damage state, with the time-dependent 
aftershock hazard, to produce exceedance probabilities at different time points over a 30-day 
period following the mainshock. Except for CBR, a sharp increase and plateauing of the 
exceedance probability for the EDP limits were observed in the first 3 days when conditioned 
on immediate post-mainshock PSDR = 0.5%. For the same immediate post-mainshock PSDR, 
the probability of exceeding the CBR limit is consistently high over the 30-day period. This 
type of assessment could inform the timing, cost and duration of repairs after a mainshock has 
occurred. For example, the results from this study showed that delaying repairs for 
approximately the first week after the mainshock could avoid having to perform redundant 
repair work caused by subsequent aftershock damage. 
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The second risk assessment category, which is described as mainshock-aftershock risk, 
accounts for the uncertainty in the intensity and damage caused by both the mainshock and 
aftershock, and is compared with the mainshock-only risk. A Markov process model is also 
used for this assessment and the probability of exceeding each EDP limit over the 50-year life 
of the building is computed. When a 2% probability of exceedance in 50 years is used as the 
risk threshold for life safety, most of the associated response demands (except for CBR) are 
within the collapse prevention performance criteria when only mainshock hazard is considered. 
However, when the mainshock-aftershock hazard is considered, the demand levels for RSDR, 
FBR and CBR are much higher than the those corresponding to collapse prevention 
performance. Even though the limits set by TBI and LATBSDC are targeted towards collapse 
prevention performance, the implied 50-year exceedance probabilities were found to be non-
uniform across the various EDPs for the mainshock only and mainshock-aftershock case, 
differing by a factor of 30 in the extreme case. This finding highlights the need to develop risk-
consistent respond demand limits when the acceptance criteria are targeted towards a single 
performance level. 
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CHAPTER 6: Optimal Decision-Making for Tall Buildings in the 
Aftershock Environment 
6.1 Introduction and Background 
Ensuring a certain level of life safety during a major earthquake has been the priority for 
the modern seismic design codes and guidelines. By integrating this primary requirement with 
the direct and indirect financial losses caused by seismic events into a probabilistic framework, 
the Performance-Based Earthquake Engineering (PBEE) [15] induces a more robust alternative 
performance assessment and design approach which have been widely used in recent 
engineering practices. However, the PBEE only considers major seismic events with long 
return periods, i.e. mainshocks, which in many cases could be followed by a series of 
subsequent earthquakes referred as aftershocks with relatively lower magnitudes and shorter 
periods, but higher occurrence rates. The additional fatality and financial losses caused by 
aftershocks have drawn attention in such sequential seismic events. For example, several 
buildings that survived the mainshock of magnitude 7.4 in the 1999 Kocaeli earthquake 
collapsed during an aftershock with magnitude 5.9 that occurred one month later, killing seven 
people and injuring more than two hundred [104]. In the 2010 Darfield earthquake, the 
mainshock with a magnitude of 7.1 is followed by two major aftershocks with magnitudes of 
6.2 and 6.0 respectively, which alone lead to 185 more fatalities and add up to over 30 billion 
dollars financial losses [10]. Similar situations are also found in 1999 Chi-Chi, 2008 Wenchuan, 
2011 Tohoku and 2016 Central Italy earthquakes [88,105].  
Special attention has been paid to evaluating the structural vulnerability or residual 
capacity of mainshock-damaged buildings in the aftershock environment. The increased 
demands of certain critical EDPs (for example, Peak Story Drift Ratio (PSDRs), Residual Story 
Drift Ratio (RSDRs) and plastic hinge rotations of beams and columns) have been quantified 
in many researches for different types of structures, such as steel moment frames [91,106,107], 
Reinforced Concrete (RC) moment frames with [89,108] or without infills [30,109–112] and 
tall buildings with shear walls [92]. More recently, researches are carried out to build the 
statistical relationship between the EDPs and component damages under mainshocks and the 
performance of the damaged building in the aftershocks. Univariate analysis for individual 
EDP [32] and triggering damage quantile [33] are performed to evaluate their effects on the 
reduction in the collapse capacity. To address the potential interaction among different EDPs 
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or component damages, multivariate statistical models [71] are employed to map physical 
damage indicators, structural response quantities and mainshock intensity to aftershock 
collapse vulnerability. More advanced machine learning and pattern recognition techniques 
[72,92] are also applied to predict the residual structural capacity of damaged buildings using 
response and damage patterns. In other works [69,70], the time-dependency of the aftershock 
hazard were coupled with residual structural capacity of damaged buildings to achieve risk 
assessment. Moreover, the financial losses for structures damaged by sequential seismic events 
have also been studied for life-cycle loss assessment [21,68,113] and corresponding decision-
making [114,115].  
The above-mentioned studies provide crucial information about the post-mainshock 
performance of damaged buildings from various perspectives, which could be directly or 
indirectly used for decision-making in the aftershock environment. For example, the certain 
threshold for the collapse probability, residual structural capacity,  financial loss or seismic risk 
could be used to decide whether to evacuate a damaged building, which could serve as powerful 
support in addition to the widely used judgment-based tagging process [12,13]. However, this 
is one-time decision-making rather than a series of optimal decision-making over an entire time 
period of interest. Time-dependent stochastic process, specifically Markov process 
[68,70,113,116], has been employed to probabilistically evaluate the distribution of the damage 
states of buildings in the aftershock environment, where the damage initially induced by the 
mainshock, the time-varying aftershock rates, and further progression damages due to 
aftershock occurrences are considered. In addition to the Markov process, Yeo and Cornell 
[117] further incorporated Dynamic Programming to determine the optimal action at any time 
point by minimizing the expected financial losses and maintaining an acceptable Equivalent-
Constant Rate (ECR) of collapse [118–120] to ensure individual life-safety. In their work, 
constant transition probabilities under aftershocks with random magnitudes and locations were 
computed and scaled by the occurrence rates to account for the time-dependent transition 
probabilities; the repairs could be considered, but was treated as a random event rather than an 
optional action; linearly proportional relationship was assumed for the expected transition and 
disruption losses.  
This chapter incorporates the aftershock hazard, the residual structural capacity of 
damaged tall buildings, and the expected financial losses from various sources into a time-
dependent probabilistic framework based on the discrete nonstationary Markov Process. 
Building-level damage states are calibrated using the PSDR. Sequential NRHAs are performed 
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to quantify the residual structural capacity, which is then coupled with time-dependent 
aftershock hazard to obtain the nonstationary transition probabilities among different damage 
states. Expected structural and nonstructural losses are assessed for each damage state, together 
with the associated repair time. Two sets of actions after the mainshock are considered at any 
time point: whether to evacuate the building and when to reoccupy the building if it is 
previously evacuated; whether to repair the building and when to stop if the building had been 
retrofitted to a satisfactory state. Dynamic Programming is performed to find the optimal 
actions throughout the entire time period of interest with the objective to minimize the expected 
financial losses after mainshocks and the constraint defined as the transition probability into 
unsafety damage states. Sensitivity analyses are finally carried out to quantify the impact of the 
key parameters on the decision-making, including time window, safety threshold, fatality loss, 
disruption loss, and repair cost. 
6.2 Optimal Decision-Making Framework 
 
Fig. 6-1. Flow charts of framework 
Fig. 6-1 provides the flow charts of the optimal decision-making framework integrating 
seismic hazard and structural analyses, direct (structural, nonstructural, fatality) and indirect 
(disruption) loss assessment, time-dependent simulation using Markov process and decision 
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optimization using Dynamic Programming. The 42-story dual-system archetype building 
introduced in Chapter 3 and used in Chapter 4 and 5 are also adopted in this chapter for 
illustration of the proposed framework, and the Aftershock Probabilistic Seismic Hazard 
Analysis (APSHA), structural modeling and ground motion selection are identical to Section 
3.3. The computed APSHAs for two scenarios with relatively low and high seismicity are 
shown in Fig. 6-2. The daily aftershock rates right after the mainshock (0 days), 3 days and 30 
days after the mainshock are compared for the two scenarios. While consistent higher rates are 
observed for the fault with high seismicity as time elapses in Fig. 6-2 (a), both aftershock 
hazards decline rapidly in the aftershock environment as shown in Fig. 6-2 (b), where the 
Spectra Accelerations (SAs) of 0.05g, 0.1g and 0.2g are used for illustration. 
  
(a) (b) 
 
 
Fig. 6-2. Comparison of daily aftershock rates (a) at 0, 3 and 30 days after the mainshock 
as SA increases and (b) with SAs of 0.05g, 0.1g and 0.2g as time elapses for the low- and 
high-seismicity faults, respectively 
Sequential NRHAs are carried out for the structural analysis, where the intact building is 
subjected to a set of as-recorded mainshock-aftershock ground motions. PSDR is widely used 
as an indicator of the reduction in the lateral force resisting capacity of damaged buildings 
under sequential ground motions [21,32,33,68,69,72] and is adopted in this study as a proxy 
for the building damage states or performance levels. The mainshocks are first scaled such that 
the corresponding PSDRs fall into 10 equal intervals with a size of 0.5% and center ranging 
from 0.5% to 5.0% with an increment of 0.5%. The center point or median value of the 
associated increment interval denotes each PSDR-based damage state. For example, the 1st 
damage state has an interval from 0.25% to 0.75%, which is denoted by PSDR = 0.5%. 
Aftershocks are then applied to the damaged building to quantify the residual structural 
capacity in terms of fragility functions from a given damage state to all the higher ones, 
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conditioned on the aftershock intensities. More details are referred to Section 5.3.1. A sample 
comparison of fragility curves showing the probability of exceeding different PDSR levels for 
the intact building and the damage state corresponding to median PSDR = 1.5% (PSDR interval 
from 1.25% to 1.75%) is shown in Fig. 5-5. The EDP portfolios for each damage states under 
mainshocks and aftershocks are used for the assessment of structural and nonstructural losses 
as well as repair times. The details are presented in the following Section 6.3.1 and Section 
6.3.2, respectively. 
The time period is discretized into small increments such that the probability of more than 
one aftershock is negligible [62]. By integrating the fragility functions and the time-dependent 
aftershock hazard, transition probabilities of the nonstationary Markov process considering 
only progressive damages under aftershocks could be obtained to simulate the expected 
distribution of damage states. The expected repair times associated with different building 
damage states are used to generate the state-dependent stationary transition probabilities from 
higher damage states to lower ones, where exponential distributions are assumed for the time 
periods needed by the repairs to cause a damage state downgrade of the building.  
Dynamic programming is then employed to efficiently target the optimal actions at each 
time step such that the expected financial loss is minimized at the time of decision-making, i.e., 
right after the mainshock. The expected financial loss integrates various sources from structural 
and nonstructural component damages, fatality due to collapse, disruption of residence and 
business and repair cost. It is the expected cumulative loss within a certain time window of 
interest and obtained by summing up the discounted values of all the potential losses in the 
future. In the following analyses, it will be referred as the financial loss for simplification. 
Aside from the fatality loss used to penalize the extreme scenarios where collapses occur, a 
certain safety threshold is also enforced in dynamic programming.  
6.3 Loss Assessment of Damaged Tall Building 
6.3.1 Structural and Nonstructural Loss 
The portfolios of 5 EDPs for each building damage state are needed for the assessment of 
the expected structural and nonstructural losses using the methodology developed in FEMA P-
58 [12,13], including PSDR, RSDR, Peak Floor Acceleration (PFA), CBR and Wall Chord 
Rotation (WCR). The losses associated with beams and columns of the special moment frames 
are indirectly evaluated using the PSDR. For each EDP, the 68 individual responses (recall 
  
 
 
91 
from Section 5.2.1, two analyses are conducted for each ground motion pair by switching the 
orthogonal direction of each record) for DS-5 (PSDR of 2.5%) in the X- and Z- direction [see 
Fig. 3-1 (b)] are shown alongside their medians and standard deviations following lognormal 
distributions. The median portfolios for all the 10 damage states are then presented in the two 
directions. 
  
(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
 
 
1Median of the PSDRs at each story from 34 ground motion pairs given DS-5 
2Median of the maxima of PSDRs along all stories from 34 ground motion pairs given DS-5 
Fig. 6-3. PSDR portfolio for DS-5 in (a) X- and (b) Z-Direction and medians for each 
damage sates in (c) X- and (d) Z-Direction 
In Fig. 6-3 (a), while the individual PSDR responses have large variation in terms of both 
peak values and shapes along building height, the median as well as the standard deviations of 
PSDR given DS-5 show sharp change at the 20th story, possibly due to the reduce of thickness 
and concrete strength of the shear wall. Local maxima of median PSDRs are found within the 
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30th-40th stories (2.0%) and 20th-30th stories (1.5%) in X- and Z-Direction, respectively. To be 
consistent with the calibration of damage states, the median of the maxima of PSDRs along all 
stories is also presented in the two directions. 2.5% is found for X-Direction while 1.9% for Z-
Direction, indicating that the performance of the former controls at this damage state. Fig. 6-3 
(c) and (d) show that the median PSDR increases from 1.1% to 1.2% in X-Direction and from 
1.1% to 1.2% in Z-Direction as the damage state gets higher. Consistent local maxima are 
reached within the 30th-40th stories in the X-Direction for all damage states, while the PSDRs 
near the 10th story take control beyond DS-6 in the Z-Direction. Relatively uniform and smooth 
shapes of PSDR portfolios are observed for lower damage states while those of the higher 
damage states tend to be choppier. This might be caused by the fact that the progressive 
damages induced by aftershocks concentrate at some of the more vulnerable stories, which 
significantly undermine the overall structural performance, rather than uniformly distributed 
into all stories. PSDR is widely used as the indicator of the sideways collapse of buildings [73–
75], and the assumed thresholds vary for different structure types. The highest damage state 
used in this study is DS-10 with the center at 5.0% and increment interval from 4.75% to 5.25%, 
and the PSDR at any story exceeds 5.25% is assumed to cause collapse. 
RSDR is widely used to decide whether the demolition is appropriate for severely damaged 
buildings when the repairs are not possible or not economic. As shown in Fig. 6-4 (a) and (b), 
the overall shapes of the RSDRs for DS-5 are similar with those of PSDRs in both directions, 
indicating a significant correlation between the two EDPs in the same direction and story. The 
medians of RSDRs at each story reach local maxima of 0.6% and 0.4% in the X- and Z-
Directions, while the median of the maxima along all stories have slightly higher values of 
0.8% and 0.5%, respectively. Per FEMA P-58 [12,13], a lognormal distribution is assumed for 
the RSDR that triggers demolition and the associated fragility function, where the median and 
dispersion are set as 2.5% and 10% for the 42-story dual-system building under study. For a 
given record, the maxima RSDR along all stories is used in the fragility function. Fig. 6-4 (c) 
and (d) show that the medians of RSDRs for the first three damage states are very limited, but 
they increase more aggressively beyond DS-4, i.e., considerable RSDRs have remained when 
the PSDR exceeds 2%. 
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(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
 
 
1Median of the RSDRs at each story from 34 ground motion pairs given DS-5 
2Median of the maxima of RSDRs along all stories from 34 ground motion pairs given DS-5 
Fig. 6-4. RSDR portfolio for DS-5 in (a) X- and (b) Z-Direction and medians for each 
damage sates in (c) X- and (d) Z-Direction 
PFA is used to simulate damage to acceleration sensitive non-structural components and 
contents such as ceiling tiles and plumbing lines. Fig. 6-5 (a) and (b) show the individual PFA 
responses as well as their median profiles in the X- and Z-Direction, respectively. The 
magnitude and shape of the PFAS are very close to each other in the two directions. The PFA 
gets local minima at the base level and keeps decreasing as the height increases until it reaches 
around the 40th floor, where a sharp reverse is observed. This is because the 42-story archetype 
building has a penthouse at the top. As shown in Fig. 6-5 (c) and (d), the medians of the PFAs 
in the two directions have considerable increments from DS-1 to DS-5; however, they tend to 
cluster beyond DS-6 and no significant increases are found. 
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(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
 
 
Fig. 6-5. PFA portfolio for DS-5 in (a) X- and (b) Z-Direction and medians for each 
damage sates in (c) X- and (d) Z-Direction 
In Fig. 6-6 (a) and (b), significant variations are observed for individual responses of CBR 
in terms of both peak values and shapes along the building height, indicating that the CBR is 
very sensitive to the record-to-record uncertainty of ground motion records and potentially to 
the seismic performance of the damaged tall buildings, which will be discussed in detail in the 
following chapters. This is also confirmed by the large standard deviations of CBR in both 
directions. The median of the CBR in DS-5 increases almost monotonically in the X-Direction, 
with a sharp jump around the 21st Floor. As for the Z-Direction, the median reaches the local 
minima within the 20th to the 30th floor and decreases beyond the 30th floor. Both could possibly 
be explained by the concrete strength and cross section changes in the corresponding stories. 
In Fig. 6-6 (c) and (d) show shifts with similar increments and shapes for the medians of CBRs 
when the damage states go up to DS-5 and DS-7 (inclusively) in the X- and Z-Directions. The 
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higher damage states are observed to have the medians of CBRs beyond 8 %, indicating 
significant component damages. 
  
(a) (b) 
  
(c)  (d) 
 
 
Fig. 6-6. CBR portfolio for DS-5 in (a) X- and (b) Z-Direction and medians for each 
damage sates in (c) X- and (d) Z-Direction 
The WCR portfolios including individual responses, medians and standard deviations for 
DS-5 in X- and Z-Direction in depicted in Fig. 6-7 (a) and (b), respectively. As mentioned in 
Section 0, the shear walls are weakened in the design as the story gets higher. As a result, some 
sharp jumps are observed for the medians of WCRs at the boundaries of different designs of 
shear walls, i.e., 20th and 30th stories. The 1st story also has a local minimum for the medians 
of WCRs because of the hinge effects of shear walls and an increase in the story height. The 
medians of WCRs shown in Fig. 6-7 (c) and (d) all have very similar shapes and almost increase 
linearly as the damage state is severer. In general, the WCRs are limited across all damage 
states and the associated financial losses are expected to be not significant. 
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(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d)  
 
 
Fig. 6-7. WCR portfolio for DS-5 in (a) X- and (b) Z-Direction and medians for each 
damage sates in (c) X- and (d) Z-Direction 
With the EDPs for all the damage states available, the expected loss assessment of 
structural and nonstructural components can finally be performed using the methodology 
developed in FEMA P-58 [12,13]. Given the EDP portfolios from the 34 pairs of ground 
motions, significantly more instances are sampled based on their joint correlations. The 
instances of damaged buildings are first classified into collapse and non-collapse cases, 
followed by further splits into reparable or nonrepairable ones, of which the latter trigger the 
demolition. If an instance is deemed as reparable, Monte Carlo simulation is then employed to 
sample component-level damage states and associated financial losses from the given EDP 
based on the fragility curves established by previous component experiments or engineering 
experiences. The Seismic Performance Prediction Program (SP3) developed by Haselton Baker 
Risk Group is used for the numerical computation of the loss and downtime assessment. 
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The archetype tall building is evaluated with a total value of 228 million dollars including 
197 and 31 million dollars for the construction and content costs respectively. The expected 
number of residents is assumed to be 1471 based on the total building area. The methodology 
is applied using to obtain the estimation of the mean financial losses for all damage states 
shown in Fig. 6-8. As PSDR itself is used to calibrate the damage state of the building and the 
maximum PSDR is capped at 5.25% for DS-10, the collapse cases are not considered for the 
loss assessment here but are addressed directly in the dynamic programming later. As we can 
see from Fig. 6-8, the financial losses from structural damages dominate up to DS-4 
(inclusively), but those caused by the excessive RSDR (demolition) take control after DS-5. A 
more detailed list for the factions of damages from various sources is presented in Table 6-1.  
 
Fig. 6-8. Estimation of the mean financial losses from different categories for each 
damage state using SP3 
Table 6-1. Details of losses from different categories for each damage state using SP3 
(unit: %)   
Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Residual Drift 0.00 0.25 3.39 6.03 16.7 25.2 36.0 49.7 66.0 75.3 
Structural 
Component 0.40 1.97 4.99 8.52 11.0 12.4 12.4 10.9 8.05 6.18 
Partition Walls 0.20 0.58 0.91 1.20 1.29 1.29 1.19 0.99 0.70 0.52 
Exterior Cladding 0.04 0.30 0.95 1.72 2.25 2.51 2.48 2.17 1.58 1.21 
Interior Finishes 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.12 
Plumbing and HVAC 0.40 1.22 1.82 2.19 2.16 2.16 2.25 1.86 1.15 1.05 
Other Non-structural 0.11 0.25 0.34 0.40 0.43 0.46 0.46 0.41 0.29 0.24 
Total 1.15 4.61 12.5 20.2 33.9 44.1 55.0 66.2 78.0 84.6 
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6.3.2 Repair Time and Cost  
The expected repair times needed for recovery to intact state from any higher damage states 
are shown in Fig. 6-9. Two approaches are used, i.e., the FEMA P-58 and REDi. The parallel 
and series approaches of P-58 are observed to be the lower and upper bounds of the expected 
repair times across all damage states. This is trivial as the former allows all the repairs of 
different components being conducted at the same time as the latter require the repairs being 
performed one by one. REDi [121] is a detailed downtime assessment methodology proposed 
by Comerio to probabilistically estimate the contribution from different components and 
account for both direct repairs and impeding factors. More applications, discussions, and 
updates could be found for the REDi methodology in recent researches [122–125], which is 
out of the scope of the current study. The expected repair time for the series approach reaches 
a plateau more than 1000 days beyond DS-5 while that of the parallel approach shows an almost 
linear increase after DS-4 (110 days). The expected repair times for the three performance 
levels (re-occupancy, functional recovery, and full recovery) following REDi are very close to 
each other and come somewhere in between the previous P-58 approaches.  
 
Fig. 6-9. Estimation of the mean repair time following P-58 and REDi methodologies for 
each damage state using SP3 
Another piece of useful information, the expected repair time 𝑇𝑖,𝑗
𝑅  from a given higher 
damage state DS-𝑖 back to a target lower one DS-𝑗, is assumed to following the relationship 
shown in Equation 6.1. The obtained lower-triangular matrix is depicted in Table 6-2. The 
damage state is capped at DS-8 as higher damage states are assumed to be unrepairable or not 
economic to repair. A constant repair cost of 0.15 million dollars per day is used in the 
following analysis if not otherwise declared, for example, in the sensitivity analyses. 
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𝑇𝑖,𝑗
𝑅  =  𝑇𝑖,0
𝑅 − 𝑇𝑗,0
𝑅  (6.1) 
where 𝑖 > 𝑗 denote a higher damage state 𝑖 and a lower damage state 𝑗; 𝑇𝑖,0
𝑅  is the expected time 
to DS-0 from a given DS-𝑖 for the performance level of reoccupancy obtained by REDi. 
Table 6-2. Expected repair time to retrofit the tall building from a higher damage state1 
back to a lower one (unit: day)   
DS 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 16        
2 61 45       
3 195 178 133      
4 362 346 301 168     
5 608 591 546 413 245    
6 770 754 709 576 408 163   
7 896 880 835 702 534 288 126  
8 980 964 919 786 618 373 210 84 
1The building is assumed to be non-reparable beyond DS-9 (inclusively) 
6.3.3 Fatality and Disruption Loss 
The fatality loss is assumed to be 5 million dollars per person if not otherwise adjusted, 
and no survivals are considered if the building is occupied at the time of the collapse, meaning 
a total fatality loss is assigned to the collapse state, DS-12.  
A full (cap) disruption loss of 0.7 million dollars per day is used when the damaged 
building is evacuated or collapses in the aftershock environment. If reoccupancy is allowed, 
the disruption loss from DS-0 to DS-10 is assumed to be proportional to the cap disruption loss. 
Starting from 0% of DS-0, the fraction goes up to 50% for DS-10 with an increment of 5%.  
6.4 Markov Process Based on the Damage States 
6.4.1 Considering Progressive Damage under Aftershocks 
A nonstationary Markov process is adopted to probabilistically evaluate the expected 
distribution of building-level damage states by incorporating the progressive damages of the 
building and time-dependent aftershock hazard, which starts from significantly higher rates 
compared with those of mainshocks but decreases rapidly. A given time window of interest is 
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discretized into small time steps to exclude the scenario where more than one aftershock occur 
[62] and to ensure the accuracy for numerical integration where shape descending slopes are 
observed for the aftershock hazard curves in Fig. 6-2. After a series of preliminary analyses, 
the time step of 0.05 day is deemed as appropriate for the current study. A total of 12 building-
level damage states are defined by adding the intact state DS-0 and the collapse state DS-11 
(PSDR > 5.25%) in addition to the previously mentioned 10 ones. Recall from Section 5.3.3, 
Equation 5.6 shows the 12-by-12 upper triangular Markov transition matrix at each time step 
for a single fault. Each entry describes the probability of transitioning between any two damage 
states, which is computed using Equations 5.7 and 5.8. Given an initial probability distribution, 
the time-dependent probability distribution in the post-mainshock environment is computed 
using Equation 5.9 by cumulatively multiplying the Markov transition matrices. The only 
notation change is that the variable n used as the identification of a fault is set to 𝐿 and 𝐻 to 
represent the low- and high-seismicity scenarios used for comparison in this chapter. 
A time window of 200 days after a mainshock is used in this chapter to provide optimal 
decision-making throughout a long enough period. Examples of transition matrices for the 
damage states corresponding to (a) immediately following the mainshock, (b) 30 days and (c) 
200 days after the mainshock of the low- and high-seismicity scenarios are shown from Table 
6-3 to Table 6-5 and from Table 6-6 to Table 6-8, respectively. As shown earlier in Fig. 6-2, 
the transition probability decreases fast as the aftershock hazard declines. Almost consistent 
larger transition probabilities are almost always found for the high-seismicity fault for the same 
entries. It is observed that the diagonal entries are always significantly larger than the off-
diagonal ones in the same row, indicating low probabilities of transitioning to higher damage 
states in the aftershock environment. The 𝑀𝑛
𝑠 in Equation 5.6 is replaced by 𝑀𝐿
𝑠 and 𝑀𝐻
𝑠  here 
to denote the Markov transition matrix of the low- and high-seismicity faults at time step s, 
respectively. For the same fault, the off-diagonal entries drop significantly from 𝑀𝐿
1 (𝑀𝐻
1 ) to 
𝑀𝐿
600  (𝑀𝐻
600 ) and almost close to zeros in 𝑀𝐿
4000  (𝑀𝐻
4000 ) for while the diagonal entries 
approach 1.0, which reflects the time-dependent decrease in aftershock hazard. As expected, 
consistently considerable higher transition probabilities are found at the corresponding entries 
for the high-seismicity fault over the low-seismicity one. It is noted that these matrices only 
reflect the stand-alone transition probabilities during the very short time step (0.05 day).  
 
 
  
 
 
101 
Table 6-3. Markov transition matrix 𝑀𝐿
1 (unit: 10−3)  
DS 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
0 807 135 38.1 9.17 4.628 1.826 0.779 0.459 0.561 0.250 0.276 1.191 
1  922 47.1 13.11 7.308 3.053 1.368 0.877 0.955 0.445 0.525 1.438 
2   979 10.06 4.695 1.795 1.294 0.665 0.623 0.359 0.270 1.792 
3    979 8.497 4.383 2.097 1.474 0.866 0.923 0.203 2.096 
4     980 8.350 3.614 1.882 2.398 1.267 0.689 2.423 
5      978 9.912 5.084 2.071 1.738 0.711 2.878 
6       973 10.48 5.770 2.413 2.738 4.832 
7        980 7.568 3.149 3.058 5.692 
8         963 6.709 6.640 22.75 
9          961 4.983 26.60 
10           973 33.64 
11            1000 
 
Table 6-4. Markov transition matrix 𝑀𝐿
600 (unit: 10−6) 
DS 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
0 106 199 56.50 13.57 6.851 2.703 1.153 0.679 0.831 0.370 0.409 1.763 
1  106 69.79 19.41 10.81 4.519 2.025 1.299 1.414 0.659 0.777 2.128 
2   106 14.89 6.950 2.657 1.916 0.984 0.922 0.532 0.399 2.652 
3    106 12.57 6.488 3.104 2.183 1.282 1.366 0.300 3.103 
4     106 12.36 5.351 2.786 3.550 1.875 1.020 3.587 
5      106 14.67 7.526 3.066 2.573 1.053 4.261 
6       106 15.52 8.541 3.572 4.053 7.152 
7        106 11.20 4.661 4.527 8.426 
8         106 9.931 9.829 33.69 
9          106 7.376 39.38 
10           106 49.81 
11            106 
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Table 6-5. Markov transition matrix 𝑀𝐿
4000 (unit: 10−7) 
DS 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
0 107 257 72.87 17.51 8.836 3.486 1.487 0.876 1.071 0.477 0.527 2.273 
1  107 90.01 25.03 13.95 5.829 2.612 1.675 1.824 0.850 1.002 2.745 
2   107 19.21 8.963 3.427 2.471 1.269 1.189 0.686 0.515 3.421 
3    107 16.22 8.368 4.004 2.815 1.653 1.762 0.387 4.003 
4     107 15.94 6.901 3.594 4.579 2.419 1.316 4.626 
5      107 18.92 9.707 3.955 3.318 1.358 5.496 
6       107 20.02 11.01 4.607 5.228 9.225 
7        107 14.44 6.012 5.839 10.86 
8         107 12.80 12.67 43.45 
9          107 9.513 50.80 
10           107 64.24 
11            107 
 
Table 6-6. Markov transition matrix 𝑀𝐻
1  (unit: 10−3)  
DS 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
0 294 477 154.6 35.89 17.41 6.634 2.774 1.561 1.971 0.863 0.951 3.871 
1  690 191.9 52.48 28.36 11.51 5.053 3.138 3.484 1.598 1.883 4.680 
2   921.0 39.46 17.78 6.485 4.707 2.317 2.158 1.270 0.907 5.927 
3    922.0 33.30 16.86 7.847 5.492 3.162 3.427 0.660 7.165 
4     923.5 32.85 13.93 7.070 9.331 4.785 2.541 8.595 
5      915.2 39.00 19.92 7.982 6.676 2.563 9.742 
6       898.5 41.01 22.65 9.418 10.77 17.62 
7        924.9 29.69 12.31 12.06 21.00 
8         860.1 26.39 25.63 87.80 
9          853.1 19.08 102.9 
10           897.0 127.7 
11            1000 
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Table 6-7. Markov transition matrix 𝑀𝐻
600 (unit: 10−6) 
DS 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
0 106 70.73 22.88 5.314 2.578 0.982 0.411 0.231 0.292 0.128 0.141 0.573 
1  106 28.41 7.770 4.199 1.705 0.748 0.465 0.516 0.237 0.279 0.693 
2   106 5.843 2.633 0.960 0.697 0.343 0.320 0.188 0.134 0.877 
3    106 4.930 2.497 1.162 0.813 0.468 0.507 0.098 1.061 
4     106 4.863 2.063 1.047 1.381 0.708 0.376 1.272 
5      106 5.774 2.949 1.182 0.988 0.379 1.442 
6       106 6.071 3.354 1.394 1.595 2.609 
7        106 4.396 1.823 1.786 3.109 
8         106 3.907 3.795 12.99 
9          106 2.825 15.24 
10           106 18.91 
11            106 
 
Table 6-8. Markov transition matrix 𝑀𝐻
4000 (unit: 10−7) 
DS 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
0 107 912 295.1 68.53 33.24 12.666 5.297 2.979 3.764 1.648 1.816 7.392 
1  107 366.4 100.2 54.16 21.98 9.648 5.991 6.653 3.051 3.595 8.936 
2   107 75.357 33.95 12.38 8.987 4.424 4.121 2.425 1.731 11.31 
3    107 63.58 32.20 14.98 10.48 6.037 6.544 1.259 13.68 
4     107 62.72 26.61 13.49 17.81 9.136 4.851 16.41 
5      107 74.47 38.03 15.24 12.74 4.894 18.60 
6       107 78.30 43.25 17.98 20.57 33.65 
7        107 56.70 23.50 23.03 40.09 
8         107 50.39 48.94 167.6 
9          107 36.43 196.5 
10           10
7 243.9 
11            107 
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A vector representing the initial distribution of the building damage states are needed to 
start the Markov process. For the case where the damage state right after a mainshock is known 
for sure, 1 is assigned at the entry corresponding to the specific damage state and 0’s for all the 
other entries. A predefined distribution representing the partial belief with the uncertainty of 
the damage states could also be an alternative option when desired. In the following section, 
only the former scenario is considered. Using the low-seismicity fault for illustration, the initial 
damage state of the building right after a mainshock could be assigned as 𝑝𝐿,0
0 = 1 (or 𝑝𝐿,5
0 =
1) and the rest 0’s in Equation 5.9, indicating the building remains intact (or suffers the PSDR 
of 2.5%) in the mainshock. 
6.4.2 Considering Recovery by Repair  
The matrices of the Markov process in Section 6.4.1 only have the diagonal and upper-
triangular entries as they exclude the scenarios where the damaged buildings recover from a 
higher damage state to a lower one, but this could happen when the repairs are performed. To 
effectively account for such possibilities, the Poisson process is used to simulate the event of 
transition between building-level damage state triggered by the repairs. For any given damage 
state higher than DS-1 (inclusively) but lower than DS-8 (inclusively), a damaged building is 
assumed to be able to recover to any lower damage state bounded by DS-0 (inclusively).  Given 
the property of the Poisson process, the time interval of the occurrence of any two events 
follows an exponential distribution. The daily rate of an event where the building is recovered 
from higher DS- 𝑖  back to a target lower DS-𝑗  is then assumed to be the inverse of the 
corresponding expected times obtained from Section 6.3.2. The transition probability from a 
higher DS-𝑖 back to a target lower DS-𝑗 for time step 𝑠 is denoted as  𝜋𝑅,𝑖,𝑗 
𝑠  and defined in 
Equation 6.2. Different with the transition matrix for the progressive damage under aftershocks, 
the transition matrix for repairs is independent of time and thus stationary. 
𝜋𝑅,𝑖,𝑗 
𝑠 = (
1
𝑇𝑖,𝑗
𝑅 ∆𝑡)𝑒
−(
1
𝑇𝑖,𝑗
𝑅 ∆𝑡)
 (6.2) 
where 𝑖 > 𝑗 denote a higher damage state 𝑖 and a lower damage state 𝑗; 𝑇𝑖,𝑗
𝑅  is the expected time 
to retrofit the damaged building from DS-𝑖 back to a target DS-𝑗, and 
1
𝑇𝑖,𝑗
𝑅  is the daily rate of the 
corresponding event; ∆𝑡 is the time step; 
1
𝑇𝑖,𝑗
𝑅 ∆𝑡 gives the rate for the exponential distribution. 
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Table 6-9. Constant transition probabilities for the tall building from certain damage 
state1 back to any lower ones in each time step (unit: 10−6)  
DS 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 609        
2 162 221       
3 51.4 56.1 75.1      
4 27.6 28.9 33.2 59.5     
5 16.4 16.9 18.3 24.2 40.7    
6 12.9 13.2 14.1 17.3 24.5 61.5   
7 11.1 11.3 11.9 14.2 18.7 34.6 79.4  
8 10.2 10.3 10.8 12.7 16.1 26.8 47.5 118 
1The building is assumed to be non-reparable beyond DS-9 (inclusively) 
6.5 Dynamic Programming for Optimal Decision-Making 
Given the Markova process and financial loss assessment for different damage states 
established in previous sections, the optimal action at each time step could be obtained by 
minimizing the financial loss right after a mainshock by considering the entire time period of 
interest. The available actions at each time step are whether to evacuate the building or 
reoccupy the building if previously evacuated and whether to repair the damaged building and 
when to stop if previously started. This ends up with four possible actions: Evacuate & Repair 
(ER), Evacuate & Non-Repair (ENR), Reoccupy & Repair (RR), Reoccupy & Non-Repair 
(RNR). A strict constraint is applied to ensure life safety in addition to the fatality loss already 
incorporated in the objective of financial loss. Damage states beyond DS-9 (inclusively) are 
deemed as unsafe, and the building is forced to evacuate, and no repairs are allowed if the total 
probability of transition into these damage states exceeds a certain threshold. This leaves only 
ENR available for this scenario. However, when the building is evacuated only as a result of 
minimizing the financial loss, ER and ENR are both valid. A time window of 200 days is used 
in the following sections if not otherwise declared. 
A naïve approach to solve for the optimal action at each time step would be enumerating 
all the possible sequences from the start all the way to the end of the time window of interest, 
and then selecting the one gives the minimal financial loss. However, this could be very time 
consuming as the time complexity is exponential. For example, the 4000 time steps each with 
12 damage states and a maximum of 4 possible actions would give a total of (4 × 12)4000 
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distinct sequences to explore, which is not feasible.  As a result, dynamic programming is 
employed to achieve a far more efficient solution, where only linear time complexity is needed. 
This is done by recognizing the fact that we can easily choose the optimal action at time step 𝑠 
if all the optimal actions are already available for all possible building damage states at time 
step 𝑠 + 1. By working backward step by step to obtain the optimal actions and associated 
minimal financial loss, dynamic programming is able to reduce all the repeated calculation in 
the naïve approach. Based on the loss assessment and the Markov process introduced in 
previous sections and the initial work of Yeo and Cornell’s [117], the dynamic programming 
with simplified equations, the action option of repairs and more realistic financial losses is 
finally applied. 
As shown in Equation 6.3, looping over all the possible actions (𝐴𝑖
𝑠) at time step 𝑠 when 
the building starts with DS-𝑖 would give the optimal actions (𝑎𝑖
𝑠,∗) and its associated minimal 
financial losses [𝐿𝑖
𝑠,∗(𝑎𝑖
𝑠,∗)]. For the damaged building in DS-𝑖 at time step 𝑠, 𝐿𝑖
𝑠(𝑎𝑖
𝑠) denotes 
the financial loss from the last time step all the way to the current step 𝑠 if 𝑎𝑖
𝑠 is the action at 
time step 𝑠, which consists of the losses from 1) the building transferring to a higher damage 
state [𝐿𝑇,𝑖
𝑠 (𝑎𝑖
𝑠)], 2) remaining in the same damage state (𝐿𝑁,𝑖
𝑠 ), and 3) the gains when the 
building recovers to a lower damage state [𝑅𝑖
𝑠(𝑎𝑖
𝑠)] if the current action (𝑎𝑖
𝑠) includes repairs. 
These different scenarios are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive and defined 
through Equation 6.4 and 6.6 using recursion, meaning any value at time step 𝑠 is expressed in 
terms of the corresponding one in time step 𝑠 + 1 . For the scenario where the building 
transforms to a higher damage state, Equation 6.4 sums up the financial losses from all possible 
damage states weighted by the transition probabilities at time step 𝑠 (𝜋𝑖,𝑗
𝑠 ). From DS-𝑖 to DS-𝑗, 
it includes a one-time damage-state transition loss [𝑙𝑖,𝑗
𝐵 (𝑎𝑖
𝑠)] given any possible action (𝑎𝑖
𝑠), the 
mean disruption loss [
1
2
(𝑙𝑖
𝐷 + 𝑙𝑗
𝐷)∆𝑡] by assuming the expected arrival time of the transition is 
in the middle of the time step and the discounted minimal financial loss from the higher damage 
state DS-𝑗  (𝐿𝑗
𝑠+1,∗𝑒−𝛼∆𝑡 ). When the building is occupied, the damage-state transition loss 
[𝑙𝑖,𝑗
𝐵 (𝑎𝑖
𝑠)) is obtained by taking the difference of the expected financial losses of the DS-𝑖 and 
DS-𝑗 assessed in Section 6.3.1; however, only 86% of those are used when the building is 
evacuated to exclude the content losses. Equation 6.5 quantifies the expected loss when the 
building remains in the same damage state, including the disruption loss for DS-𝑖 and the 
discounted minimal financial loss from the same damage state (𝐿𝑖
𝑠+1,∗𝑒−𝛼∆𝑡). The potential gain 
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for the repairs defined in Equation 6.6 has similar components with Equation 6.4 with three 
key differences: 1) the additional cost for performing the repair at time step 𝑠 [𝑙𝑅(𝑎𝑖
𝑠)∆𝑡]; 2) 
the one-time damage-state transition gain [−𝑙𝑖,𝑗
𝐵 (𝑎𝑖
𝑠) ] given any possible action (𝑎𝑖
𝑠) , 3) 
transition is only considered from a higher damage state to a lower one. The term 𝑅𝑖
𝑠(𝑎𝑖
𝑠) could 
be simply set to zero if no repairs are considered. Equation 6.7 restricts the action to ENR when 
the transition probability into unsafety damage states exceeds the predefined threshold. 
𝐿𝑖
𝑠,∗(𝑎𝑖
𝑠,∗) = min
𝑎𝑖
𝑠∈𝐴𝑖
𝑠
[𝐿𝑇,𝑖
𝑠 (𝑎𝑖
𝑠) + 𝐿𝑁,𝑖
𝑠 + 𝑅𝑖
𝑠(𝑎𝑖
𝑠)] (6.3) 
𝐿𝑇,𝑖
𝑠 (𝑎𝑖
𝑠) = ∑ 𝜋𝑖,𝑗
𝑠  [𝑙𝑖,𝑗
𝐵 (𝑎𝑖
𝑠) +
1
2
(𝑙𝑖
𝐷 + 𝑙𝑗
𝐷)∆𝑡 + 𝐿𝑗
𝑠+1,∗𝑒−𝛼∆𝑡]
𝑘
𝑗=𝑖+1
 (6.4) 
𝐿𝑁,𝑖
𝑠 = 𝜋𝑖,𝑖
𝑠 (𝑙𝑖
𝐷∆𝑡 + 𝐿𝑖
𝑠+1,∗𝑒−𝛼∆𝑡) (6.5) 
𝑅𝑖
𝑠(𝑎𝑖
𝑠) = 𝑙𝑅(𝑎𝑖
𝑠)∆𝑡 + ∑ 𝜋𝑖,𝑗
𝑠  [−𝑙𝑖,𝑗
𝐵 (𝑎𝑖
𝑠) +
1
2
(𝑙𝑖
𝐷 + 𝑙𝑗
𝐷)∆𝑡 + 𝐿𝑗
𝑠+1,∗𝑒−𝛼∆𝑡]
𝑖−1
1
 (6.6) 
𝐴𝑖
𝑠 ≝ {
{ER, ENR, RR, RNR }, if  𝑃𝑢
𝑠 < 𝑃0
{ENR }, if 𝑃𝑢
𝑠 ≥ 𝑃0
 (6.7) 
where 𝑖, 𝑗 = 0, … ,11 identifies the damage state in time step 𝑠 and 𝑠 + 1; ∗ marks the optimal 
value; 𝛼 denotes the daily discount rate corresponding to an assumed annual discount rate of 
4%; Δ𝑡 is the size of the time step; 𝜋𝑖,𝑗
𝑠  is the transition probability from DS-𝑖 to DS-𝑗 at time 
step 𝑠, where the identification for fault in previous sections is removed for simplification here; 
𝑎𝑖
𝑠 is the action at time step 𝑠 given the building ends in DS-𝑖 from time step 𝑠 − 1; 𝑙𝑖,𝑗
𝐵 (𝑎𝑖
𝑠) is 
the  one-time damage-state transition loss given action 𝑎𝑖
𝑠; 𝑙𝑖
𝐷 (𝑙𝑗
𝐷) is the disruption loss if the 
building is in DS-𝑖 (𝑗); 𝑙𝑅(𝑎𝑖
𝑠) represents the constant daily cost for repairs if 𝑎𝑖
𝑠 ∈ {𝐸𝑅, 𝑅𝑅}, 
otherwise equals 0; 𝑃𝑢
𝑠 is the probability of transition into unsafe damage sates (higher or equal 
to DS-9) and 𝑃0 is the corresponding acceptable threshold. 
In the following sections, the optimal actions and corresponding minimal financial losses 
are obtained following the dynamic programming, where both low- and high-intensity 
scenarios are considered for comparison. Four distinct cases are explored by considering 1) 
safety threshold only, 2) financial loss and safety threshold, 3) financial loss and repair and 4) 
financial loss, safety threshold, and repair. While only the last case applies the full process of 
the dynamic programming introduced earlier, the first 3 ones also give insights into the partially 
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simplified process when deemed appropriate in engineering practices. For all the cases, no 
policy is presented for damage state beyond DS-9 (inclusively) as they are assumed to be unsafe 
and simply be evacuated without question. It is noted that the financial loss is the additional 
loss in the aftershock environment, and the one-time transition loss of the building from intact 
to any damage state already happened and is set aside. The financial loss is the sum of these 
two parts, but only the former is used for decision-making as we can only make arrangement 
for the future. It is important to note that the results of the dynamic programming are only valid 
for the time window considered, and the seismic hazard includes only the aftershock hazard 
following the already occurred mainshock without considering the mainshock hazard in the 
future. For example, the optimal policy in this study might end with stopping the repairs when 
aftershock seismic risk drops significantly and leaving the building with considerable damages; 
however, it could be more beneficial to keep repairing the building to the full recovery state 
when considering any future mainshock hazard.  
6.5.1 Safety Threshold Only  
The seismic risk, which is quantified as the probability of a damaged building transforming 
into unsafe damage sates, is the only constraint for the optimization in this case. The policy is 
simple, i.e., the building remains occupied if the seismic risk always below the threshold or 
will be issuing a permit for reoccupation as soon as the seismic risk drops below the threshold. 
By following this policy, this case, in fact, has no optimization for financial loss.  
The dynamic programming is performed by simplifying Equation 6.3 to  
𝐿𝑖
𝑠,∗(𝑎𝑖
𝑠,∗) = 𝐿𝑇,𝑖
𝑠 (𝑎𝑖
𝑠,∗) + 𝐿𝑁,𝑖
𝑠 , and 𝐴𝑖
𝑠,∗ = 𝐸𝑁𝑅  if 𝑃𝑢
𝑠 ≥ 𝑃0  and 𝐴𝑖
𝑠,∗ = 𝑅𝑁𝑅  otherwise. The 
exceedance rate of 2% in 50 years is used for the seismic design for the Maximum Considered 
Earthquake (MCE) to limit the collapse probability and ensure life safety in the pre-mainshock 
environment. 5 times this rate is adopted by Yeo and Cornell’s [117] to compute the 
corresponding ECR in a much shorter time period of 0.5 days. As collapse is very rare 
compared with the unsafe damage sate and the time step is even reduced to 0.05 day in the 
current study, we further increase the threshold  𝑃0 to 250 times the corresponding rate in 50 
years for MCE in the pre-mainshock environment. Sensitivity analyses regarding this threshold 
are performed in the following sections to better understand its impact on the optimal decision-
making and address any concerns on its assumption.  
As we can see from Fig. 6-10 (a), for all post-mainshock damage states, the optimal 
decision is to evacuate the building right after the mainshock due to the high seismic risk within 
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a certain time period even for the low-seismicity scenario. The waiting time to reoccupy the 
building gradually increases from 6 days for the intact building to 18 days for the damaged 
building of DS-5. A considerably longer time of 32 and 38 days are observed for higher damage 
states DS-6 and DS-7, and a huge jump to 106 days for DS-8. Similar patterns could be found 
for the high-seismicity scenario in Fig. 6-10 (b), but as expected, consistently longer times are 
needed for all damage states before the reoccupancy. For example, the times for DS-0 and DS-
6 rise to 19 and 109 days respectively, while the DS-8 building remains to be evacuated for the 
entire 200 days under consideration.  
  
(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
 
 
Fig. 6-10. (a-b) Actions following the safety threshold policy and (c-d) corresponding 
minimal financial losses for the low- and high-seismicity scenarios within 200 days after 
mainshock, respectively  
Fig. 6-10 (c) shows the financial losses for the low-seismicity scenario given the building 
starts from different damage states under the mainshock. Recall from the backward calculation 
in dynamic programming, these curves start to cumulate from the 200 days and all the way 
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back to right after the mainshock, i.e., the time point we are making these decisions. By keeping 
the ascending order in terms of the damage state throughout the entire time period (except for 
DS-8 for the high-seismicity scenario, which will be discussed later), the curves reach a range 
of 65 to 105 million dollars right after the mainshock for DS-0 to DS-5 and 129, 136 and 185 
million dollars for the last three damage states, respectively. Some sharp drops on the 
cumulative curves are observed at the times corresponding to the reoccupancy as a result of the 
difference between the significant reduction in disruption losses and a moderate increase in the 
fatality loss due to collapse. The larger the difference, the shaper the drop in the slope. As for 
the high-seismicity scenario, Fig. 6-10 (d) gives consistently higher financial losses compared 
with those for the low-seismicity one. A cluster within 155 and 191 million dollars of all 
damage states right after the mainshock. A possible explanation is that the significantly longer 
waiting times to reoccupy the damaged building limit the reduction of disruption losses and the 
higher seismic risk adds to the increase in the fatality loss due to collapse. As a result, the 
differences in the cumulative losses are not obvious. An interesting finding is that the financial 
loss of DS-8 is lower than those of the DS-6 and DS-7. This is because that reoccupying the 
damaged building as soon as the safety threshold is satisfied might not be the optimal action, 
i.e., the increase in the fatality losses due to collapse could already exceed the reduction of 
disruption losses. This is further proved in the next section. 
6.5.2 Financial Loss and Safety Threshold 
This case seeks to use dynamic programming to obtain the optimal action by minimizing 
the financial losses in addition to the enforcement of the safety threshold. This is achieved by 
setting 𝑅𝑖
𝑠(𝑎𝑖
𝑠) = 0  at all times and 𝐴𝑖
𝑠,∗ = {𝐸𝑁𝑅}  if 𝑃𝑢
𝑠 ≥ 𝑃0  and 𝐴𝑖
𝑠,∗ = {𝐸𝑁𝑅, 𝑅𝑁𝑅} 
otherwise. The key difference with Case 1 is that a second thought considering the minimal 
financial losses are conducted before reoccupying the damaged building when the safety 
threshold is satisfied.  
The optimal policies for both low- and high-seismic scenarios versus the elapsed days after 
the mainshock for all post-mainshock damage states are shown in Fig. 6-11 (a) and (b), 
respectively. Again, the optimal actions right after the mainshock are always to evacuate the 
building. This decision is obtained by two independent criteria, the safety threshold, and the 
minimal financial loss, where the former always takes control from the beginning and then 
hands over to the latter. As we can see, the times for evacuation due to the safety threshold in 
Fig. 6-11 (a-b) are identical to those in Fig. 6-10 (a-b); however, considerable additional 
  
 
 
111 
waiting times for reoccupancy are required for all the damage states. For example, the times of 
building closure are elongated by 6-38 days from DS-0 to DS-7 for the low-seismicity scenario. 
Moreover, the building is evacuated for the entire 200 days in Case 2 compared with 106 days 
in Case 1. For the high-seismicity scenario, 19-58 days are added to the total evacuation times 
from DS-0 to DS-5, and those are extended to the end of the 200 days for DS-6 and DS-7. 
Recall from Case 1, this proves that the policy considering only safety threshold is indeed not 
the optimal one. 
  
(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
 
 
Fig. 6-11. (a-b) Optimal actions considering financial loss and safety threshold and (c-d) 
corresponding minimal financial losses for the low- and high-seismicity scenarios within 200 
days after mainshock, respectively 
Fig. 6-11 (c) and (d) show the financial losses for the low- and high-seismicity scenario 
given the building starts from different damage state under the mainshock, where the ascending 
order in terms of the damage state is observed throughout the entire time period. The financial 
losses for the low-seismicity scenario are in the range of 63 to 101 million dollars for DS-0 to 
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DS-5, and 121, 127 and 155 million dollars for the last three damage states, respectively. The 
financial losses for the high-seismicity scenario concentrate from 145 to 183 million dollars, 
which are consistently higher than the previous ones for the low-seismicity scenario. Each of 
the financial losses, in this case, are less than the corresponding one in Case 1. Different from 
the sharp drops found in Case 1, the curves tend to be smooth in this case. This might because 
most of the switches of the actions from evacuation to reoccupancy happen where the trade-off 
between the reduction in disruption losses and the increase in the fatality loss due to collapse 
are very small. 
6.5.3 Financial Loss and Repair 
Case 3 considers the financial loss and the option for repair without enforcing the safety 
threshold, which could be easily applied using dynamic programming by removing the 
constraint in Equation 6.7. All the four actions ER, ENR, RR, and RNR are always available and 
minimizing the financial loss is the only objective. In this case, the action of evacuation and 
repair are independent with each other. As the minimal financial loss serves as the control 
criterion in both Case 2 and Case 3, the evacuation times of the building are identical in these 
two cases [see Fig. 6-11 (a-b)].  
As one can expect from Fig. 6-12 (a-b), the financial losses achieve the minimum across 
the 4 cases, where the ranges of 56-118 million dollars and 131-174 million dollars are 
observed with consistent ascending order in damage states for the low- and high-seismicity 
scenarios, respectively. The significant reduction of the financial loss benefits solely from the 
consideration of repairs.  
No simple pattern could be used to explain the optimal repair periods for the low- and high-
seismicity scenarios shown in Fig. 6-12 (c-d). No repairs are needed for the intact building in 
both scenarios. In Fig. 6-12 (c), the repairs start immediately after the mainshock from DS-2 
to DS-7, but each has a different duration which could be as long as 160 days for DS-7 and as 
short as 100 days for DS-5. The repairs start 2 and 15 days after the mainshock for DS-1 and 
DS-8 respectively. The former continues for 142 days and the latter remains to the end of 200 
days. For the high-seismicity scenario in Fig. 6-12 (d), the repair periods for DS-1 and DS-2 
are postponed by roughly 20 days with similar durations. DS-3 through DS-5 have longer 
durations than those in the low-seismicity scenario. The repairs are delayed by 31-43 days and 
extended to the end of the time window for DS-6 to DS-8. The fact that the repairs do not start 
immediately nor continue to the end of the time window for some damage states is the nature 
  
 
 
113 
of the optimization. The repairs are performed by paying a constant daily cost in exchange for 
the potential benefits to reduce the financial losses: 1) one-time gain when building recoveries 
to a lower damage state, 2) continuing lower expected disruption loss, 3) lower expected 
financial losses of the building with lower damage state in the future and 4) less expected 
fatality loss as the probability of staying or transforming into higher damage states are reduced. 
The repair strategy could vary a lot for different damage states in the aftershock environment 
as a result of the time-dependent interactive relationship among these factors. 
  
(a)  (b)  
  
(c) (d) 
 
 
Fig. 6-12. (a-b) Minimal financial losses considering financial loss and repair and (c-d) 
corresponding optimal repair periods for the low- and high-seismicity scenarios within 200 
days after mainshock, respectively 
6.5.4 Financial Loss, Safety Threshold and Repair 
Case 4 is the final case which incorporates the financial loss, safety threshold, and repair 
and employs the complete version of the dynamic programming. The key difference with Case 
3 is that both the reoccupancy and repairs are allowed only when the safety threshold is satisfied 
  
 
 
114 
to guarantee the life safety of the residents as well as workers. Similarly, the evacuation times 
are controlled by the optimal financial loss controls over the safety threshold for all damage 
states and are identical to those from Case 2 and 3.  
As a result of the trade-off between safety and financial losses, some increases in the 
optimal financial losses are found for different damage states in both the low- and high-
seismicity scenarios in Fig. 6-13 (a) and (b) due to the enforced delay of repairs. The ranges of 
57-144 million dollars and 135-183 million dollars are observed with consistent ascending 
order in damage states for both scenarios, respectively.  
  
(a)  (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
 
 
Fig. 6-13. (a-b) Minimal financial losses considering financial loss, safety threshold, and 
repair and (c-d) corresponding optimal repair periods for the low- and high-seismicity 
scenarios within 200 days after mainshock, respectively 
Fig. 6-13 (c) and (d) present the optimal repair periods for Case 4. Again, no repairs are 
needed for the intact state. For most of the damage states, the repairs start as soon as the safety 
  
 
 
115 
threshold is satisfied, such as DS-1 to DS-7 for the low-seismicity scenario and DS-1 to DS-5 
for the high-seismicity one. However, the repairs are postponed for a few days even after the 
safety threshold is satisfied for DS-8 and DS-6 to DS-7 in the low- and high-seismicity 
scenarios, indicating the minimal financial losses govern these times. No repairs are ever 
performed for DS-8 in Fig. 6-13 (d) as the building remains evacuated and controlled by the 
safety threshold for the entire time window. It is found that although start at different times, 
the repairs for the same damage state in the two cases end at a similar time. This might because 
it is not economically optimal to pay constant repair cost when the aftershock seismic risk drops 
significantly in a certain period after the mainshock, which is true in both cases. 
6.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
It is important to understand and quantify the impact of key parameters on the optimal 
policy and the minimal financial losses obtained from the previous analyses. Independent 
sensitivity analyses are conducted in this section for five parameters: time window, safety 
threshold, fatality loss, disruption loss, and repair cost. Only the low-seismicity scenario is 
considered in this chapter. Instead, two damage states, DS-2 (PSDR=1.0%) and DS-6 
(PSDR=3.0%), are used for comparison. 
6.6.1 Time Window  
As shown in Fig. 6-14 (a), the financial losses for all damage states increase monotonically 
as the time window rises from 20 days to 300 days. As expected, the curves of the DS-0 and 
DS-8 serve as the lower and higher bounds. The curves cluster when the time window is small 
and spread out when it gets large. This is because more potential damage state transition of the 
damaged building is considered, leading to more customized optimal policies used for different 
damage states in a longer period. While the ascending order in terms of the damage state is 
nicely held, a cross of DS-6 and DS-7 is found near the time window of 125 days. This might 
because the evacuation time required by the safety threshold exceeds that by the minimizing 
financial losses for DS-7 within a certain time window. Fig. 6-14 (b) depicts the optimal 
waiting time for reoccupancy of different damage states as time window changes. For any 
damage state, this time is certainly bounded by the time window, and then decided from the 
safety threshold and minimal financial loss. The latter takes control for the damage state below 
DS-3 (inclusively) and DS-7 (inclusively) when the time window is taken as 20 days and 80 
days respectively. For DS-8, the time window controls up to 260 days. 
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(a) (b) 
 
 
Fig. 6-14. (a) Minimal financial losses and (b) optimal waiting times for reoccupancy in 
different time windows 
The variation of the start and end of the repair process during aftershock environment is 
shown for post-mainshock DS-2 and DS-6 in Fig. 6-14 (c) and (d), respectively. As we can see, 
the safety threshold and minimal financial loss always control rather than the time window. For 
DS-2, no repairs are performed when the time window is less than 40 days, and the optimal 
repairs start consistently at 10 days after the mainshock but with longer durations as the time 
window increase beyond 60 days. The fact that the repairs do not continue to the end of the 
time window might because the aftershock seismic risk drops significantly in a certain period 
after the mainshock and it is not economically optimal to pay constant repair cost after that. 
Similar results are found for DS-6 but with longer waiting time before repairs and shorter 
duration at each time step. The longer waiting time is because the higher aftershock seismic 
risk is higher for DS-6 and take more time to get below the safety threshold needed to start the 
repairs. Recall from Table 6-9, for a given target lower damage state, the higher an initial 
damage state, the lower the transition probability. Moreover, for a given initial damage state, 
the constant transition probability into a lower damage state drops fast as the target damage 
state goes lower. For example, the transition probability is 6.15 × 10−4 from DS-6 to DS-5 
while is only 1.29 × 10−5 from DS-6 to DS-0. These indicate that performing the repairs with 
the same constant cost, a lower damage state is more economically beneficial compared with a 
higher damage state in terms of the expected financial gain defined in Equation 6.6. The benefit 
of the repair for higher damage state is more to reduce the probability of the collapse of the 
damaged building such that the fatality loss is limited rather than to recover the building to 
lower damage states. As a result, even though start later, the repairs for a higher damage state 
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(DS-6 in this case) could end earlier as the collapse risk drops significantly after a certain 
period. 
  
(a) (b) 
 
 
Fig. 6-15. Optimal repair periods for (a) DS-2 and (c-d) DS-6 in different time windows 
6.6.2 Safety Threshold 
The safety threshold range defined as the daily transition rate into the unsafe damage states 
is increased from 5.5 × 10−7 to 5.5 × 10−4 for the sensitivity analyses, which correspond to 
0.5 and 500 times the daily exceedance rate of the MCE level.  
Three phases of the safety threshold could be divided from Fig. 6-16 (a). In Phase 1, the 
safety threshold governs the financial losses for all damage states when it is small enough such 
that the building remains evacuated throughout the entire time window. This is marked by 
either a linearly sharp descending line (DS-0 to DS-7) or a horizontal line (DS-8). In Phase 2, 
as the safety threshold increases, it gradually releases the control of evacuation to the minimal 
financial loss from the lower damage state to the higher ones. The switching point is around 
8.2 × 10−5. However, the safety threshold in this phase still governs the start of the repairs 
after the mainshock, as depicted by the gradually descending lines in Fig. 6-16 (a). In Phase 3, 
the safety threshold is so large such that it never governs any decision at any time, thus the 
minimal financial loss each damage state simply remains the same. It is noted that curves of 
DS-6 to DS-8 are approaching but have not yet reached phase 3 at 5.5 × 10−4. Similar phases 
are observed in Fig. 6-16 (b) for the waiting times for reoccupancy of different damage states, 
but Phase 2 and Phase 3 are actually merged into a single phase as the optimal evacuation and 
repair times are independent with each other.  
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Fig. 6-16. (a) Minimal financial losses and (b) optimal waiting times for reoccupancy 
with different safety threshold  
Fig. 6-17 (a) and (b) give examples of the optimal repair periods as the safety threshold 
varies for the building in DS-2 and DS-6 after the mainshock, respectively. No repairs are 
performed when the safety threshold is below 8.2 × 10−5, which corresponds to the end of 
Phase 1 defined earlier. As the safety threshold increases beyond this point within the 
considered range, the repairs start from 55 to 10 days and from 26 to 5 days for DS-2 and DS-
6, but consistent end times of 100 days and 143 days are found for them, respectively. 
  
(a) (b) 
 
 
Fig. 6-17. Optimal repair periods for (a) DS-2 and (c-d) DS-6 with different safety 
threshold 
6.6.3 Fatality Loss 
The actions and corresponding financial losses are reoptimized for the fatality loss ranging 
from 1 to 20 million dollars per person. Fig. 6-18 (a) shows the curves of the DS-0 and DS-8 
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serve as the lower and higher bounds, and each curve increases monotonically with decreasing 
slope. Larger changes of minimal financial losses are observed for the lower damage states. 
For example, the minimal financial loss for DS-0 increases from 37 to 98 million dollars while 
it only rises from 133 to 154 million dollars for DS-8. This is because the severely damaged 
building is evacuated for the most part of the time window if not entire, so the fatality loss 
caused by collapse would not be significantly impacted. On the other hand, the trade-off 
between continuing disruption loss and the fatality loss are kept evaluation at each time step 
for slightly damaged building. Fig. 6-18 (b) depicts that the waiting time for reoccupancy of 
each damage state remains constant when the fatality loss per person is below 2 million dollars 
per person, meaning only the safety threshold is controlling. After that, it increases almost 
linearly until reaching the cap of 200 days when the building is simply closed for the entire 
time window due to excessive fatality loss caused by a potential collapse. The higher a damage 
state, the sooner it reaches the cap due to its higher probability of collapse given the same 
aftershock hazard. 
  
(a) (b) 
 
 
Fig. 6-18. (a) Minimal financial losses and (b) optimal waiting times for reoccupancy 
with different fatality costs 
In Fig. 6-19 (a) and (b) show the optimal repair periods as the fatality loss varies for the 
building in DS-2 and DS-6 after the mainshock, respectively. The constant start times are 
controlled by the safety threshold, but long durations from 125 to 153 days and from 53 to 123 
days are assigned as the fatality loss increases for the two damage states respectively.  
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Fig. 6-19. Optimal repair periods for (a) DS-2 and (c-d) DS-6 with different fatality costs 
6.6.4 Disruption Loss 
The influence of changing the cap of disruption loss from 0.1 to 2 million dollars per day 
on the optimal financial loss is explored in Fig. 6-20 (a). It is noted that the cap corresponds to 
the highest damage state where the damaged building collapses. The state-dependent disruption 
loss for any other damage state is computed according to the proportional relationships defined 
in Section 6.3.3. DS-0 and DS-8 serve as the lower and higher bounds. Each curve increases 
monotonically with slightly decreasing slope when the disruption loss is below 0.5 million 
dollars per day. After that, almost linear increases are observed. Significantly more losses are 
added to the higher damage states as longer evacuation times are expected.  
Fig. 6-20 (b) shows how the increase of the cap of disruption loss shortens the waiting time 
for reoccupancy in order to get minimal financial loss. As mentioned in the previous section, 
this is also the result of the trade-off optimization between the disruption loss caused by 
building evacuation and the fatality loss due to collapse. Sharps drops in the waiting times for 
reoccupancy are found for DS-0 to DS-7 when the cap of disruption loss is less than 1 million 
dollars per day, especially below 0.5 million dollars per day. No obvious changes happen after 
1.5 million dollars per day as the evacuation is controlled by the safety threshold, which is 
independent of the disruption loss. A different curve is observed for DS-8, which is initially 
evacuated for the entire 200 days but starts to be reoccupied for some time in the late stage of 
the time window when the state-dependent disruption loss goes over 0.48 million dollars per 
day. 
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(a) (b) 
 
 
Fig. 6-20. (a) Minimal financial losses and (b) optimal waiting times for reoccupancy 
with different disruption losses 
Fig. 6-21 (a) and (b) show that the repair durations increase from 61 to 169 and from 48 to 
137 for DS-2 and DS-6 respectively as the state-dependent disruption loss rises from 0.01 to 
0.2 and from 0.03 to 0.6 million dollars per day. The repairs start immediately at Day 18 when 
the safety threshold is satisfied for DS-6 but slightly delay for the DS-2 when the disruption 
loss is below 0.02 million dollars per day. 
  
(a) (b) 
 
 
Fig. 6-21. Optimal repair periods for (a) DS-2 and (c-d) DS-6 with different disruption 
losses 
6.6.5 Repair Cost 
The repair cost varying from 0.02 and 0.6 million dollars per day is used for the sensitivity 
analysis. As shown in Fig. 6-22 (a), the minimal financial loss of each damage state increases 
until reaching a plateau when the repair cost is so high such that it is never performed for the 
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damaged building. For example, the repairs could save up to 26 and 23 million dollars for the 
building with DS-2 and DS-6 right after the mainshock; however, no gains are observed when 
the repair cost exceeds 0.45 and 0.55 million dollars per day for the two damage states. Fig. 
6-22 (b) confirms the fact that the change of repair cost would not influence the optimal waiting 
times for reoccupancy in all cases, as is discussed earlier. 
  
(a) (b) 
 
 
Fig. 6-22. (a) Minimal financial losses and (b) optimal waiting times for reoccupancy 
with different repair costs 
Very similar behaviors are observed for the repair periods of DS-2 and DS-6 in Fig. 6-23 
(a) and (b). The duration reaches the maximum when the repair cost is the lowest, and keep 
decreasing as the repair cost goes up, until a point that no repairs are performed. The upper 
bound for possible repairs is 0.53 and 0.32 million dollars per day for DS-2 and DS-6, 
respectively.  
  
(a) (b) 
 
 
Fig. 6-23. Optimal repair periods for (a) DS-2 and (c-d) DS-6 with different repair costs 
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6.7 Conclusions 
This chapter focuses on the optimal decision-making in the aftershock environment by 
integrating the aftershock hazard, the residual structural capacity of damaged tall buildings, 
and the expected total financial loss into a time-dependent probabilistic framework based on a 
discrete nonstationary Markov Process. The expected total financial loss includes various 
sources from structural and nonstructural component damages, fatality due to collapse, 
disruption of residence and business as well as potential repair cost. It is defined as the expected 
cumulative loss within a certain time window of interest and obtained by summing up the 
discounted values of all the potential losses in the future. The objective is to minimize the 
expected financial loss and ensure life safety at the same time by the additional constraint 
defined as the transition probability into unsafety damage states. The transition from a higher 
damage state to a lower one, which is previously excluded in Chapter 5, is also considered in 
this chapter to account for the repairs. Two sets of actions after the mainshock are considered 
at any time point: whether to evacuate the building and when to reoccupy the building if it is 
previously evacuated; whether to repair the building and when to stop if the building had been 
retrofitted to a satisfactory state. Dynamic programming is then performed to find the optimal 
actions throughout the entire time period of interest. Sensitivity analyses are finally carried out 
to quantify the impact of the key parameters on the decision-making, including time window, 
safety threshold, fatality loss, disruption loss, and repair cost. 
It is assumed that the damaged tall building is forced to be evacuated and no repairs are 
allowed when the seismic risk is higher than the safety threshold, and all the actions are 
available to minimize the financial loss otherwise. The decision of evacuation/reoccupancy and 
repair/non-repair are always treated independently. Two scenarios are employed for 
comparison using the time-dependent aftershock hazards from a low- and high-seismicity fault, 
respectively. Four difference cases are explored for the dynamic programming by considering: 
1) the safety threshold only, 2) the financial loss and safety threshold, 3) the financial loss and 
repair and 4) the financial loss, safety threshold, and repair.  
Case 1 serves as the baseline where the building is occupied as soon as the safety threshold 
is satisfied. The evacuation time and financial loss increases as the damage states get higher. 
For some severe damage states and high-seismicity scenarios, the damaged building could 
remain closed for the entire time window of interest. Some sharp drops on the financial loss 
curves are observed at the times corresponding to the reoccupancy as a result of the difference 
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between the significant reduction in disruption losses and a moderate increase in the fatality 
loss due to collapse.  
Case 2 shows that given the key parameters used, the control criterion for the evacuation 
time is always the minimal financial loss rather than the safety threshold, meaning additional 
waiting time is needed to reoccupy the damaged building to further reduce the fatality loss for 
the rare event of a collapse. Relatively smoother curves are found in this case, which might 
because most of the switches of the actions from evacuation to reoccupancy happen where the 
trade-off between the reduction in disruption losses and increase in the fatality loss due to 
collapse are very small.  
Case 3 obtained the minimal financial losses for all damage states across all cases as the 
safety threshold is removed such that the repairs could be performed as early as needed. The 
fact that the repairs do not start immediately nor continue to the end of the time window for 
some damage states is the nature of the optimization. The repairs are performed by paying a 
constant daily cost in exchange for the potential benefits to reduce the financial losses: 1) one-
time gain when building recoveries to a lower damage state, 2) continuing lower expected 
disruption loss, 3) lower expected financial losses of the building with lower damage state in 
the future and 4) less expected fatality loss as the probability of staying or transforming into 
higher damage states are reduced. The repair strategy could vary a lot for different damage 
states in the aftershock environment as a result of the time-dependent interactive relationship 
among these factors. 
Case 4 adds the safety threshold to Case3 and is the full application of dynamic 
programming considering all aspects. Most of the start times of repairs are postponed compared 
to Case to ensure the life safety of the worker; however, the repairs for the same damage state 
in the two cases end at the similar time. The is because it is not economically optimal to pay 
constant repair cost when the aftershock seismic risk drops significantly in a certain period 
after the mainshock, which is true in both cases. 
Sensitivity analyses show that all the five key parameters have considerable impacts on the 
optimal actions as well as the minimal financial losses of the decision-making in the aftershock 
environment. A positive correlation is found between the minimal financial loss and all key 
parameters except the safety threshold, the increase of which releases the constraint for the 
optimization. The safety threshold, fatality loss, and disruption loss have significant impacts 
on the evacuation times or the waiting times for reoccupancy, while the time window only 
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serves as a valid higher bound and the repair cost has no influence on it. The duration of the 
repair increases when all the parameters rise except for the repair cost. However, this is 
generally achieved by starting the repairs earlier as the safety threshold increases and ending 
the repairs later when the time window, fatality loss, and disruption loss gets larger. 
The proposed optimal decision-making framework could be used at any time in the 
aftershock environment to provide solid support to the for the stakeholders such as residents, 
earthquake engineers, insurance companies as well as policymakers. However, it is important 
to note that the results in this study are only valid for the time window considered, and the 
seismic hazard includes only the aftershock hazard following the already occurred mainshock 
without considering the mainshock hazard in the future. For example, the optimal policy in this 
study might end with stopping the repairs when aftershock seismic risk drops significantly and 
leaving the building with considerable damages; however, it could be more beneficial to keep 
repairing the building to the full recovery state when considering any future mainshock hazard. 
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CHAPTER 7: Conclusion, Limitations, and Future Work 
7.1 Overview 
The primary objective of this study is to present a series of frameworks for the post-
earthquake performance assessment and optimal decision-making of tall buildings. More 
specifically, a machine learning framework to assess the structural safety is first proposed and 
applied to a low-rise frame building. The methodology is then extended to tall buildings with 
substantial modifications including the adoption of specialized techniques to handle the high-
dimension feature space. Seismic risk assessment is then carried out for the tall building by 
comparing the time-dependent probability of exceeding various response demand limits over a 
pre-defined period using mainshock-only and mainshock-aftershock hazards. The risk-based 
consistency of the EDP-based limit state acceptance criteria is also examined. Finally, a 
framework to support optimal decision-making following the mainshock is formulated to 
minimize the expected financial losses and, at the same time, ensure life safety. The proposed 
prediction model, risk assessment methodology and optimal decision-making strategy provide 
critical insights into the seismic performance of mainshock-damaged tall buildings and useful 
guidance to occupants, structural engineers, insurance companies as well as policymakers. 
7.2 Findings 
The key findings from chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6 are presented in this section. Recall that 
Chapter 3 presented the structural modeling, probabilistic seismic hazard analysis and ground 
motion selection for tall buildings with core walls and special moment frames, which laid the 
foundation for the analyses in Chapters 4-6. 
7.2.1 Chapter 2: Machine Learning Framework for Assessing Post-Earthquake 
Structural Safety 
Previously developed post-earthquake structural evaluation methods have based the safety 
state criteria on the exceedance of pre-defined response demand levels or damage state ratios 
within individual structural component groups. In contrast to these prior approaches, the 
outcome of the proposed framework consists of classification trees, each comprising of a high-
dimension space of response and damage patterns partitioned into multiple subspaces. Given 
an arbitrarily observed pattern for a damaged structure, each tree is intelligently searched to 
find the matching subspace, which will serve as the basis for classifying the safety state of the 
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structure. The result is a discrete probability distribution of the structural safety state, which 
serves as an indicator of the confidence of the prediction.  
The application of the proposed methodology to a 4-story reinforced concrete special 
moment frame building showed that the predictive models trained using machine learning 
algorithms can provide predictions with high performance in terms of accuracy, sensitivity, 
and specificity. Relatively high sensitivity is also observed in the prediction models developed 
for the case study, which is critical for reducing the rate of high-risk erroneous predictions i.e. 
model predicts safe when the building is unsafe. The proposed framework could be used to 
conduct rapid probabilistic assessments of whether a damaged building is safe to reoccupy 
following an earthquake. Additionally, the trees generated by the machine learning algorithms 
could be used to prioritize field inspections following an earthquake. Moreover, the 
probabilistic safety state predictions could be used in community resilience evaluations and 
individual building life-cycle performance assessment and optimization. 
7.2.2 Chapter 4: Pattern Recognition Approach to Assess the Residual Structural 
Capacity of Damaged Tall Buildings 
Pattern recognition models are constructed for the different EDP groups built on a 
significantly smaller (compared to the raw data) feature space. The global EDPs are observed 
to be strong indicators of the reduction in structural capacity possibly because they are directly 
associated with the CP performance metric. However, only the FBR, CBR and RTS give 
informative predictions and a weak relationship was found between the FCR and CCS and 𝜅𝐶𝑃. 
For FCR, this is likely due to the strong-column-weak-beam principle used to design the 
reinforced concrete frames, which seeks to limit plastic rotation demands in the frame columns. 
As for CCS, it is possible that most of the compressive strains in the shear wall concrete come 
from gravity loads with only small changes resulting from the lateral forces induced by 
mainshocks. While it is useful for feature selection, the predictive performance of LASSO is 
limited because of the highly nonlinear relationship between 𝜅𝐶𝑃 and features. SVM with a 
radial basis function kernel can significantly reduce the root mean square errors using the 
selected features. Moreover, the reserved features can be used when the selected ones are 
unavailable, within minimal loss in the predictive accuracy.  
The proposed methodology provides a rapid link between the structural responses 
measured during an earthquake to the building performance in subsequent events. This 
information can be used to optimize the placement of sensors used to measure such responses 
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and guide engineers performing post-earthquake inspections and assessments of residual 
structural capacity, which can be updated in real-time as structural response data becomes 
available.  
7.2.3 Chapter 5: Seismic Risk Assessment of Tall Buildings Considering Mainshock and 
Aftershock Hazard 
In this study, an aftershock seismic risk assessment is first conducted, which considers the 
case where the mainshock has occurred and the immediate post-mainshock building-level 
damage state is known. Except for CBR, a sharp increase and plateauing of the exceedance 
probability for the EDP limits was observed in the first 3 days when conditioned on an 
immediate post-mainshock PSDR = 0.5%. For the same immediate post-mainshock PSDR, the 
probability of exceeding the CBR limit is consistently high over the 30-day period. This type 
of assessment could inform the timing, cost and duration of repairs after a mainshock has 
occurred. For example, the results from this study showed that delaying repairs for 
approximately the first week after the mainshock could avoid having to perform redundant 
repair work caused by subsequent aftershock damage. 
The mainshock-aftershock risk, which accounts for the uncertainty in the intensity and 
damage caused by both the mainshock and aftershock, is performed and compared with the 
case where only mainshock hazard is considered. The probability of exceeding each EDP limit 
over the 50-year life of the building is computed. When a 2% probability of exceedance in 50 
years is used as the risk threshold for life safety, most of the associated response demands 
(except for CBR) are within the collapse prevention performance criteria when only mainshock 
hazard is considered. However, when the mainshock-aftershock hazard is considered, the 
demand levels for RSDR, FBR and CBR are much higher than the those corresponding to 
collapse prevention performance. Even though the limits set by TBI and LATBSDC are 
targeted towards collapse prevention performance, the implied 50-year exceedance 
probabilities were found to be non-uniform across the various EDPs for the mainshock only 
and mainshock-aftershock case, differing by a factor of 30 in the extreme case. This finding 
highlights the need to develop risk-consistent response demand limits when the acceptance 
criteria are targeted towards a single performance level. 
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7.2.4 Chapter 6: Optimal Decision-Making for Tall Buildings in the Aftershock 
Environment 
In this study, a framework is developed to support optimal decision-making related to tall 
buildings in the post-earthquake environment. Dynamic programming is utilized under the 
following four conditions: 1) only a pre-defined safety threshold is considered, 2) financial 
losses and a pre-defined safety threshold are considered, 3) financial losses and repairs are 
considered and 4) financial losses, a pre-defined safety threshold, and repairs are considered.  
The evacuation time and financial loss increases as the damage states get higher. For some 
severe damage states and high-seismicity scenarios, the damaged building could remain closed 
for the entire time window of interest. Sharp decreases in financial losses are observed at the 
times corresponding to reoccupancy. This is because of the difference between the significant 
reduction in disruption losses and a moderate increase in the fatality loss due to collapse. For 
the adopted parameters, the controlling criterion for the evacuation time is always minimizing 
the financial losses rather than the safety threshold. In other words, additional waiting time is 
needed to reoccupy the damaged building to further reduce the fatality loss for the rare event 
of a collapse. The fact that the repair does not start immediately nor continue to the end of the 
time window for some damage states is an artifact in the optimization. When repairs are 
performed, there is a constant daily cost that is offset by the following: 1) a one-time gain when 
building recovers to a lower damage state, 2) a continuous reduction in the expected disruption 
losses, 3) lower expected financial losses when, in the future, the building is in a  lower damage 
state and 4) less expected fatality loss as the probability of staying in the current state or 
transitioning to a higher damage states is reduced. Because of the time-dependent interactive 
relationships among these factors, the repair strategy could vary significantly.  
All five key parameters have considerable impacts on the optimal actions as well as the 
decision-based minimal financial losses in the aftershock environment. A positive correlation 
is found between the minimum financial loss and all key parameters except the safety threshold, 
which, when increased, relieves some of the optimization constraints. The safety threshold, 
fatality loss, and disruption loss have significant impacts on the evacuation times or the waiting 
times for reoccupancy. The time window only serves as a valid higher bound and the repair 
cost has no influence on it. There is a positive correlation between the duration of the repairs 
and all parameters except for the repair cost. However, an increase in repair duration is 
generally achieved by starting the repair earlier as the safety threshold increases and ending the 
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repair later when the time window, fatality loss, and disruption loss gets larger. It is important 
to note that the results in this study are only valid for the considered time window. Moreover, 
only aftershock hazard is considered because the assumption is that the mainshock has occurred 
and the additional future hazard from additional mainshocks is not considered. For example, 
the optimal policy in this study might end with stopping the repair when aftershock seismic 
risk drops significantly and leaving the building with considerable damage. However, it could 
be more beneficial to continue the repairs so that the building is restored to full functionality 
when considering any future mainshock hazard. 
7.3 Limitations and future work 
The classification of the safe and unsafe damage states in Chapter 2 and the residual 
capacity evaluation in Chapter 4 is entirely dependent on the statistics from the simulations of 
the available seismic hazard, ground motion data, and structural design, etc. There could be 
some bias that undermines the performance. It could be useful to incorporate expert opinions 
from earthquake engineering researchers and engineers into the predictions of the machine 
learning models, for example, following a Bayesian approach. 
Although building-level damage states are used, the calibration simply using PSDR may 
not provide accurate estimation for system-level performance. A potentially better option 
would be using the residual structural capacity proposed in the current study. For example, 
constructing the Markov process in Chapter 5 and optimizing decisions in Chapter 6 based on 
building-level damage states grouped by certain intervals of residual structural capacity rather 
than PSDR. 
The current work can map the damage or response patterns to safe/unsafe state or residual 
structural capacity, but no result is provided on how the relationship would change if one or 
more key structural components are repaired. With this piece of information, we can obtain an 
optimal repair sequence for the damaged building such that it can recover as soon as possible. 
Moreover, this can be then combined with the decision-making framework in Chapter 6 to get 
the optimal actions and repair sequences as time elapses after the mainshock. 
The variation of building structures is not addressed in the current study. To generalize the 
feasibility of the proposed frameworks and methodologies, additional evaluations are needed 
using a set of buildings with different structural configurations and lateral force resisting 
systems.  
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Finally, the analyses used in the current study only incorporated record-to-record 
uncertainty. Prior studies have shown that modeling uncertainty can affect both the dispersion 
and median values of limit-state-based performance metrics. Therefore, for implementation 
purposes, the effect of modeling uncertainty should be incorporated in future work. 
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